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Yugoslavia

International—A UN task force, consisting of 192 officers, arrived in Belgrade on 12 February. TANJUG reports that the officers are reinforcements for the existing 50 members of the peace operation who have been in Yugoslavia since 7 January. Major General Slavko Jovic, member of the Yugoslav State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations, said that the UN officers would consider including several more villages in the UN protection zone, as requested by the governments of western and eastern Slavonia. "It is our wish that the liaison officers establish two or three more new points along the line of the cease-fire," he said.

In a letter to Cyrus Vance, Borisav Jovic, member of the SFRY Presidency, stated that he "unconditionally" accepts the UN plan and expressed his "complete readiness to cooperate," TANJUG reports. In the letter, Jovic wrote that Milan Babic "has been left isolated in his stands and without the support of the highest organ of government of Krajina." Jovic called Babic's resistance "a personal issue which can have no effect on the behavior of the competent organs and citizens."

Serbia—The oppposition Serbian Democratic Party (DS) is demanding that Republican President Slobodan Milosevic resign and calling for new elections. TANJUG reports that the DS blames the currrent leadership for making the citizens of Serbia "the biggest losers in the disintegration of Yugoslavia." Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, head of Serbian Democratic Party, stated that the moment is right for "testing the mood of the people in this legitimate manner."

Romania

Bucharest radio reports that Petre Roman, leader of the National Salvation Front (FSN), commented on the initial results of the 9 February elections, stating that the FSN has received "the first results" of elections in the localities where mayors have been elected. He said that "these results seem promising for the FSN," but we "can expect further stiff competition."

The Democratic Convention held a news conference at the Romanian Democratic Party Headquarters on the partial local election results. Opposition party members "stressed the weight" of these results, "the unity of the opposition forces, and the development of the maturity of the Romanian electorate," according to Bucharest radio. They also pointed to "the need to establish a strict schedule for the parliamentary and presidential elections."

Budapest MTI reports that several Hungarian parliamentarians who monitored the local elections as "international observers" noted the following: "Despite some infringements of the law, local elections in Romania were conducted honestly." "The most striking violation was the breach of the election campaign ban on a number of occasions over two days before the Sunday elections." In addition, "the gravest violation of the election law occurred in Tirgu Mures, where the electoral committee failed to invalidate remaining blank ballot papers before opening the boxes."

Albania

President Alia signed a decree declaring that parliamentary elections will be scheduled for 22 March 1992, ATA reports. Alia claims that the "untimely elections" became a "necessity" given the "new political circumstances" unfolding in Albania. "The new elections should provide the country political stability. They must also provide the progress of economic reform," Alia said.

Poland

Warsaw TV reports that negotiations were held between the government leadership and Solidarity on the decision to increase prices. Commenting on the talks, President Walesa said he considers "the way in which my dear Solidarity demands that the government must withdraw prices" "a great mistake." He stated that "the government introduced the price hikes and it was entitled to do so and no one can take this right away..." "However, no one will take away from the unions the right to demand compensation for this because they cannot afford it..." Labor Minister Jerzy Kropiwnicki remarked that "it closes the era of confrontation between the government and society and marks the beginning of a period when a society's representation" will "participate in decisionmaking."

Alia Signs Decree Setting 22 Mar Election Date

AU1102203692 Tirana ATA in English 1918 GMT 11 Feb 92

["Press Release of President Ramiz Alia"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, February 11 (ATA) - Relying on fundamental constitutional provisions, today I signed the decree declaring the new parliamentary elections, fixing the date of elections on March 22, 1992.

This decree also declares the suspension [passage indistinct] due to the delay in preparing the indispensable juridical conditions, as the approval of the new election law, the creation of central election commission, redivision of the country in precincts etc., acts which according to the law, should be over at least 35 days prior to elections.

It is already known that the political decision to hold untimely elections has been attained since last May agreement which led to the creation of stability government. The parties abided by this decision [words indistinct] made necessary the approach of new elections. The decree I signed today gives the necessary juridical form to this political decision .

The untimely elections became gradually a necessity for the new political circumstances created in Albania. Important changes have taken place since last year elections. New parties have been created. Political democracy has [passage indistinct] speech, faith and organization, movement and communication, can be successfully carried out.

The new elections need a maximum attention and consideration. We cannot go ahead and come out of crisis without a full [passage indistinct], with the People's Assembly down to the power organs in district and countryside.

The new elections should provide the country political stability. They must also provide the progress of economic reform. The end of crisis, the start of a normal work are only THe dawn of a turn expected by all, on whose basis may emerge [passage indistinct] for the future. People need tranquillity and social peace, work, order, and law.

It is already clear that all the problems concerning our people cannot be solved immediately. But the most important thing is to create conviction that Albania will have a future, that reason will triumph over passions, that progress of new Albanian democracy is irrevocable [words indistinct] run the country in a civilized way.

All these make March 22 elections the most important political event of the year, a serious test for the parties and people themselves. They are an appeal for wisdom, honest contest of alternatives, sound reasoning and well thought opinion [words indistinct]. I believe [words indistinct] will make the election campaign be a school of political democracy, which guarantees the participation of people in the poils and free, equal and honest elections. I also believe that the political forces will have the necessary psychological and moral preparation to accept the outcome of elections, whatever it may be. The outcome will be the people's verdict. [words indistinct]

Announcing the day of new elections I want to remind the state organs of the indispensability of their total engagement to ensure the necessary administrative material and technical conditions so that elections be honest, free, to provide [words indistinct] institutions and mass media to be invited in our country to cover all the stages of the election campaign.

I avail myself of the opportunity to appeal on the political forces, working people of press and information, all electors to render their contribution to [words indistinct] after a tiresome year full of political events and troubles, it is to the good of the country that people go to elections having in mind their political convictions and consciousness and not according to the momentary passions [words indistinct].

I assure the people that fully abiding by the constitutional law on the figure and responsibilities of the head of state I will work that all [words indistinct] having equal legal conditions.

Text of Statute Published

AU1202100692 Tirana ATA in English 0905 GMT 12 Feb 92

["Decree of the President of the Republic"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, February 11 (ATA)—Bearing in mind the agreement reached among the political forces in December 1991,

considering the coming elections as an indispensable factor for political stabilisation,for the governing of the country and for the further development of the economic reform,

after getting the opinion of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and of the chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly,

basing on point 9 and 3 of the Article 28 of the Law 7491, dated April, 29, 1991 "On the Main Constitutional Provisions",

I decree:

1. The dissolution of the People's Assembly of the 12th legislature

2. The holding of the new elections to the People's Assembly on March 22, 1992, on Sunday.

3. The Council of Ministers is charged with the task to take all the organisational measures as well as to guarantee the necessary material and financial basis in implementation of the Law 7556, dated February 4, 1992 "On the Elections to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania".

This decree enters into force immediately.

The president of the republic

Ramiz Alia
February 11,1992.

People's Assembly Approves Election Law

AU1102141092 Tirana ATA in English 1036 GMT 11 Feb 92

["From the Law on the Elections to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, February 11 (ATA)—Recently, the People's Assembly approved the law "On the Elections to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania". This law has 94 articles. It says among other things:

The elections for deputies to the People's Assembly are conducted in the territory of the Republic of Albania through general, direct, free and secret ballot. All the Albanian citizens who on the day of the elections are 18 years of age are granted the right to vote. The right to be elected to the People's Assembly as a deputy is granted to all those who on the day of the elections have reached the age of 21, who have Albanian nationality and permanent residence to the Republic of Albania. The deputy to the People's Assembly cannot be at the same time an elected or nominated member to the local power organs, to the organs of state administration and justice. The People's Assembly is made up of no less than 140 deputies. If in the first round of elections none of the candidates wins more than 50 per cent of the valid votes, then a week after, a second round is made in the respective constituency. In this round the candidate who has won the greatest number of the votes is considered the deputy elected. In case the votes are equal, then the lot is used to elect the deputy.

The law underlines that any Albanian citizen can be presented as candidate for deputy as a representative of any party, a party grouping or as independent candidate. The candidate should have the signatures of no less that 400 electors of the respective constituency, who forward him.

The said law explains further on the chapter of the elections list, which says among other things that all the citizens enjoying the right to vote are enrolled in the elections lists. These lists are compiled for every polling center. The Albanian citizens with permanent residence abroad, who will be in the territory of the Republic of Albania until the day of the elections, are enrolled in the elections' lists of their former living countries when they demand this. The participation in the polls of those persons is noted down to their international passports.

Further on the law on the elections continues with the chapter of the constituencies and polling centers, which points out that for the elections of the deputies to the People's Assembly 100 constituencies with an approximately equal number of electors are created, with the chapter on the elections commissions, which stresses that the electoral central commission, the electoral commissions of the constituencies and the commissions of the pollin_ centers are set up to run the elections.

The chapter of the elections campaign points out that this campaign starts with the announcement of the elections' date and closes 24 hours prior to this day. The election campaign is prohibited in the military units and the depoliticised institutions. Likewise, the electoral campaign is prohibited for persons that have no Albanian citizenship.

Then the law on the elections goes on with the chapter of the polls and the voting results, with the expiry of the mandate of the deputy to the People's Assembly, with the penal and administrative provisions and with the latest provision.

The law points out that in the elections can participate as observers parliamentary representatives of the CSCE member states, of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, of the European Parliament and of the other organisations related to the human rights question, representatives of the foreign political movements and parties, as well as individuals invited from the parties and party groupings, representatives authorized by local and foreign organisms specialised in the field of election.

Prime Minister Says Price Controls Inevitable

AU1002152292 Sofia BTA in English 1437 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Tatyana Tsekova report]

[Text] Sofia, February 10 (BTA)—The executive power belongs to the government and it will exercise it, all the more that it enjoys the support of the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov said at today's press conference. He also said he respects the trade unions' right to express opinions on the cabinet ministers and even raise resignation demands but pointed out that whether and when a minister would be replaced does not depend on them.

The prime minister stressed the necessity of rapidly starting small privatization. Mr. Filip Dimitrov explained the fact that the Council of Ministers had not submitted its own privatization bill by saying there was some misunderstanding between the respective parliamentary committees and those of the government. Now the Council of Ministers is working on a privatization bill which, according to the prime minister, should give the administration a free hand in the quick promotion of privatization ensuring at the same time guarantees against secret privatization, against corruption and speculative capital.

Mr. Dimitrov described the government's decision to keep its control over the prices of the 14 staple goods monitored by it as an antimarket but inevitable measure. The prime minister said that this measure would hold back the promotion of market-based economy and the revival of agriculture but it had to be implemented because of the high social cost of the reform. The government does not intend to freeze wages, the prime minister said answering a question.

The government will soon make out a report on its activity in the first one hundred days and will outline its intentions but it is not going to work out a programme different from the election platform of the Union of Democratic Forces. According to Prime Minister Dimitrov the government is coping well with its tasks and has the situation in hand.

Dimitrov: Cabinet Needs 'Free Scope of Action'

AU0702213092 Sofia BTA in English 1950 GMT 7 Feb 92

[Excerpt] Sofia, February 7 (BTA)—"The cabinet needs free scope of action which may be granted by parliament," Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov told Radio Free Europe today. He predicted that the first positive results of the economic reform would become evident next year. The premier urged parliament to adopt a privatization act as quickly as possible.

Asked about the situation in the Balkans Mr. Dimitrov said he believed in the progress of the Bulgarian-Greek relations despite the difference in the two countries' positions as regards the recognition of the Yugoslav republics. He expressed his hope that Greece would interpret Bulgaria's move as a desire to establish good-neighbourly relations in the Balkans.

In a message to the Bulgarian Free Centre President Zhelyu Zhelev praised this organization for its contribution for the provision of "objective and precise information on the developments in Bulgaria during the time of the dictatorship."

Lord Marshall, head of the World Association of Nuclear Operators, told Reuter that the two faulty reactors at the Kozloduy N-Plant could be repaired. His statement contradicts that of a German politician who recently argued that the Soviet-made WWER 440 reactors at Generating Units One and Two should be closed down. The two units have been shut down temporarily.

Mr. Dimitur Ludzhev, minister of defence, and Chinese Ambassador Bai Shoumian discussed the possibilities for cooperation in military economics and medicine.

The number of cases filed at the National Investigation Service has increased by 65 per cent from the same period last year while at the same time almost half of the investigators have left the service, the Central Council of the Union of Investigators announced today, calling on the respective authorities to take prompt action.

Bulgaria does not and will not have petrol in the near future, judging by the reports from the Burgas-based petrochemical plant (the major producer of liquid fuels in this country) saying that the former Soviet Union has failed to make a delivery as a result of which the plant has only 5,000 tonnes of oil. A Bulgarian tanker with 35,000 tonnes of Soviet oil is expected to arrive but things are quite unsettled in the longer term, the plant's director Evtim Tsintsarski told BTA. [passage omitted]

Social Democrats Within BSP Form Faction

AU1102133392 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 6 Feb 92 p 1

[Kameliya Stancheva report: "Social Democrats Within Bulgarian Socialist Party Unite"]

[Text] The Social Democrats within the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] have united and intend to register their faction in accordance with the Law on Persons and Families in the next few days, an informed source reports.

Chavdar Kyuranov will be the leader of the Union for Social Democracy within the BSP. Dimitur Yonchev, Aleksandur Tomov, Filip Bokov, and Velislava Dureva will be his deputies.

Almost 45 members who disagree with the "modern leftist" line of the BSP that prevailed at the party's last congress united around the new idea. However, they will reportedly continue to observe the party statute.

The Socialist organizations in Gabrovo and Veliko Turnovo support the Union, the source said.

Now the BSP Social Democrats await the blessing of the party leadership and rooms at the party's headquarters on Positano Street.

Social Democrats Deny Report

AU1102135992 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 7 Feb 92 p 2

[DUMA PRESS report: "BSP Will Not Split"]

[Text] The informed source was not sufficiently informed, a letter of the municipal councils of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] in Gabrovo and Veliko Turnovo to 24 CHASA and DUMA reads. The letter was written in connection with the 6 February report in the newspaper of the private owners [24 CHASA] under the headline "Social Democrats Within the BSP Unite."

The local party leaders, Boyko Velikov and Ivelin Nikolov, explain that their participation in the Union for Social Democracy does not commit their party organizations "en bloc." A discussion will be conducted in the party and it will clarify the positions of every Socialist and the entire party. Everything else is nothing more than cheap newspaper sensations, the letter points out.

According to the decision of the 40th BSP Congress, the discussion will begin at the 8 February regular plenum of the BSP Supreme Council, Klara Marinova reported at a news conference.

Chavdar Kyuranov, Andrey Lukanov, Aleksandur Tomov, Velislava Dureva, and other participants in the Union for Social Democracy, about which DUMA reported in December, immediately after the congress, confirmed that there will be no split in the BSP or its parliamentary faction.

The union was conceived in accordance with the party statute norms. Its members disagree as to the need to seek legal registration. Today they are holding a meeting.

Foreign Minister Ganev Assesses Balkan Situation

AU1002104592 Sofia BTA in English 0959 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 10 (BTA)—Bulgaria is naturally turned to Europe but our vision of Europe passes through our responsibility in the Balkans, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ganev says in an interview for "DEMOKRATSIYA." In it he dwells on the government's foreign policy in the first 100 days since its coming into office.

Referring to the recognition of the independence of four former Yugoslav republics, Mr. Stoyan Ganev explained that the differences between the Bulgarian politicians were not on the essence of the problem. According to him, the recognition of the republics should have been accompanied by a declaration of the recognition of the existing borders. Our stand is clear and categorical, Bulgaria's recognition of the four republics is also a renunciation of territorial claims, including on Macedonia, and if all Balkan countries do as Bulgaria has done this will have an enormous stabilizing effect on the region, the Bulgarian foreign minister points out.

After the complication of the relations with Greece following Bulgaria's recognition of Macedonia, recently there has been a certain "brightening up," according to Foreign Minister Ganev, and his meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Antonio Samaras in Davos also contributed to this.

In Foreign Minister Ganev's opinion, the time has come to seek additional guarantees for the stability in the Balkan peninsula. The recognition of Macedonia and of the other former Yugoslav republics by the European Community should be accompanied by guarantees for the neighbouring states, Mr. Stoyan Ganev believes.

In his interview he points out that the principle of consolidation of the borders and renunciation of territorial claims is becoming particularly topical now. We should live in European conditions in the Balkans, i.e. in conditions of security. The existing borders, the renunciation of territorial claims, security and the recognition of the present realities in the Balkans with which all should conform should be affirmed in a common Balkan charter. According to Mr. Ganev, to this end it would be useful to hold a "mini-Balkan Helsinki conference" which should be also attended by representatives of countries related to the Balkan region—Hungary, Italy, Austria, Moldova and others.

Referring to the Bulgarian initiative for a trilateral meeting between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, Mr. Stoyan Ganev pointed out that Bulgaria has already achieved certain success: His meetings with the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers in Washington and Davos outlined a common stand on the possibility for starting negotiations between military experts of the three countries to prepare a meeting of the foreign ministers or even a meeting at a higher level.

Foreign Minister Ganev believes that the idea for a Balkan conference would not impede the holding of a trilateral meeting between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey proposed by the Bulgarian foreign minister in November in Brussels. The one does not exclude the other but complements it. Now is the time for regional security, a time for seeking new forms of security and cooperation, the Bulgarian foreign minister believes.

In his interview Mr. Stoyan Ganev says that Bulgaria's idea for taking part in the transportation of the aid of the advanced countries to the Commonwealth of Independent States was received as a practical decision and Bulgaria has already been offered to join a "triangular operation."

Slovak Parliamentary Delegation Pays 3-Day Visit

Examines Cooperation With Ganev

AU1002171192 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Text] On 10 February, Stoyan Ganev held talks with a Slovak parliamentary delegation led by Frantisek Miklosko, chairman of the Slovak National Council, which is visiting Bulgaria.

There are opportunities for cooperation between Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic in the sphere of the economy and in the exchange of experiences in processes such as privatization. Furthermore, this direct cooperation will enrich relations between Bulgaria and the CSFR.

Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev briefed the Slovak parliamentarians on certain basic tasks of Bulgarian diplomacy and more especially on efforts to conduct a European policy in the Balkans, which will act as a stabilizing factor.

The chairman of the Slovak National Council stressed that Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic could cooperate both directly and within the framework of Bulgarian-CSFR cooperation, as well as within the framework of various regional organizations.

Discusses Reform With Zhelev

AU1002205892 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Text] On 10 February President Zhelyu Zhelev received the Slovak parliamentary delegation led by Frantisek Miklosko, chairman of the Slovak National Council, which is visiting in Bulgaria.

Information was exchanged on the reforms in the two countries. It was noted that the two countries have similar problems in the transition from communism to democracy. The necessity of expanding the exchange of information was pointed out; thus one country could avoid mistakes made by the other.

Frantisek Miklosko stressed that Bulgaria is a stabilizing factor in the Balkans and that Slovakia and Czechoslovakia are interested in cooperation with Bulgaria.

Talks With Assembly Leadership

AU1002210092 Sofia BTA in English 1920 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Excerpt] Sofia, February 10 (BTA)—Today the chairman of the Slovak National Council (Slovakia's parliament), Dr. Frantisek Miklosko, had talks in Bulgaria's parliament. The two sides paid special attention to the similarity and the difference between the social and political situation in Bulgaria and Czecho-Slovakia after the overthrowal of the totalitarian regime, the tasks the two countries' parliaments have got to cope with in the new conditions and the tendencies in the one-time opposition formations which now have become ruling ones.

Dr. Miklosko stressed the importance of the interaction between "democratic Bulgarians and Bulgarian Muslims in their common struggle against the communists." He drew a parallel with Slovakia where the ruling coalition enjoys the support of the Hungarian minority. "How should conciliation be achieved in the strongly polarized post-totalitarian societies?" Mr. Stefan Savov, chairman of the Bulgarian National Assembly, answered the guest stressing that there is not and there will never be any witchhunt in Bulgaria. He added that informers and active participants in the so-called "regeneration process" (the coercive change of ethnic Turks' names) are barred from employment in the judiciary.

The opposition intends to seek interaction with the extraparliamentary democratic forces, the prerequisites for it are the economic crisis and certain vestiges of the authoritarian past observed in the Union of Democratic Forces, the MP's [member of parliament] of the Bulgarian Socialist Party told their Slovak colleagues.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] is a universal Bulgarian public political organization which has the status of a party, it is not ethnicity-based, though 95 percent of its membership come from the minorities, the MP's of the DPS explained to the Slovak guests. According to the spokesman for the DPS, Mr. Anal Lyutfi, a proof of Bulgaria's nondiscriminatory approach to the minorities would be their more active inclusion in the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. [passage omitted]

Chairman Reveals Impressions

AU1102204792 Sofia BTA in English 2031 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 11 (BTA)—My first impression of Bulgaria, with which our contacts weakened over the past few years, were the democratic changes, said Mr. Frantisek Miklosko, chairman of the Slovak National Council (parliament), who paid a three day visit to Bulgaria.

President Havel may visit Bulgaria by the end of the mandate of the present Czecho-Slovak authorities. As regards Alexander Dubcek, he has been avoiding visits to the five countries whose troops invaded Czechoslavakia in 1968 before genuine democratic changes take place in them, Mr. Frantisek Miklosko said. But after the actual changes in Bulgaria and the victory of the democratic forces Dubcek may come to Bulgaria, the guest said.

Carnogursky Responds to Dam Agreement Cancellation

AU1202085392 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 10 Feb 92 p 1

["BZ" report: "Slovak Republic Prime Minister's Statement; We Will Complete the Gabcikovo Project"]

[Text] At a briefing following the 7 February Hungarian Government session, a spokesman announced that Hungary will be forced to rescind the international agreement on the construction of hydroelectric projects on the Danube (as we reported in the Saturday issue of SLOVENSKY DENNIK). At a Christian Democratic Movement district assembly in Prievidza, Slovak Republic Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky responded to this news with the following statement:

"Such a decision by the Hungarian Government would be, first, a formal violation of the agreement of 1977, because this agreement is irrevocable and second, a removal of any doubt that the temporary solution is the only way of bringing Gabcikovo into operation, because all the other alternatives require cooperation from the Hungarian side. It is obvious that the Hungarian side is not willing to cooperate.

"Therefore, we will work on the completion of the Gabcikovo project. At the same time, scientific studies on the environmental impact of the project are being analyzed, particularly its effect on underground waters, and other studies are also being processed. An underground waters research project, financed by the EC within the framework of the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program, will be conducted in the very near future. Thus, we are acting very responsibly from the ecological point of view, too.

Dienstbier Discusses German Ties, Arms Exports

AU1102130392 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 6 Feb 92 p 3

[Interview with CSFR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier by Ivana Stepankova; place and date not given: "Capital Does Not Mean Germanization"]

[Text] [Stepankova] The unified Germany is asserting itself more and more on the international scene. The magazine STERN asserts that whoever does not yield to German demands will fall into disgrace in Bonn. What is the foreign minister's opinion on our powerful neighbor?

[Dienstbier] In a new situation, the larger Germany is looking for its role in Europe. I do not see any danger in it because the world is different from what it was 50 or 100 years ago. Germany is a committed member of integrating organizations, such as the EC, NATO, and CSCE. Indulging in reminiscences is rare. It cannot prevail. Of course, such a large country as Germany is watched more closely than smaller countries. Its actions have a greater impact. In principle, I would say, Germany's policy is democratic and European.

[Stepankova] Czechoslovak-German relations have again become a frequently discussed topic, particularly in connection with the signing date of the CSFR-German treaty. What do you think about the atmosphere, three days prior to Chancellor Kohl's visit to Prague?

[Dienstbier] Very often, we confuse things. Articles by Sudeten Germans or the Christian Social Union are being reprinted in connection with the treaty, and we speak about the influx of German capital. I would like to separate these things. The treaty deals with present and future cooperation in specific terms, and it deals with the past only in three sentences. It does so in such a manner that no one can refer to the treaty when asserting historical claims. On Sunday, I spoke with Rau, the minister president of North Rhine-Westphalia (SPD) [Social Democratic Party], Minister Genscher (Free Democratic Party of Germany), and Lambsdorff, chairman of this party. All of them said unequivocally that their parties would not vote for any resolution in the Bundestag that would go against the spirit of the initialed treaty. No resolution can pass without these two parties. Even if it did pass, then it would be a bad political gesture, but it would have nothing to do with the treaty, since a parliamentary resolution can only expresses an opinion—it is not a law.

[Stepankova] It is the opinion of some Sudeten German functionaries that President Benes caused their countrymen to be deported in 1945. They even want to organize a conference on this subject. Has the CSFR considered the abrogation of Benes' decrees?

[Dienstbier] Czechoslovakia has never considered the abrogation of Benes' decrees. It is not considering it, and I cannot imagine what kind of people would have to rise to power in order for us to be able to even think about it.

[Stepankova] Recently, there have been a large number of reports saying that German capital is planning an economic offensive against the CSFR. Do you see such a threat?

[Dienstbier] We still have too little capital in our country and there is no threat of Germanization. For a long time, this capital has not been purely German capital, it is rather international capital. From the very beginning, I am personally trying to achieve the diversification of foreign capital in our country. This is why we held talks with the "Asian tigers", the Japanese, and with French, English, and U.S. companies. When people in the United States or France complain that there is too much German capital in our country, then I reply: It is your fault. While you are constantly waiting for the situation to come back to normal here, the Germans and Austrians are taking risks. With Ministers Dobrovsky and Vavrousek, we are trying to push through a 21st century project in which U.S. and Canadian capital would participate to build a large international airport in Milovice. It would be a long-term investment, for 15 to 20 years, worth at least 20 billion dollars.

U.S. Defense Minister Cheney sent a group of experts specializing in the transformation of military airports to civilian airports to our country. They inspected the terrain and appreciated its great strategic importance. They said the project was an exceptional chance for Czechoslovakia. The project should create a large number of jobs and offer a program for enterprises within the framework of conversion. The project would be economically and ecologically meaningful and would contribute to the diversification of capital in our country. The project could be a driving force for our economic reform and a stimulus for our common state.

[Stepankova] Chancellor Kohl gave a personal order to stop the German ship that was carrying a consignment of Czechoslovak tanks. It seemed to Prime Minister Calfa that many circumstances were strange, particularly the timing.

[Dienstbier] In this situation, I do not want to comment on the timing. It is an internal matter for the German administration to stop a German ship on German territory, if the ship violates German law. When conducting business, our enterprises should know how to conduct it. When an enterprise argues that it does not know German law, then it shows that it does not have great skills. Unfortunately, the press is busy writing about the 16 tanks and does not pay attention to the substance of the matter.

We do not have any law that would regulate the export of military technology and define the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of the Federal Ministry of Trade. We have no consistent idea about conversion, either. The military know very well what weaponry we need to manufacture in order to modernize our defense system. The commission, involving various sectors, that approves arms exports has only an advisory role. The Federal Foreign Ministry has only one vote in it. They have to take into account economic interests at a given time.

Contracts that are submitted to the commission are virtually finished contracts. Moreover, there have been allegations that our economic and commercial relations are influenced by our arms exports. For example, we will receive an order for a power station or cement factory only on the condition that tank exports will be permitted. At the same time, the situation is complicated by the fact that the republics' jurisdiction is unclear and because we have a national problem. Our administration is unbelievable in that matter.

Mr. Glezgo is the chief of the commission for the arms trade and a deputy. He issues export licenses. The legislative, executive, and supervisory powers are thus concentrated in one person. This is a rarity in the world. The same people work in this line of business for many years—people from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade, Omnipol, and people in industry. We simply must adopt a new concept for the export of Czechoslovak arms, a concept that would be in harmony with our concept for the defense of the state, conversion, and our foreign policy.

As long as there are no firm rules, and we act under the pressure of circumstances, and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have the same authority as is usual in other countries, we will achieve nothing. We will have to face situations and problems such as those we encountered in the case of tank exports to Syria. This is in direct contradiction to the interests of our state.

Tank Shipment Allowed To Leave Denmark for Syria

AU1202135992 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 10 Feb 92 p 14

[CSTK report: "Tanks Allowed To Leave Denmark"]

[Text] Copenhagen— On 8 February a court in Copenhagen allowed the Danish Nadja J freighter, which is loaded with 12 Czechoslovak tanks and 186 tonnes of ammunition, to leave the port of Soeby for Syria. This was announced by the French AFP agency. This ruling by a court of appeal upheld Friday's verdict of a local court at Rudkoebing that the cargo on board the Nadja J does not violate Danish laws that ban arms exports to some high-risk regions.

The freighter, which belongs to the Danish N.H.H. Hansen shipping company, left the Polish port of Szczecin 10 days ago. At the beginning of last week it was towed away from the Kattegat Strait, where it had run aground, to the port of Soeby on the Danish island of Aero where it was subsequently impounded.

The Danish Ministry of Justice did not want to become reconciled to the local court's verdict and appealed against its ruling that the freighter be allowed to leave. Even though Syria is in a high-risk region, it is not explicitly named on the list of countries that are subject to the Danish ban on arms exports.

The owners of Nadja J have announced that they will seek 100,000 Danish crowns ($16,300) damages for losses incurred as a result of the freighter's impoundment.

'Distorted' Report on Nuclear Safety Standards Denied

LD1202044192 Prague CSTK in English 1644 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Bratislava Feb 11 (CSTK)—A spokesman for a nuclear power station in Slovakia today labelled as distorted a report that its nuclear reactors do not meet current security requirements.

REUTER news agency in a story released February 6 said Soviet-designed Tver 230 reactors, including two located in Jaslovske Bohunice, west Slovakia, do not meet safety standards. The story was thought to have

been based on a report released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Press secretary for the state-owned Slovak energetics enterprise (SEP), Juraj Sidor, said talks between the power station and the IAEA produced no new recommendations for the station which were not covered by the station's work plan for 1991-92.

Dienstbier Views Changing European Security Needs

AU1002134092 Prague CSTK in English 2053 GMT 7 Feb 92

[Text] Prague Feb 7 (CSTK)— "Since the very beginning of our government I have been asserting the idea that the fundamental strategy for European, and thus also our security rests in expanding the zone of democracy and prosperity as eastwards as possible," Jiri Dienstbier says in LIDOVE NOVINY today.

Returning to the January 30-31 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Prague, the Czechoslovak foreign minister says the iron curtain has disappeared more quickly than expected. "That is why many (people) have difficulties in getting used to the demise of the divided world in which danger was predictable and controllable." After long months, the fact has been comprehended that "security of the West, too, now may depend more than ever before on what is going on in Central and Eastern Europe, and also in Asia," Dienstbier says.

"Struggle for European security is now being waged in the Balkans just as in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Central Asia. It was very pleasant to see how representatives of these countries want to accede to all documents adopted within the Helsinki process thus far, including pacts on human rights, on the rights of national minorities, and the commitment not to change borders by force," Dienstbier says. But he warns that "it will be very difficult to assert all of this, somewhere even to comprehend, and failures cannot be ruled out either."

That is why Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev just as representatives of some other new republics called at the meeting not for non-interference, but on the contrary for interference in their countries' internal affairs, in order to support, if not save the fragile emerging democracy and prospect of prosperity, Dienstbier says.

"If these democracies collapsed and nationalist, military, religious, or other dictators came to power" a new division of the world into prospering democracies and countries impoverished under authoritative regimes would follow, Dienstbier says.

Baksay Responds to Conflict of Interest Charges

AU1002134292 Prague CSTK in English 1953 GMT 6 Feb 92

[Text] Prague Feb 6 (CSTK)— Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Minister Jozef Baksay today abolished three privatization investment funds founded by an organization controlled by the ministry and engaging its officials on their supervisory boards, the Czech independent leftist daily RUDE PRAVO reported today. Baksay's decision came in reaction to growing concern about state officials' engagement in the management of privatization funds which was prohibited by a government decree issued last April.

About 400 privatization investment funds have been founded in Czechoslovakia in connection with the first wave of privatization in which state property worth 260,000 million crowns (8,700 million USd) is to be turned to private owners, partly by the sale of coupons to Czechoslovak citizens—future shareholders. Many people entrust their coupons to investment funds.

On January 31, the daily published the results of its investigation at the Czech Privatization Ministry showing there were at least 46 government officials engaged in the funds' management, including five parliament deputies and three deputy ministers. The daily writes today that "the conflict of interests of people holding seats both on the funds' supervisory boards and at ministries can be solved by only one way—they must leave one of their seats." It recalls that Economics Minister Vladimir Dlouhy ordered his subordinates to decide within one week while Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus gave them time till the end of February.

Slovaks Deny Defiance of Conversion Program

AU1202093992 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 7 Feb 92 p 2

[Lubo Rabay, Jozef Supsak report: "Conversion Behind the Curtain"]

[Text] Bratislava— Karol Fajth, press secretary to the Slovak minister of international relations, yesterday labeled the "sensational" revelations by the periodical RESPEKT about trade in heavy military equipment as investigative journalism in the service of money.

The tanks from the Martin Heavy Engineering Works currently being exported to Syria are part of a deal that has been proper and legal from the very beginning and, what is more, has never been concealed. Turning this deal into a scandal serves ulterior motives. Commenting on the statement made by Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Martin Porubjak in "The Week in Review" program on television that the arms industry lobby, in conjunction with some political forces, seeks the Slovak Republic's secession from the CSFR in order to be able to resume arms trading, Karol Fajth said that, apparently, Martin Porubjak has "dropped an impenetrable theater curtain" between himself and the reality generated by the intense pace of conversion in

Slovakia [allusion to Porubjak's original profession as artistic director of a Slovak theater].

Representatives of the Slovak Ministry of Economy and of the Martin Heavy Engineering Works who attended the briefing confirmed that the program of conversion in Slovakia is being implemented to the full extent and at the planned pace. By 1995, arms production in Slovakia is to drop to 15 percent of its level in 1988 and privatized enterprises may give up arms production completely. Arms production is viewed as a production branch that has no prospects in the long term and an intensive search for alternative production programs is under way. The speed of conversion is too precipitate, however, as no other country has implemented conversion at this pace. This has been confirmed by foreign experts dealing with Slovak conversion within the framework of international aid projects. There was also apprehension expressed at yesterday's briefing, which was held on the occasion of the upcoming CSCE international seminar on the conversion of the arms industry in Bratislava, about whether it was correct to provide some foreign experts with such detailed information on production in our enterprises.

Meciar Fears Arrest, View Post-Election Scenario

AU1002113592

[Editorial Report] Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech on 4 February on pages 1 and 3 carries a 1,400-word interview with Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), by Josef Zalesak, entitled "You Do Not Jump Off a Tiger." In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Meciar expresses, among other things, concern at possible attempts to "suppress the HZDS," including the "arrest" of leading HZDS representatives. Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 6 February on page 2 carries a 600-word CSTK report entitled "Second Stage of the Revolution?" The report deals with an "informal meeting" with Vladimir Meciar held in the House of Slovak Culture in Prague on 5 February. At the meeting Meciar discussed, among other things, his ideas concerning developments after the June 1992 parliamentary elections, which Meciar expects will be won by the HZDS.

In the bulk of the SVOBODNE SLOVO interview, Meciar reacts to the many accusations being leveled against him in the media. He refers to the "conspiratorial roles being foisted" upon him, such as that he is "an StB [secret police] and KGB agent, a cryptocommunist, a person who does not sufficiently combat fascism and anti-Semitism, an extended arm of Soviet generals, and, most recently, according to MLADA FRONTA DNES, a subversive element." Meciar dismisses all these assessments as being politically motivated, caused by the fact that "some circles in Prague evidently consider me to be one of the people posing the greatest threat to their interests in Slovakia." Meciar says that he views these attacks as one of the risks that the profession of a politician entails and that he will not let himself be deterred by them: "When you are riding on a tiger, you have no choice but to keep riding. You cannot jump off," he says.

Meciar also reiterates that he is not opposed to the "coexistence of Slovaks with Czech and Moravians" but that "it is necessary to find a new form of coexistence, based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and self-determination."

The SVOBODNE SLOVO interview includes the following passage:

[Zalesak] "What is your perception of the viability of the Slovak emancipatory process?"

[Meciar] "This process is historically irreversible. It is impossible to put an end to it by means of a pseudo 'treaty' that would lower Slovakia's status to that of a semi-autonomous and semi-sovereign entity. Our principle is to arrive at a solution by way of agreement, by peaceful means, without great material losses and human suffering. We will therefore hold discussions and explore further paths toward agreement. We would consider it very unfortunate if someone regarded a concept differing from his own as a catastrophe and resorted to a one-sided step or to the attempt at an Army or security forces' intervention aimed at reversing the situation in Slovakia. This would only suppress the situation and would be followed by an even greater explosion, bearing the risk of a possible counter-reaction."

[Zalesak] "What makes you engage in such skeptical contemplations?"

[Meciar] "It is, among other things, the experience from the period prior to the last parliamentary elections. It cannot be ruled out that the same circles and offices that had triggered the Bartoncik affair [reference to the exposure of the then Czechoslovak People's Party chairman's past as an StB agent 48 hours before the elections] will launch new operations aimed at persecuting and discrediting other persons. We would consider it very unfortunate if, out of fear of the outcome of the elections, an attempt were to be made to suppress our movement or if one of the measures were to be implemented with which we are being threatened. I am thinking of the arrest of some [HZDS] representatives for their supposedly extremist Slovak positions. It goes without saying that this would cause a conflict. We therefore trust that the people who are in power today but who know that they will stop playing their parts as soon as the elections come will display civilized conduct, political consideration, and readiness to come to an agreement."

The CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY report on Vladimir Meciar's Prague appearance quotes the HZDS chairman as saying that "the question of whether the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic ought to be individual subjects under international law should be decided only after the elections." In Meciar's opinion, the elections will be "the start of the

second stage of the revolution" and the HZDS should emerge from them as "the political force, onto which the citizens of the Slovak Republic will place the burden of responsibility."

Referring to Meciar's ideas about the post-election development, the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY report says: "According to Vladimir Meciar's ideas, as the first thing after the elections the two republics should declare their sovereignty and, subsequently, their constitutionality [ustavnost]. The third step would be for both sides to work out about five different variants of mutual arrangement, which would be submitted to the citizens for consideration in a referendum. V. Meciar cited as such variants a federation, a confederation, a real union, a Benelux-type setup, and independent states. In his opinion, the two republics should, first and foremost, recognize each other as sovereign entities, which the HZDS chairman considers to be the basis for future talks."

According to the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY report, Meciar also expressed the HZDS's preference for the Slovak constitution to be adopted only after the elections as "the quality of the composition of the Slovak parliament will be better then." Meciar said that, given the present composition of the Slovak National Council, the opposition can prevent the adoption of the Slovak constitution but cannot push through its own draft.

Dealing with the HZDS's stand on the elections, the report says: "The HZDS does not want to conclude pre-election coalitions. The HZDS chairman does not rule out a pragmatic coalition with the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] after the elections, although he is clearly aware of the differences of opinion between himself and ODS Chairman Vaclav Klaus. As for Czech political parties, a sympathetic impression on HZDS representatives was made by the Conservative Party-Free Bloc of Jiri V. Kotas. It was the only Czech party which approached talks with the HZDS without any bias."

Czech Right-Wing To Support Slovak Parties

AU1102112792 Prague CSTK in English 1528 GMT 8 Feb 92

[Excerpt] Bratislava Feb 8 (CSTK)—A session of the Board of Right-Wing Parties and Movements from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia was held here today with the aim to support Slovakia's right-wing parties and movements and establish contacts with them. Participants in the session said in a declaration approved at the end of the session that the electoral law passed by the Federal Assembly (parliament) denies the rights of all Czechoslovak citizens living abroad. The document describes the law as discriminatory and calls for its amendment. The declaration also appeals to Slovakia's right-oriented parties to create a broad rightist bloc with an economic and civic programme as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

KHD 'Moderates,' 'Radicals' Clash in Parliament

AU0702174992 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 4 Feb 92 p 4

[Marian Bednar commentary: "Meciar Is Waiting for the Spokesman!"]

[Excerpts] Based on the events of the last day of the 21st plenary meeting of the Slovak National Council [SNR], one can be so bold as to say that the more radical part of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Club of Deputies had come to the parliamentary lobbies with the intention of sweeping clean the political scene. The motion to recall Julius Brocka, who belongs to the moderate Carnogursky wing, from the post of chairman of the KDH Club of Deputies and the indirect instructions given to Slovak National Party [SNS] deputies that they put forward to the plenum a motion to pass a vote of no confidence in Ivan Miklos, minister for the administration of national property and its privatization, are closely connected.

It was as if the whole action taking place in the lobbies had been guided by the words spoken by Jan Klepac, a radical, at the KDH briefing the day before: "Unfortunately, the government headed by Jan Carnogursky cannot present the policy of one movement. The interests of our coalition partner, the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence [ODU-VPN], have been pushed through on many occasions, for which we, too, have had to pay the price before citizens. It will be necessary to sweep the table clean before the elections...."

The outcome suggests that the heralded premature spring cleaning in parliament did not come off. The SNS deputies withdrew their motion, for which Julius Brocka, the moderate chairman of the KDH Club of Deputies, deserves major credit. He drew the SNS deputies' attention to the fact that they were to play the role of a sniper, hired to settle the disagreements between a part of the KDH's radical wing and the ODU-VPN Minister Ivan Miklos on the course of privatization. Immediately before this, Julius Brocka successfully defended his "chairmanship" when, in a secret ballot (initiated by the radicals), he prevailed by a single vote. Had he lost, the developments might have taken a different course. [passage omitted]

The whole situation within the KDH Club of Deputies must be seen in its broader connections. The KDH radicals have begun to assert their autonomous policy more intensively, which has not gone unnoticed by the KDH's rival, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. The words of the HZDS chairman that he is losing orientation as to who in the KDH is its spokesman responsible for the entire movement are quite appropriate. It is only up to the KDH how it will cope with this situation. A great deal will be suggested by whether KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky will lean toward the concept of economic reform being asserted by the radicals or the one being asserted by the moderates.

Ex-Democrats Form HZDS Right-Wing Platform

AU0702201392 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Feb 92 p 2

[CSTK report: "Movement for a Democratic Slovakia: Election Campaign"]

[Text] Jan Bajanek is the chief of the election campaign for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. The election campaign will be based on the premise that both the Slovak Republic and the confederation should have the character of subjects under international law. This would guarantee the sovereignty of Slovakia as well as the Czech Republic and, in designated areas, also the sovereignty of their common bodies. On economic issues, he said, the campaign will be mainly about "changing the strategy of economic reform." On social issues, the HZDS wants to advance to the voters the offer of job creation in Slovakia "by means of investment policy." According to Jan Bajanek, the campaign will evolve in the form of "progressive gradation."

Information was also provided at the briefing on the newly established Club of Free Democrats [klub Slobodni demokrati] within the HZDS framework. This political initiative issued a statement signed by HZDS Secretary Olga Keltosova, Stanislav Novak, and Milan Vaskor. The statement indicates that the club is composed largely of former and current members of the Democratic Party who disapprove of the Democratic Party's present political orientation. The platform wants to operate as the "right wing" in the HZDS and, at the same time, it wants to "refine" the whole movement.

Committees View Terminating CSFR Dam Agreement

LD1102193292 Budapest MTI in English 1754 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Budapest, February 11 (MTI)—Hungary's stand on an 1977 agreement with Czechoslovakia on the construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Hydro-Electric Dam was discussed by parliamentary committees today. At the closed session, the economic, environmental protection and foreign affairs committees examined the possibility of terminating the agreement and decided to further analyse details at separate sessions before making a final decision, environmental protection committee chairman Nandor Rott told MTI.

Although it runs counter to the 1977 agreement, Czechoslovakia will certainly refuse to suspend work to rechannel the Danube River until completion of a joint expert examination this summer, an unnamed Hungarian Government official said. Thus, Hungary is forced to terminate the agreement. The termination, however, should be put off until after a meeting between the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak environmental protection committees in Prague late February, the official said.

Nevertheless, in the meantime, the termination can be prepared by the Hungarian Government working out a proposal to be submitted to parliament. The government can take the final step only with parliament's approval, the official said.

Antall, Yeltsin Discuss Honoring WWII Dead

LD1202062492 Budapest MTI in English 1946 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Budapest, February 11 (MTI)—A monument in memory of Hungarian soldiers killed in action on Russian territory during World War II may be erected, the Hungarian Government spokesman's office reported today. Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall and Russian President Boris Yeltsin have been discussing the issue recently in a series of letters.

During talks with Yeltsin preceding the signing of the Hungarian-Russian Basic Treaty 6 December 1991, Antall proposed Hungary should set up a monument in Russia dedicated to Hungarian soldiers buried there.

Yeltsin has proposed bilateral talks be held on the issue to reach an inter-governmental agreement in the near future. Acknowledging the tragedy World War Two was for both sides, Yeltsin wrote, "remembering the victims up to this day, we understand Hungary's endeavour to pay tribute to the memory of compatriots buried in our land."

Antall, meanwhile, wrote that Hungary, "with the 50th anniversary of the Hungarian Army's collapse at the Don River drawing near," has a "moral obligation to raise a monument" in memory of its compatriots. "World War II is the gravest tragedy in Hungary's modern-age history. The nation's sufferings are indescribable. No Hungarian family was left unaffected by shocks of the war," Antall wrote. "Due to democratic changes in our country, now the nation can settle its moral debts, having the opportunity to duly remember those killed and to ease the pain of those they left behind."

Bod Views Effects of Foreign Investments

AU1102142592 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 8 Feb 92 p 11

[Interview with Akos Peter Bod, chairman of the Hungarian National Bank, by Tibor Flanek; place and date not given: "If the Dollar Invades Us"]

[Text] Akos Peter Bod recently participated in the first national meeting of manager clubs in Szeged. Among other things, he spoke about the effects of the considerably higher than planned influx of foreign investments and the recommended reaction of the Hungarian economy to this. He gave an interview to our correspondent on these issues and on the monetary policy concept.

[Flanek] Mr. Bod, in Szeged you are said to have spoken about the fact that as long as there is a shortage of forints in the Hungarian economy, the incoming dollars will flood the economy. Does the faster than expected influx of foreign investment and convertible currencies have a negative effect, or is it actually advantageous?

[Bod] Based on the data and facts of the past period, I can say that the Hungarian economy has survived—in fact, compared to similar countries, it has successfully survived—the domestic political, economic, and geopolitical changes. The incoming foreign investment is proof of this. I would like to remind people that in the spring of 1990 Hungary was virtually without international reserves, and many people doubted that serious investments would take place here. It is good that the pessimists were wrong, and, in the process of establishing joint ventures and privatizing enterprises, hard currency worth $1.2 billion came to Hungary in 1991. The beginning of 1992 shows a continuation of this process. This is a great success because the incoming money contributes to the increase of our international reserves, the introduction of new technology, and to accelerating the modernization of our economy.

[Flanek] How does the monetary policy have to react to the larger amount of money inflow, what effects does all this have on bank interest rates, and do you think that, as a result of these phenomena, the forint will indeed have to be devalued or revaluated?

[Bod] In my lecture, I indeed said that people who shaped Hungarian economic policy were surprised by the amount of interest shown toward Hungary. At the end of 1990, most of us predicted about half the actual amount of investment that actually came to our economy. For the monetary policy, this favorable change resulted in having a larger than expected amount of

money in the economy while inflation concomitant with the change of the economic system was causing problems anyway. This is one of the reasons the bank interest rates were high in 1991. The much better than expected balance of payments meant that, in spite of the much more than 30-percent producer and consumer price increases, we only had to devalue the forint by 20 percent.

Obviously, exporters were not happy about this because a greater devaluation would make exports more profitable. As for our reaction, the central bank will have to continue to ensure control over the increase of the amount of money, and—I know that this sounds strange for non-professionals—the increased capital influx also causes new types of problems. As for inflation, we will be able to increasingly perceive its decrease in 1992. It is also an important piece of information for the entrepreneurs that, already in this year, they will not be able to increase their selling prices by 20 or 30 percent in many industries. Commercial banks will have to be aware that their customers will not be willing or able to pay the 30 to 40 percent interest rate on credit amid the smaller prospects of price increases.

[Flanek] You are supposed to have raised the the possibility of capital exports to the Balkans, including Croatia, and to the Ukraine. To what extent are these realistic possibilities, and what advantages could they have for the Hungarian economy, which is otherwise short of capital? Does the possible regional capital export mean that we should concentrate our integration efforts on this area rather than on West Europe and the EC?

[Bod] As we have gone past the most difficult part of the changes, it will soon be time to think about the possible directions of development. This is one of the reasons that, during my conversation with entrepreneurs, I also referred to the fact that Hungarian entrepreneurs have been setting up increasing numbers of joint ventures abroad. These, of course, are mainly small and in nearby places. If someone takes a wood-turning machine and technical design to Subcarpathia to process the local wood—this is not a made-up example—then, in an economic sense, he is exporting capital and know-how.

New possibilities that could not have been used before exist for the Hungarian economy even in our neighborhood. Therefore, we have to try to exploit this through the new methods too. This is by no means in contradiction to our moves toward West European integration. As a result of great efforts, today approximately 70 percent of Hungarian exports are bought by the developed market economies of the world, that is, the most demanding markets. This does not mean, though, that we should forget about the business possibilities provided by the neighboring countries. The rather demanding Austria does not find it degrading to make profitable businesses to the east of its borders. Decision-makers should think about this.

President Walesa Criticizes Solidarity's Demands

LD1102220292 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Before the deliberations of the National Commission of Solidarity, during the meeting with foreign journalists, President Lech Walesa said, among other things:

[Begin Walesa recording] I consider as a great mistake the way in which my dear Solidarity demands that the government must withdraw prices. Solidarity should demand compensations, not govern for the government. The government introduced the price hikes and it was entitled to do so and no one can take this right away from the government.

However, no one will take away from the unions the right to demand compensation for this because they cannot afford it and so on. [as heard] So, the position today, well it is not clear who is the government and who is what. Solidarity is now becoming the governmental movement. It orders us to withdraw and wants to govern. It cannot govern. It may demand compensations and has the right to do so and may even in those compensations, but it cannot force the government to withdraw. [end recording]

Government Urges Solidarity To Back Program

LD0702204392 Warsaw PAP in English 2239 GMT 6 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 6—Negotiations between the Solidarity leadership and government representatives started here Thursday [6 February] with a 7-hour debate during which the head of the Central Planning Office (CUP) appealed for unionists' support for the government programme that promotes exports and investments and may reduce inflation to a single digit in two-years time.

Addressing the meeting Labour Minister Jerzy Kropiwnicki said it closes the era of confrontation between the government and society and marks the beginning of a period when a society's representation would participate in decisionmaking.

CUP head Jerzy Eysymontt presented the main points of the assumptions of the socioeconmomic policy which Jan Olszewski's cabinet is preparing, and said the government programme should make it possible to shape by 1994 "a new type of economy that would be able to function relatively autonomically, without state intervention."

Thanks to such a policy the current year may become the zero-point mark for an economic growth in the years to come, Eysymontt claimed and said that in 1993 and 1994 it will be possible to achieve a modest, 2.5 or 3 per cent growth of gross domestic product (GDP), without, however, an increase in consumption. He also announced the government's intention to depart from financing some domains of public life, such as free health care or education.

If successfully implemented, all these plans may bring Poland closer to a single-digit inflation, a moderate deficit and a moderate economic growth, the minister declared.

The talks were attended by representatives of several ministries, including those of labour, finance and privatization. Four working teams were set up, of which the team for power economy is to meet Friday [7 February]. The remaining ones: for economic policy, social policy, and the rule of law (due to discuss ways of combatting economic fraud) will start working by next Thursday at the latest.

The Solidarity leadership, on their part raised the issues of industrial policy, privatization, the construction of the annual budget, social policy, and measures to fight economic fraud.

Alternative solutions to the rises of energy prices were presented to the government by Solidarity Leader Marian Krzaklewski several days ago. Solidarity proposed to withdraw from the price hikes, or to reduce them by half, or to accept the payment in the form of a poll tax.

The unionists expect that the decision on the subject will be made during the debate of the working team for power economy on Friday, spokesman for Solidarity Andrzej Adamczyk said.

Olszewski Interviewed on Economic Crisis

AU1102092992 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 10 Feb 92 pp 156-158

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Jan Olszewski by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Our Patience is Exhausted"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Olszewski, you are the head of what is already the third government in two years, a minority government, which you had great difficulties forming in the first place. How long will you last?

[Olszewski] In our country it seems almost to have become a tradition that every government only lasts about a year. If it is correct that three times is lucky, my government might also reach this target. We are forced to be optimists and are preparing a program for two, three years. But whether we can implement this program ourselves or whether we will have to pass on the task to our successor, only time can tell.

[DER SPIEGEL] Have you not set your sights a little too low?

[Olszewski] There are many people who claim that with such goals I am an irrepressible optimist. I say: I am a moderate pessimist.

[DER SPIEGEL] The patience of the people after the economic shock therapy of your liberal predecessors seems to be at its end. Workers are threatening to strike against price hikes. Will you have to give in?

[Olszewski] The supply of patience and readiness for sacrifices has been very large over the past two years. You are right: Now it is exhausted. In many social groups, for instance among pensioners, the issue is no longer psychological stamina. We have come dangerously close to the biological limit of survival.

[DER SPIEGEL] How do you intend to overcome the crisis?

[Olszewski] Our leeway is very slight. The only solution is to enter into negotiations with the trade unions to conclude some sort of treaty. This agreement should last for several months. And we want to find means to protect the needy from the worst consequences of the price hikes.

[DER SPIEGEL] You started work with a promise to conduct a socially more compatible economic policy then your predecessors. However, the citizens are uncertain, because so far you have not presented a program.

[Olszewski] We have taken on some bitter hereditary burdens, for instance the provisional budget for the first quarter of this year. We will be able to implement our own ideas only as of April. In my government statement I hinted at the main directions of future policy. However, I have not been able to announce any specific decisions, plans, or intentions, because at this time I did not yet have the exact economic data.

[DER SPIEGEL] May we help you a bit? The number of unemployed is rising, in 1991 industrial production declined by about 15 percent, investments decreased by a total of 10 percent. More than one-third of state enterprises are incurring losses....

[Olszewski] The list could be continued. In other fields it is even worse. Only an emergency program can help. For instance, we will decide which state companies have a chance of survival. The others will have to be restructured very quickly or will have to be closed down.

[DER SPIEGEL] This is what your predecessors also wanted to do.

[Olszewski] We will hand over the state companies to the Treasury, which acts as a sort of Trust Agency. The Treasury will take over some of the shares, thus acting like a private owner. In addition, we must clarify ownership of many companies and real estate very quickly. We should privatize small and medium-sized companies and apartments before we tackle large enterprises.

[DER SPIEGEL] In Germany, the example of the Trust Agency shows how protracted such a gigantic privatization program can be. Bonn is able to balance the social hardships with massive financial subsidies. You are not. How much time do you actually have?

[Olszewski] A matter of years. However, we must develop mechanisms so that in this transition period the state sector works under the same market economic conditions as the private one.

[DER SPIEGEL] During this period unemployment will rise. What is the pain threshold for you?

[Olszewski] It is difficult to cite exact figures. We want to negotiate specific quota with the trade unions. It is important that not only the number of unemployed is kept in within certain limits, but also that those affected enjoy the maximum social protection. The bearable number of unemployed should depend on the amount that we can use in the budget for social protection. If money is scarce, we must be very careful in restructuring the economy.

[DER SPIEGEL] Western businessmen seem to prefer investing in Hungary or the CSFR to investing in Poland. What are the reasons for this?

[Olszewski] Basically, we must improve the infrastructure, but at the moment we are not using loans, which we have received for these tasks, to the full. My government will give priority to this problem.

[DER SPIEGEL] All this costs a lot of money, and the state coffers are empty. How do you want to get to grips with the difficulties, without starting printing money again, thus fanning inflation?

[Olszewski] The main source of state revenues, the state companies, has dried up. On the other hand, the private sector, which is just developing, has not yet been turned into a source of revenues. There is no law on tax discipline, nor any control by the revenue offices. The state apparatus, which was established at the time of communism, has remained untouched. It is paralyzed and bloated. Only one example: Measured by the most favorable European criteria, we have about 100,000 teachers too many. If we eliminate such excesses, we can free funds.

[DER SPIEGEL] After the confusion of forming the government, the West often recalls the interwar period and the authoritarian regime of dictator Jozef Pilsudski. Does Poland only have the alternative: Pilsudski or chaos?

[Olszewski] No. The executive branch is to be strengthened. We will work for that. But your comparison with Poland under Marshal Pilsudski is wrong. If at all, I want to recall another time of the interwar period: the government of Wladyslaw Grabski. The nonpartisan government that Grabski formed in the first half of the 1920's received authorization from the Sejm, with which it reformed the economy and the currency by means of decrees.

[DER SPIEGEL] At your eastern border you have a number of new, partly very turbulent states. Russia and the Ukraine are quarreling about the division of the Army. Is this a reason for concern for Poland?

[Olszewski] This is a reason for concern for the entire world. A large amount of weapons of mass destruction has been accumulated in these areas. If anarchy breaks out there, these weapons could get out of control.

[DER SPIEGEL] Would NATO membership give Poland more security?

[Olszewski] Without a doubt. Therefore, we will do everything to get close To NATO and to the EC. However, this should be a mutual process.

[DER SPIEGEL] In western Ukraine and in Lithuania there are Polish minorities. Are you afraid that nationalist unrest in these areas might give rise to a situation that would force Poland to act for the protection of its compatriots?

[Olszewski] I hope that such situations will not arise. If there should be problems, we must, first of all, expect to grant asylum to the Poles living over there. This would be difficult enough. The question of intervention in areas outside our borders is to be ruled out for reasons of principle.

[DER SPIEGEL] In France, Great Britain, and in the United States concern about Bonn's growing weight has increased recently. What do you think of a strong Germany?

[Olszewski] Poland is looking for a short and simple way into the EC. We think that the expansion of the EC should be a response to the changes in Europe's structure, which developed as a result of Germany's expansion after the disappearance of the GDR. New EC members could contribute to creating a counterweight.

[DER SPIEGEL] Could the xenophobia in Germany awaken old animosities in relations between Poles and Germans?

[Olszewski] The physical attacks on Poles on the territory of the former GDR are very unpleasant for us. Such incidents lead to the revival of the old prejudices, which come from the time of World War II.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you have the impression that the FRG Government is acting with sufficient sensitivity toward Poland?

[Olszewski] We are far from shifting the blame for certain excesses to the FRG Government. We know that Bonn had to take on a difficult legacy. I hope that old antagonisms will be reduced as a result of economic, political, and cultural development, of the opening of the borders, and of increasing family links.

Former Minister Supports Economic Program

LD1102173992 Warsaw PAP in English 1454 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Krakow, Feb. 11—Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz said in an interview for the TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY weekly on Tuesday [11 Feb] that he did not distance himself from his economic programme which had lasting effects.

Leszek Balcerowicz told the weekly that his programme was not restricted to curbing inflation only but concerned many more changes in the country's economy. These were the introduction of a more adequate price system, the convertibility of the Polish zloty, the acceleration of ownership transformations, the creation of genuine local governments and the initiation of changes in the country's financial system.

The effects of the so-called Balcerowicz programme, added the former deputy prime minister, could only be destroyed by the return to price control and the policy of easy money.

Walesa on Counteracting Economic Fraud

LD0702205192 Warsaw PAP in English 2153 GMT 6 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw. Feb. 6—President Lech Walesa deemed preventing economic frauds the biggest challenge now facing the parliament, the president, political forces and bodies of the administration of justice at a meeting Thursday [6 February] with deputies, senators and authorities of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL).

The president called on parliament, including the PSL floor group, to help expose frauds. The president ranked building "a legal structure and drawing outline of Poland as it should look like" among the most important tasks of parliament of the present term of office. "We will be able to achieve this when there are agreement and cooperation and when we reject our narrow interests."

PSL deputies called on the president to stand above political divisions in Poland. Referring to this issue, Lech Walesa said: "I will see to honest democratic game. I unleashed war against everybody so that healthy trend could be established from the grass roots level."

Referring to the PSL status on the political scene, Lech Walesa stressed that when the party gained majority, he, as the president, would not let anybody eliminate it. "I do not consider you the left wing but if anybody tries to outwit you, the president will protect you," he said.

Deputy Chairman of the PSL Parliamentary Floor Group Roman Jagielinski stressed that his party was not against reforms. But he said that governments would have to be more responsible and one could not permit the destruction of the economy under the pretext of privatization or liberal programmes. He emphasized that Poland could not let itself be used by foreign countries.

Adopting a stand on this issue, Lech Walesa said: "I would like to get approval for mass privatization. We must privatize ourselves wisely, otherwise foreign countries will always cheat us. Systemic changes should also

be extorted in industry, otherwise farmers will always pay for all mistakes in this area of the economy," the president added.

Spokesman Defends Walesa's Call for Special Powers

LD1002164392 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1000 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Text] President Lech Walesa believes that the provision of special powers to the state in the fields of law and order, security, privatization, and reprivatization are most important for the government and for the efficient functioning of the state. Presidential spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski spoke about it this morning on the Warsaw Radio Z.

Andrzej Drzycimski said that these three issues are crucial for getting away from stagnation, which we are in at present. He gave an assurance that the president is certainly going to support the government's efforts to get the right to issue decrees, and recalled similar presidential support during Mazowiecki's and Bielecki's governments.

Referring to reaction to Lech Walesa's speech before the Council of Europe, the spokesman said that the first reaction came from a Russian delegation, which came to thank President Walesa for his speech. It was clear to the Russians that President Walesa was speaking also on their behalf, Andrzej Drzycimski said.

Szczecin Voivoda Views Talks With Olszewski

PM1202091592 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 24 Jan 92 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Szczecin Voivoda Marek Talasiewicz by Danuta Jezowska; place and date not given]

[Text] [Jezowska] You were present at last week's inaugural meeting between Prime Minister Olszewski and the country's voivodas. Is there a previous tradition of such meetings?

[Talasiewicz] Meetings arranged between voivodas and the prime minister, or individual ministers, or else heads of the Council of Ministers Office, were held sporadically during Tadeusz Mazowiecki's rule. Krzysztof Bielecki invited voivodas to a similar meeting only once. Now Prime Minister Olszewski has announced that closer links will be forged between the government and local administration organs in individual voivodships. This suggests that our meeting with the premier was not the first and last.

[Jezowska] What did you talk about?

[Talasiewicz] We discussed relations between local administration and self-government structures, and also the so-called special administration. We talked about problems of unemployment and about the financial situation in the regions. But the main point of the meeting was the premier's assessment of the condition of the state and society within it.

[Jezowska] What did he say?

[Talasiewicz] In Olszewski's opinion the financial and social condition of the country is much worse than could be expected. However, in contrast to earlier versions, he does not intend to introduce corrections to Krzysztof Bielecki's state of the country report. This is because each government has the right to present its own self-assessment. The Olszewski government will prepare the state's balance of accounts anew. This work will be coordinated by the deputy for Szczecin, Artur Balazs. According to the premier, the main element of the new report will be an assessment of the existing budgetary liabilities. There are huge discrepancies in the estimated size of these liabilities. Some commentators speak of 20 trillion zlotys [Z], but there are those who maintain that the budget is short of as much as Z70 trillion.

[Jezowska] What liabilities are these?

[Talasiewicz] The state's internal debts reach back two or even three years. They include a variety of unpaid invoices representing capital investment projects and other contracts. For example, in our voivodship, where I estimate the liabilities of the state budget at about Z150-200 billion, the state's debt is made up from the costs of building new schools, roads, the ferry port in Swinoujscie, and the promised financial backing for a range of projects negotiated in agreements between regional state administration offices and parish authorities. The Olszewski government intends to prepare this "balance sheet" very soon indeed, preferably before the middle of February.

[Jezowska] Going back to the assessment of the social situation in the country....

[Talasiewicz] The prime minister assessed the recent strikes as the most serious since the eighties.

[Jezowska] Is the premier's much-quoted opinion that Poland is suffering from a crisis of state administration structures proved correct at voivodship level?

[Talasiewicz] This was precisely the subject of my address at the meeting. I spoke about the fact that Poland is perceived as a centralized country, whereas at voivodship level the phenomenon is seen more as "deconcentration," which should not be confused with decentralization. The deconcentration consists in a lack of a true power center in a voivodship. Nearly every ministry sector has its own special services there, a number of plenipotentiaries, and representatives linked only very loosely with the voivoda's office. The policy of the individual sectors is realized in the field through those plenipotentiaries and representatives. There is hardly any sign of a cohesive policy pursued by the government.

[Jezowska] How does the prime minister perceive the function of voivodas in the changed state administration structures he has pledged to introduce?

[Talasiewicz] I have my doubts about this aspect of the changes. On the one hand I have heard arguments about the need to strengthen the position of voivodas so they can discharge the role of true steward, representative, and effective executor of the state's interests in the area he administers. On the other hand, we have been told that in situations when a conflict arises between the general administration, that is, the one I represent, and local self-government structures, central government will always take the side of local self-government. I see a certain inconsistency here, since the interests of state and local administration are often incompatible by their very nature—as, for example, in many cases of environmental planning concerns. From the local council's viewpoint, for instance, siting an open-air market close to the state border is a most advantageous and profitable move, whereas from the viewpoint of the state's interests such a move could be indeed undesirable. Consequently, I believe that unconditional support offered by the government to local self-government structures in all conflicts is, to say the least, of questionable value. To tell the truth, I myself sometimes wonder about the real role of a voivoda. Is he to be a true steward of his area and a representative of the government? Or a representative of the Council of Ministers only? I must admit that there are times when I think that a voivoda is but a statutory figurehead and an awkward ballast at that.

[Jezowska] Can we expect changes in the financing of voivodship budgets?

[Talasiewicz] There was talk of creating budgetary reserve funds to be administered by voivodas. It would be tantamount to a kind of financial backing for local, regional policies, and at the same time a guarantee of their implementation. If we follow this concept to its logical conclusion, it should mean that the state's general interests, which the premier invoked so often, should stand a chance of being realized also at the regional level, within the scope of individual voivodships.

[Jezowska] Thank you for talking to us.

Conference of Citizens' Committees Meets in Warsaw

LD0902133392 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 9 Feb 92

[Text] The National Conference of Citizens' Committees began deliberations over an hour ago at the musical academy in Warsaw. Andrzej Jelenski reports.

[Begin Jelenski recording] After electing co-chairmen and heads of commissions, a letter from Prime Minister Olszewski, who could not attend, was read by Lech Dymarski. The prime minister emphasizes the fact that the Citizens' Committees has gathered only a few days before the planned government presentation of a social and economic plan, and proposals for coming out of the recession. Prime Minister Olszewski writes that all members of the citizens' movement, including himself, should be aware that the decay of civic attitudes poses a threat to our country. The premier underscores that in the present situation the citizens' movement is as indispensable for Poland as political parties. During today's conference, a report on the Citizens' Foundation and a draft of a future statute are to be presented. [end recording]

Walesa Comments on Defense Discussion

LD0902210892 Warsaw PAP in English 2013 GMT 9 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 9—Before coming back to Warsaw from a weekend in Gdansk, President Lech Walesa had a meeting with journalists on Sunday [9 February] at which he said that parliament must take its time to properly work on new laws, and it must be able to control any special powers given to the government.

Asked whether there is a conflict between the president and the government, as suggested by reports from the recent conference of the National Defence Committee (KOK), Lech Walesa replied that the press had deliberately fanned up the highly desirable discussion over Poland's defence which has to be creatively worked on at the time when old doctrines have gone and new ones must be developed. The KOK meeting opened not concluded this discussion, the president added.

Commenting on the recent visit of South African President Frederik Willem de Klerk President Walesa said that cooperation seems very promising for both, Poland and RSA in the economic and the political sphere.

Parys Stresses Future NATO Integration

LD0802082992 Warsaw PAP in English 1818 GMT 7 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 7—Poland wants eventual integration with NATO, said Defence Minister Jan Parys at a press conference in Warsaw on Friday [7 February].

"Our long term aim is integration with NATO, it being the only defence system in Europe—we want to reach it gradually through cooperation with selected countries, who are ready to do this more quickly", he said.

Until now there had not been a "formal initiative" from the Polish side concerning integration, there had however been "a series of positive signals from the Pact (NATO) side". He thought that there were many possibilities of cooperation which did not require membership of NATO.

The alliance is taking decisions "long and democratically" according to Parys, which is why it is necessary to differentiate between cooperation with the countries in the pact and cooperation with its structures.

Minister Parys announced that Poland's will to cooperate with NATO had a conditional character. "We can leave it at any moment, if we find it does not bring us any

benefits", he said but added that "faced with serious dangers our army needs support from outside".

The minister said that NATO secretary general, Manfred Woerner would be visiting Poland next month and that he himself would be visiting NATO headquarters in Brussels at a still unspecified date.

Defense Minister Recalls Military Police Commander

LD0802133392 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 8 Feb 92

[Text] National Defense Minister Jan Parys has recalled General Jerzy Jarosz from the post of commander in chief of the military police. Thus, the last member of the Military Council of National Salvation [WRON] has been withdrawn from active service in the Polish Army. Let us remind you that yesterday Minister Parys said he had recalled another member of WRON, General Miroslaw Hermaszewski, the first Polish astronaut, from the post of deputy commander of the Air Force.

Parys Discusses Future of Armed Forces

AU1002142192 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8-9 Feb 92 p 1

[Zbigniew Lentowicz report: "The Army Carries Out Orders"]

[Text] "We have reached a critical stage in the process of reducing military spending," said Jan Parys, minister of national defense, at a news conference on 7 February. "The structure of defense constitutes a closed system, and a further reduction in spending could cause the system to collapse. However, most of the present government is determined to maintain efficient Armed Forces, which form the foundation of the state."

This news conference, the new defense minister's first one, was held at the Defense Ministry's majestic conference center at Zwirko-Wigura Street in Warsaw. The minister described this facility as "quite a good relic of the Warsaw Pact."

Minister Parys said that the Polish political milieu possesses three distinct schools of thought on the subject of state security. The fist school consists of "reductionists," in other words crypto-pacifists who insist that at a time of detente, the disarmament of the Armed Forces must be continued. The proponents of a military autarchy underline the need for military self-sufficiency, claiming that military danger is divided equally among everyone, therefore it is necessary to organize defense on all fronts simultaneously. "We realize the need to be prepared to defend each border, but the danger is clearly assymetrical," said the minister. Asked which school of thought Jerzy Milewski, chief of the National Security Council, adheres to, Jan Parys gave no reply. All he said was that the preliminary draft of the defense doctrine presented by the National Security Council at the latest meeting of the National Defense Committee is full of inconsistencies and ambiguity. "One cannot talk about a threat from the West and at the same time belong to the Council of Europe and attempt to join the European Community," he said.

However, a little later, he said: "There is no conflict between the Belvedere and the government on the one hand and the Defense Ministry on the other about the division of responsibility for defense. Any major move is discussed with the president beforehand, during regular meetings. These meetings show that consensus is possible. The prime minister also regularly devotes two hours a week to talks on the subject of the Army." The defense minister did not hide the fact that there are differences of opinion between the two centers of authority on several issues. "I have no intention of indulging in public debates and arguments; after all I am not a party politician, but the head of an Army that is supposed to be an apolitical institution. I am obliged to adhere closely to the laws and constitution, which lay down the precise duties of not just the Defense Ministry."

The minister said that it is not at all certain whether a general inspector of the Armed Forces, responsible for the military part of the civilian Defense Ministry, will ever be appointed, because the experience provided by this post during the Second Republic is not all positive. "But if parliament amends the constitution and the relevant legislation, the Army and I will immediately adapt to it. No one orders military cadres to be loyal, because it is quite obvious that they must be so, and that any order must be carried out."

"In my safe I have at least 30 plans of Army reforms produced by people with the best of intentions," Minister Parys continued. "However, the time for reducing the size of the Army is not yet ripe, and in the present conditions it would be a careless thing to do.

"The military vacuum in Poland is a danger to international equilibrium. This has been repeated by the foreign politicians taking part in talks with our Ministry recently. Military circles also realize that we will never overcome an external threat without help from outside. Therefore our military cadres are insisting on Poland's emergence from its isolation. We will aim toward integration with the Western system of security. But before this distant objective is reached, we will undertake closer defense cooperation with several NATO countries that have already expressed their readiness to tighten their contacts with Poland. I shall visit NATO headquarters in Brussels, and in March NATO secretary general Manfred Woerner will probably visit Poland.

Jan Parys confessed that while he was still at his senior post in the Central Planning Office, he was subjected to pressure to let the "Proxy Ltd." company, investigating the restructuring of the defense industry, have access to a series of secret documents on defense. He did not submit to this pressure, nor did he reveal the names of

the persons who had exerted it. "Neither the Defense Ministry nor the General Staff have disclosed any specialized information to this firm, which has had links with German business since July 1991," he said.

No Results From Talks on Russian Gas Deliveries

LD1102172192 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1500 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] We have got the best of it today because it is gas load factor one, but that is mainly thanks to the good weather and the gas reserves. The reduced supply of Russian gas to Poland continues, however. Mieczyslaw Ratajewicz, a department director at the Ministry of Overseas Cooperation, spoke about what is happening with the negotiations on this matter.

[Begin Ratajewicz recording] There continue to be no results from the intensive talks held recently which were aimed at raising the level of gas from Russia to Poland. The last talks held on Friday [7 February] between Minister Glapinski and and Yurij Kashlev, the Russian Ambassador, have still not yielded any results. Talks are being held at all possible levels with all the interested institutions and offices, both in Warsaw and in Moscow. We are waiting for results. We haven't any. [end recording]

Gas Supply Requirements, Complications Examined

PM1202085792 Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 25-26 Jan 92 p 3

[Ewa Sielicka report: "Gas Noose Tightens Over Industry: No Threat to Domestic Consumers"]

[Text] The decision to switch to nationwide gas supply level 12 for industrial enterprises (for the present time, this applies to the metallurgical, chemical, and nitrogen products industry) has already resulted in many complications and tangible losses to the economy. We were told at the Police Chemical Plant that they were instructed to apply gas supply level 10 as early as 14 January. For this particular enterprise, this has meant a virtual disruption of the production processes.

Poland's daily gas requirement totals 35 million cubic meters, including 22 million cubic meters imported—according to earlier trade agreements—from Russia. However, as we know, the tap on the Russian gas pipeline has just been turned down and, as a result, the supply of Russian gas has fallen to the level of 14 million cubic meters per day. Attempts are being made to supply the missing amount from local gas sources within the country, but this can only meet a small proportion of the total requirement.

According to information obtained from Anna Ferens, press spokesperson for the Ministry for Foreign Economic Cooperation, the head of the ministry conducted telephone negotiations with the Russian partners all day yesterday, trying to arrive at an agreement to "regulate" gas supplies from Russia to Poland. In all likelihood, one of the chiefs at the Ministry for Foreign Economic Cooperation will be traveling to Moscow within the next few days to hold direct negotiations aimed at working out new terms for the deliveries of Russian gas to our country. Unfortunately, the ministry spokesperson was unable to cite any other measures that the ministry might take to find alternative solutions to the problem.

In the meantime, as could be expected, the drastic reduction in the supply of Russian gas has caused serious disruptions in various sectors of Polish industry.

Our reporters spoke to the managers of several enterprises which still have to rely exclusively on supplies on Russian gas. Their comments are published below.

Ryszard Bielas, chief energy engineer at the Police Chemical Plant:

"We are at present obliged to comply with the requirements of the instruction to reduce consumption of gas supplied to our plant through the Polish Petroleum and Gas Extraction Board to level 12, which in practice means that production of ammonia and carbamide has to be halted. Let me add that the production process of both these compounds becomes seriously disrupted already at gas supply level 8. The situation is critical, of course. However, let me point out that until the end of last year we were instructed to receive gas at supply levels 10-11, and we were even warned that in the first quarter of this year we would be entitled only to supply level 16, which is the so-called critical, or zero point.

"The current requirement of using gas supply level 12 poses no physical danger of any kind to persons involved with the gas supply installations in our enterprise. If there is any danger at all, it may affect gas installations within the municipal gas supply network; however, as we know, there have been no restrictions in the supply of gas to city users."

Miroslaw Malinowski, general manager, Pulawy Nitrogen Products Plant:

"The restrictions imposed on the gas supply to our enterprise have meant that we are currently 20 percent short on our daily requirement. This in turn means that daily output of nitrogen-based fertilizers at Pulawy is reduced by 1,500 tonnes in relation to our target capacity. The resultant financial losses amount to 20 billion zlotys per day."

Zbigniew Januszkiewicz, general manager, Gdansk Phosphate Fertilizers:

"Our plant is not affected by the gas supply difficulties. We do not use gas in the fertilizer production process."

Miroslaw Dobrut, general manager, Gdansk Division of the Pomeranian Gas Works:

"Fortunately, there are virtually no enterprises that need to use gas in their technological processes either within the Tri-City area [Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot] or throughout Gdansk Voivodship. Nor is there any danger that the supply of gas to individual consumers will be reduced to any degree. True, we have had several reports from domestic consumers that the gas pressure in their appliances has decreased, but this decrease is not the result of the general gas supply level reductions. It is correct to assume that the decision to maintain municipal gas supply levels unchanged was dictated chiefly by safety considerations. A reduction or disruption in the supply of gas to the municipal networks could have incalculable consequences. It is certain that it could take several months to resume regular gas supply to the networks at the required level. You should remember that there are 270,000 individual gas consumers in the Tri-City alone."

Reports forwarded to us by the Polish Petroleum and Gas Extraction Board and the National Gas Distribution Board indicate that at the moment the gas pressure in the distribution networks is not continuing to be reduced. Consequently, unless there are further disruptions in the supply of gas from Russia, the situation ought to return to normal.

Transportation Agreement Signed With Belarus 8 Feb

LD0802221692 Warsaw PAP in English 1826 GMT 8 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 8—Poland and Belarus on Saturday [8 February] signed an agreement on cooperation in road, rail, and air transport, as well as on opening new border crossings in future.

Both sides agreed on a number of facilitations for transit of cargo and passengers, including 3 thousand permissions for Belarus trucks and passenger buses to enter Poland during the first half of this year, a permission for Polish airline LOT planes to fly over Minsk, and Belarus cargo transit via Polish Baltic ports supported by rail transport.

Belarus is also interested in starting a direct Bialystok-Brest train connection and building a fast train line from Berlin via Warsaw, Tiraspol, Brest, to Minsk.

Olszewski Meets Belarussian Deputy Prime Minister

LD0802224792 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 8 Feb 92

[Text] Prime minister Jan Olszewski has met Stanislav Bril, the deputy prime minister of Belarus. The talks dealt with economic relations, transport, tourism, and the exchange of experts. Both politicians also recognized that it is the joint responsibility of Poland and Belarus to inform world public opinion about the permanent effects of the catastrophe in Chernobyl.

Parys, Latvian Counterpart Discuss Cooperation

LD0802132992 Warsaw PAP in English 1233 GMT 8 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 8—Defence Minister Jan Parys met here Saturday [8 February] with his visiting Latvian counterpart Talvas Jundzis.

The ministry press spokesman reported after the meeting that the two had discussed possibilities of cooperation between the two armies and the signing of a proper military document on this issue.

Minister Parys was invited to pay a visit to Latvia.

Economy Minister Signs Agreement With Moldova

LD1002230692 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Excerpt] Poland signed an economic agreement with Moldova, which includes cooperation in the fields of industry, agriculture, maritime economy, transport, building, and tourism. The agreement was signed by the Constantin Tampiza, minister of economy and finance of Moldova, and Adam Glapinski, minister for foreign economic relations. [passage omitted]

Initial Results of 9 Feb Local Elections

FSN Leading in Bacau County

AU1102151792

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 1400 GMT on 11 February carries a three-minute report by correspondent Victor Spirache from the Central Electoral Commission in Bucharest on the latest information about results of the 9 February municipal elections.

"After Bistrita-Nasaud, Bacau [central Moldavia] is the second county that has informed the Central Electoral Commission of election results." Spirache says that there were "87 constituencies in Bacau County" and mayors have been "elected in 24 constituencies, of which one is Onesti."

As for the "remainder of 63 constituencies a second poll will be organized for the position of mayor."

In connection with the 24 constituencies in which mayors have been elected, "the situation is as follows: National Salvation Front—11; independents—7; Democratic Convention—2; Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania—2; Republican Party—1; and Ecologist Movement of Romania—1 constituency."

As for the "1,255 councillor mandates, 1,236 mandates have been granted for all the constituencies of Bacau County, namely 87—as mentioned at the beginning—as follows: 530 National Salvation Front, that is, 42 percent; 245 Democratic Convention, that is, 19.5 percent; 196 Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania, that is, 15 percent; 123 independents, that is, 9 percent; and so forth."

Six Counties Report on Ballots

AU1102194292 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1830 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 11/2/1992—Following the February 9 local polls, only two towns in Maramures County elected their mayors, that is Tirgu Lapus and Cavnic where the mayors are the candidates of the National Salvation Front. A second ballot is to be organised in the other towns.

According to the preliminary data, in Buzau County the National Salvation Front candidates got 26 seats in commune mayorships, while four settlements elected independent candidates. Estimations show that a second ballot will be organised in thirty settlements on February 23.

Future mayors were elected in 41 constituencies in Prahova County, while a second ballot is to be organised in other 58 constituencies. Of the 41 elected mayors, 25 belong to the National Salvation Front, 9 are independents, 3 represent the Democratic Convention, 3 belong to the Agrarian Democratic Party, and one belongs to the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party.

A second ballot for the election of mayors is organised in all towns and municipalities of Hunedoara County.

Mayors are known in 27 of the 55 communes of Hunedoara County, almost eighty percent of them belonging to the National Salvation Front. A second ballot is to be arranged in the other settlements.

The situation in the 85 settlements of Vilcea County is as follows: 43 elected mayors belong to the National Salvation Front, one mayor to the Agrarian Democratic Party, one mayor to the Democratic Convention, one mayor to the Democratic Left Union, while three mayors are independent. A second ballot will be organised in over thirty settlements of that county.

Mayors were also elected in 23 of the 88 settlements of Teleorman County: 19 belong to the National Salvation Front, four are independent. A second ballot is to be organised in 65 commune constituencies as well as in all towns and municipalities of the county.

Teleorman, Others Release Results

AU1102200292

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 1600 GMT on 11 February carries a 3-minute report by Victor Spirache from the Central Electoral Commission on election results in Teleorman County.

According to Spirache, "voting took place in 88 electoral constituencies." Mayors were elected in 23 constituencies, "19 from the National Salvation Front [FSN] and four independents." New elections of the position of councillors will be organized in four localities, while results in the other constituencies as follows: "FSN 535; the Romanian Agrarian Democratic Party [PDAR] 163; 119 independents; the Democratic Convention 95; the separate list of the National Liberal Party 75; and other political groups."

At 1800 GMT the station carries a report from the Central Electoral Commission saying "so far, official results of local elections in four counties were released." It adds that "mayors were elected in 24 constituencies in Bacau County, 20 in Bistrita-Nasaud, 41 in Prahova, and 23 in Teleorman. Most of the mayors and councillors elected in these counties belong to the FSN. A runoff, however, will have to be organized in 223 constituencies."

Salaj, Covasna Relay Results

AU1202123492 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] Official election results have been received only from Salaj and Covasna Counties, apart from those received from the other four counties—Bistrita, Bacau, Prahova, and Teleorman—whose official election returns were announced yesterday.

An hour ago, the Central Electoral Commission informed us that in Salaj County voters cast their votes at 58 constituencies in four towns and 54 villages; a second poll is needed in four towns and 25 villages. Of the elected mayors, nine belong to the National Salvation Front [FSN]; nine to the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]; three are independent; two represent the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania; one represents the Democratic Convention; and one represents the Romanian National Unity Party.

In Covasna, of the 33 mayors who have been elected, 26 represent the UDMR; three the FSN; three are independent; and one represents the Democratic Convention.

Opposition Leads in Bucharest

AU1202120892 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 12 Feb 92

[Text] After the ballot-counting in 817 of the total of 1,104 polling stations in Bucharest, the results are as follows: 301,304 votes for Crin Halaicu of the Democratic Convention, that is, 45.74 percent; 206,342 votes went to Cazimir Ionescu, National Salvation Front, that is, 31.33 percent; 45,722 votes for Radu Ioan Theodoru, Romania Mare Party, that is, 6.94 percent; 27,234 votes for Calin Popescu Tariceanu, National Liberal Party (young wing), that is, 4.13 percent; 10,642 votes went to Tache Pirvulescu of the ecologists, that is, 1.63 percent; 10,318 votes for Ion Bratianu, Bratianu Liberal Union, that is, 1.57 percent; and 6,636 votes for Nica Leon, Liberal Democratic Party, that is, 1.01 percent.

The other candidates for the position of general mayor of Bucharest up to the number of 33 have achieved less than 1 percent of the number of votes cast and announced so far.

As for the mandate of councillor, the Democratic Convention achieved 42.94 percent of the votes cast, that is, 32 mandates; the National Salvation Front—30.91 percent, that is, 23 mandates; Romania Mare Party comes in third—7.43 percent, that is, 6 municipal councillor mandates; National Liberal Party (young wing)—3 mandates; and ecologists—2 mandates. One mandate each has been achieved by the Free Exchange Party, the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania, the Bratianu Liberal Union, the National Unity Party of Romania, the Romanies' Alliance, the Social Democratic National Salvation Front, the Leftist Democratic Union, the National Party of Free Producers, and the Republican Party.

Mrs. Anisoara Stanciu, deputy president of the Municipal Electoral Commission, who provided the above information for this newscast, said that the final results of the local elections in Bucharest Municipality are expected by the end of the day.

Bucharest Totals Expected 12 Feb

AU1102214092 Bucharest Romanian Television Network in Romanian 1800 gmt 11 Feb 92

[Excerpts] At 1030 GMT, Gheorghe Netea, chairman of the Bucharest Mayoralty Electoral Commission, told us that he has received data from 41 percent of the polling stations throughout Bucharest. The rest will be received tonight. [passage omitted]

In view of the fact that the computation of results will last until 0100 GMT, we cannot offer any other data about results in Bucharest Municipality. [passage omitted]

Roman Comments on 'Promising' Results

AU1102165392 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Here is the comment made by Petre Roman, national leader of the National Salvation Front [FSN], on certain partial results of the 9 February elections.

[Begin Roman recording] We have the first results of local elections in the localities where the mayors have been elected, that is where the candidates won the majority of the votes. There are 756 such localities. We note that 471 were won by the FSN, 61 by the Democratic Convention, 39 by PDAR [Romanian Agrarian Democratic Party], 65 by the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [UDMR], 85 by independent candidates, and 13 by the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]. These results seems promising for the FSN. However, we know that we can expect further stiff competition—which should bring out the maximum of the FSN meaning and potential—in the other localities and certain large cities in Romania, which can hopefully lead to a situation similar to the present one. [end recording]

Democratic Convention Praises Returns

AU1102163292 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] A news conferences was held today at the Romanian Democratic Party Headquarters organized by the Democratic Convention. In their speeches, Corneliu Coposu, president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party; Sergiu Cunescu, president of the Romanian Social Democratic Party; Radu Campeanu, president of the National Liberal Party; Nicolae Manolescu, president of the Civic Alliance Party; Otto Weber, president of the Romanian Ecologist Party; and Andras Bodor of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania emphasized the importance of the results achieved by the Democratic Convention in the local elections.

According to our reporter, the speakers stressed the weight these results have, the unity of the opposition forces, and the development of the maturity of the Romanian electorate.

Answering the questions asked by reporters, the leaders of parties making up the Democratic Convention emphasized the need to rally their forces for the second round of elections. They also pointed out the need to establish a strict schedule for the parliamentary and presidential elections.

In the opinion of the leaders belonging to the Democratic Convention, there has to be a period of at least two months between parliamentary and presidential elections, an interval considered as optimal for mounting an effective campaign.

Opposition on 'Genuine Wish for Change'

AU1102203592 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1857 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 11/2/1992—The central base of the Romanian Social Democratic Party in Bucharest was the venue Tuesday, February 11, of a press conference organized by the parties making up the Democratic Convention. The leaders of the major opposition parties made brief statements on the recent local elections.

Corneliu Coposu, National Peasant Christian Democratic Party president: We are contented with the preliminary local election returns which prove that the Romanian public opinion started coming to reason. As for our election propaganda I can say it was null because we had no financial means.

The only propaganda for us was the National Salvation Front's [FSN] two-year government inability.

Sergiu Cunescu, president of the Romanian Social Democratic Party: Today is a festive day for us because it is the Romanian people's victory. Its vote has proved it has the power to retrieve democratic traditions and ideas. This success can be explained in the rally of all forces that fight for the establishment of democracy.

Radu Campeanu, National Liberal Party president: No one knows the final results, but one can note a tendency which deceives nobody. In the territory, the ratio between the FSN and the Democratic Convention is one to two, with a few exceptions. Two conclusions can be drawn: Following these elections the opposition enters the administrative structures, and the future legislative elections are likely to evince the same tendency. It is important that the heirs of the communist system have lost part of power.

Nicolae Manolescu, Civic Alliance president: The results so far show a genuine wish for change. The next two weeks will show to what extent the wish for change will find the political form of manifestation. This victory is the victory of the unity of the democratic opposition, of those who formed the Democratic Convention.

Andras Bodor, UDMR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania] representative: The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania wishes to further cooperate with the democratic forces. This victory must be consolidated on a local plane as well, and the would-be mayors will have to prove they are indeed better.

Absenteeism of Opposition Noted

AU1102203792 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1903 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 11/2/1992—Press correspondents' accounts show that absenteeism registered particularly high figures at the February 9 local polls. There are counties where only 50 to 57 per cent of the population voted. Only in a few counties in centre Transylvania, in Arges and Olt the electorate reached 70-75 per cent.

Analysing the results so far, one can see that in more than 70 per cent of constituencies no candidate for the office of mayor has the majority requested by the election law—50 per cent plus one—which calls for another ballot for the first two candidates.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from the data supplied so far is the ascent of the opposition forces, more particularly of the Democratic Convention that gained numerous posts of mayors and councillors, and where the necessary majority could not be obtained, it succeeded in stopping the FSN [National Salvation Front] representatives' way to mayorship, which calls for another confrontation.

Noteworthy is also the fact that the FSN has remained in several counties a major force that got both the offices of mayor and of commune, town and municipal councillors.

One can also note the ascent of the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania—especially in the Danube plain—of the Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) in Transylvanian counties and in Bucharest as well as of the National Liberal Party-the Young Wing.

Hungarians Observe 'Honest' Voting

LD1202061992 Budapest MTI in English 1837 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest, February 11 (MTI)—Despite some infringements of the law, local elections in Romania were conducted honestly, Hungarian parliament Constitutional Committee member Jozsef Horvath said.

Horvath and two other Hungarian MPs [member of parliament] Miklos Csapody and Zoltan Hajdu monitored Romania's local elections as international observers.

The most striking violation was the breach of the election campaign ban on a number of occasions over two days before the sunday elections, Horvath told MTI.

Horvath, who monitored elections together with Csapody in Cluj (Kolozsvar) and Tirgu Mures (Marosvasarhely), said his most shocking experience was when at a ballot station he was rebuked for speaking Hungarian.

The gravest violation of the election law occurred in Tirgu Mures, where the electoral committee failed to invalidate remaining blank ballot papers before opening the boxes. The committee agreed to do that only after a firm warning from Hungarian and U.S. observers, Horvath said.

On several occasions, Hungarian observers witnessed voters trying to cast their ballots with identity cards without a photo and with forged stamps, Miklos Csapody said.

Csapody said although he had accreditations signed by the chairman of the Bucharest-based National Election Committee, twice he was denied entry to ballot stations.

Stolojan Interviewed on Union, Economic Issues

Part One

AU1102115592 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 5 Feb 91 pp 1, 3

[Part one of interview with Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan by Liana Simion; place and date not given: "The Trade Unions Favor a Measure That Will Indiscriminately Deal a Blow to All Enterprises"]

[Text] [Simion] Mr. Prime Minister, at the meeting on 31 January with the "Alfa" Trade Union Cartel, you surprised the audience when you told Mr. Cojocaru that his theory was nonsense and demagogy. Who got irritated then? Prime Minister Stolojan or the economist Stolojan?

[Stolojan] The economist in me was irritated. For two reasons. First, I was sure that Mr. Cojocaru would want to begin a discussion with me on the planned gross national product, the consumption and accumulation funds, the material and financial structure of the gross national product, and the way the latter develops if there are certain changes. However, I am not sure if this was any help and whether the 400 people present there understood the link between this jargon and their problems. Second, for hours on end I talked with Mr. Cojocaru—it was not the first time that we met—and I told him that his theory was nonsense. Any man in his right mind and endowed with elementary logic will oppose what he says there.

[Simion] Actually, why did the minimum wage of 24,300 lei that was demanded by the "Alfa" Cartel through its economic counselor, Dr. Constantin Cojocaru, not convince you to renounce the government alternative of 8,500 lei?

[Stolojan] The first question is one of common sense. Industrial production has decreased by 40.4 percent since 1989. There are objective reasons: the disintegration of the former CEMA, which means 50 percent fewer exports for us in addition to raw material imports, and objective reasons: a 17 percent decrease in working time throughout the country due to the reduction of the work week from six to five days. Such questions as reducing the retirement age limit, the increase in the amount of unpaid leave and vacation time, as well as other disruptions were not taken into consideration. No one can afford to maintain real wages as long as such phenomena exist. Unfortunately, we have given the impression that the following correlation is possible: Although production is decreasing, real wages stay the same or increase.

[Simion] How did you give that impression?

[Stolojan] In 1990 we spent our foreign currency reserves of approximately $1.7-1.8 billion. Then we turned part of the resources envisaged in the budget for investments into resources for consumption. Although 1991 began with certain wage limits—because our reserves were exhausted—the standard of living did not deteriorate as it should have, because we took up a $1 billion credit and recorded a state budget deficit of approximately 60 billion lei. Thus we promoted the policy whereby consumption is higher than what the country produces. Such a policy is excusable during a transition period; such a policy may be promoted for one, two, or three years, but not too long because debts may actually reach uncontrollable levels and the situation may become worse than it was initially. No man in his right mind can believe that the standard of living may be preserved under such circumstances.

[Simion] You have strayed from my question....

[Stolojan] Well, during such times people appear who are fishing in troubled waters and who do not know the country's situation, because they left it a long time ago. They do not realize what is happening now and come up with such theories. They start out from a given subject, from a pre-established objective (namely what they plan to demonstrate) and then they manipulate some data for this purpose. This procedure is very well known in the world of statistics and in politics....

[Simion] Can you be more explicit?

[Stolojan] I am talking about Cojocaru's procedure. This is not the first time it has been used. He took some statistics (I am not going to say which because there were several variants) and through his speculative theory "demonstrated" that by producing less one can live better. The government department for forecasts will publicize and examine Mr. Cojocaru's speculative theory.

[Simion] Let us continue along the same line. I would like to ask you to briefly comment on the following subjects: 1. The current underrating of the labor force through the minimum wage imposed by the government delays and blocks the introduction of technical progress; 2. higher wages would compel enterprise managements

to eliminate the labor force surplus and to organize their activity more effectively; 3. increasing the weight of wages in the structure of costs and prices to the detriment of profits would lead to a more judicious distribution of resources at the level of economic enterprises, thus creating a motivation for work; 4. the minimum salary of 8,500 lei does not cover consumption needs as estimates made by the Statistics Directorate of the Ministry of Labor demonstrate.

[Stolojan] These are Cojocaru's opinions.

[Simion] Not necessarily; they are the opinions of certain economists who do not like the government's wage policy....

[Stolojan] The second affirmation is exactly what we are pursuing, but not through discretionary large-scale measures to indiscriminately deal a blow to enterprises, but—as established by our 1992 anti-inflation wage policy—by controlling the total salary fund at the level of enterprises in order to take into consideration the realities in each of them. We have created a dynamic macroeconomic environment, but there are enterprises that cannot give up—at the small-scale level—a certain set structure in the labor force because of specific technological processes. The trade unions favor a measure that will indiscriminately deal a blow to all enterprises. As for ourselves, we want to offer them the opportunity to act themselves by proceeding from tangible realities and on the basis of precise calculations and control of the wage fund, so that each of them is able to increase—if possible—individual wages. This is difficult; it means departing from the socialist collective mentality and from the idea that enterprises are "our mother." The affirmation on increasing the weight of wages to the detriment of profit is also Cojocaru's idea. Currently the structure of costs reflects numerous distortions, including subsidies for consumer goods that are not very clearly obvious in the costs. A measure would be to give up subsidies, to provide compensations, increase wages, and, at the same time, reduce profits. This means a decrease in budget incomes from which we grant subsidies. In our country, education, medical care, and social insurance continue to be based on a number of gratuities. If wages increase too much to the detriment of profits, then budget incomes will decrease and thus the part from which the state finances medical care, education, and so forth will decrease as well. He who imagines that a medical care, social security, and educational system may be changed over night proves economic infantilism. This tendency of pushing certain decisions to the large-scale level, which will cause uncontrollable disruptions at the small-scale level, is intolerable; it means economic dictatorship. The question on minimum wages has been misunderstood. They do not guarantee a medium level of consumption. Minimum wages mean the limit of subsistence; actually they should be above the limit of subsistence, which has to be guaranteed by unemployment benefits. I have requested that these things be examined very thoroughly and that trade union specialists be involved in these studies in order to conduct a dialogue. A few days ago I read a study made by a specialized institute (published in a newspaper). It was an initial study and demonstrated that in December 1991 the subsistence limit for a family with one wage-earner was 7,500 lei; for a family with two wage-earners 14,00 lei; with three wage-earners 17,000 lei; and with four wage-earners 22,000 lei. As you see, these figures would not have refuted the minimum salary of 8,500 lei. The minimum wage is, so to say, a historic category. In the economy, two or threefold increases—namely from 8,500 to 24,300 lei—are not normal; there are leaps regarding mechanisms and systems, while in economic variables such leaps do not occur just like that... Wasn't there something else...

[Simion] Yes, the first affirmation in connection with underrating the labor force.

[Stolojan] There is some truth in this. Such a correlation has to be examined in Romania's current situation. In countries with a market economy, underrating the labor force is a factor that would hamper technical progress, because it—as a capital investment—appears to be more costly. In our country, the state's investment potential is extremely low. Despite this, people build and buy houses. Thus resources still exist. Unless we ensure a sound foundation for the production-wage correlation, we will not be able to introduce technical progress. The correlation of underrating the labor force—delaying technical progress has a long-term validity. Unfortunately, however, at this time this correlation is not being confirmed in our country. In the short term, an unjustified increase in wages does nothing but completely exclude any possibility of introducing technical progress. Some people believe that any income increase has to "go into" wages and do not leave anything for technical progress. How can I motivate enterprises not to use everything for consumption and to leave something for investments and for progress? In tourism, for instance, some enterprises were leased for a maximum of one year and those companies are now collecting incomes that they spend on wages. They have I don't know how many automobiles (social expenses, so to say) and color television sets instead of investing the money. Thus, instead of becoming investment factors, these enterprises have become spending machines and the management of some of them have turned them into personal feuds, which is worse than during the time of socialism.

Part Two

AU1102163192 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 6 Feb 92 pp 1, 8

[Part two of interview with Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan by Liana Simion; place and date not given: "It Would Be Political Shortsightedness To Postpone General Elections"]

[Excerpts] [Simion] From what you say I understand that our enterprises are not aware of their role in the current stage. [passage omitted]

[Stolojan] The role of enterprises is to produce goods and provide services at competitive prices and quality. There is no other role. If we do not eliminate this combination of work and half-hearted work that characterized us in the past and that can be noted even now, the situation will be pretty bad. We have not been able to rid ourselves of the socialist mental complex not to lose work places. [passage omitted] In a market economy, enterprises are not social welfare units keeping everyone employed. [passage omitted]

[Simion] Do constant wage claims in Romania stem from the price explosion? What is actually going to happen to prices?

[Stolojan] How much did the Russians increase prices in a month? I will tell you: by 400 percent! Do you know how much prices increased in our country in one and a half years? By 444 percent! What does this mean? For one thing, the Russians realized our mistake and did in one month what we did in one and a half years. The effects remain to be seen in their case. When it comes to staples and foodstuffs for the people, things cannot be left to reach a balance by themselves. It is possible, but extremely dangerous from the point of view of social tension. [passage omitted]

[Simion] Then what do we do?

[Stolojan] We have to supervise price negotiations, because the revenue policy does not only include wages, but also prices. Some errors have occurred in the price policy in this period. [passage omitted] The wage problem caught us unprepared—both the government, the employers, and the trade unions. We are facing a new situation. I understand what the trade unions want: They need maneuvering space. In 1990, aside from claims and reparations, there were actually periods when wages were paid without anything being produced.

[Simion] That was a compromise at that time.

[Stolojan] You should not forget that those who made that compromise at that time had moral strength; they had participated in the revolution. [passage omitted] At that time there was a lot of maneuvering space for the trade unions: Wages increased by 60 percent; a tremendous increase that could not be explained by any of the economic theories or principles of the market economy! What is the maneuvering space of trade unions in 1992? The problem posed is the negotiations at the level of enterprises! We have to clarify how this activity is going to take place in Romania.

[Simion] How?

[Stolojan] Well, both the trade union and we ourselves are learning. I have told them that things cannot continue this way and that wages have to be linked to productivity, which is the case throughout the world. However, aside from this correlation, there is also a social compromise. It is sought to ensure the social peace that is needed in the economy, without sacrificing, however, economic stability. In Romania the restructuring of all the components of the economy has not been concluded. We are far from having finalized restructuring processes. Price changes occur, designed to correct basic imbalances created in the socialist economy. Prices and the inflation rate are higher in our country than in others. This is natural! This is where the indexation element comes in to protect people's incomes against a certain increase in prices. To mix up these problems: Production, productivity, and wages, without observing real proportions, means to preserve the situation of 1990 and 1991. Unfortunately, neither we nor the trade unions were prepared to deal with these problems by starting from a clear concept and from the experience of other countries. [passage omitted] We have come up with something new, but it is not convenient, because it is difficult to be accepted and to be implemented. An economist said that this system is something for the year 2000. That is not true. [passage omitted] During the past 40 years we achieved such a labor force structure in enterprises that now we have a labor force surplus. Although we do not like it, we have to accept unemployment. It will take years and years before we will be able to introduce technologies...

[Simion] What does the proposed system actually mean?

[Stolojan] We have changed our income policy. [passage omitted] If the trade unions, together with the enterprise managements, thoroughly examine the situation of the labor force and begin to rid the enterprises of the labor force surplus then individual wages can immediately increase. This step has to be taken. [passage omitted] If this is achieved in a responsible way, the effects will be beneficial for everybody. I think that the problem of unemployment is not appropriately dealt with in our country. We have unemployment, but we also have vacant positions. [passage omitted]

The financial situation differs between enterprises; some are able to guarantee minimum wages of 14,000 lei, while others guarantee 12,000 or 10,000 lei. This is difficult to understand, and some of the trade union leaders dislike this for many reasons. Those managers who are familiar with the figures, difficulties, and hardships encountered when trying to preserve a certain balance in a given enterprise do not get involved. They should come forth and say: Look what such a measure—compulsory minimum salary of 24,000 lei—taken at the top means. The pseudo-theory of those who support Cojocaru and who have paid him to say that wages may increase by reducing profits...

[Simion] Who is paying him, Mr. Stolojan?

[Stolojan] I do not know; obviously he is paid to say this, but such a theory cannot function in our country. The second category of people who should have clarified problems are public functionaries. [passage omitted]

[Simion] Who are the public functionaries you mentioned?

[Stolojan] All those who are working in the Ministry of Economy and Finance and in the Ministry of Labor. [passage omitted] Their position has to be neutral and objective, the position of specialists. Why does this not occur? Because those whose views they reject would remember them, and they would be the first ones to be affected, because they are not protected by law.

[Simion] Talking about changes, elections, do you think that the trade unions' fuss about the 24,000 lei, the explosion of meat prices—in Bucharest alone—exactly during the campaign for local elections also has a covert political explanation?

[Stolojan] That is possible. I have asked the Ministries of Economy and Finance and of Agriculture to come up with a solution, something against the split in the price policy.

[Simion] Are there any signs that the elections may be postponed? You have said that some parties or party factions have requested this.

[Stolojan] Local elections proceed along an even line. There is no one to postpone them. Things are progressing satisfactorily. General elections will be held in May. Once again, I want to repeat that it would be political and economic shortsightedness to postpone general elections. Those who want this are people whose position might change following the elections. I am not talking only about those active in politics, but also of those in the socioeconomic activity. Many of them are appointed after the elections. With the change of the parliament and government, the change of public functionaries will also begin. You realize that, although not overt, there is quite big opposition on the part of some of them. Very many people dream of the postponement of the elections. This would be extremely harmful from both a political and economic viewpoint. If local elections are disappointing for some people, they will reassess things and say "Well, we need more time to prepare the electorate," while others will say: "Well, the electorate is very well prepared at this time." This is where, in the final analysis, the general interests, the national interest comes in. It is important for all of us that general elections take place as soon as possible.

[Simion] Are you able to say for sure that you will resist until after the elections and that you will complete your mandate?

[Stolojan] This is difficult to guarantee. I would like to complete the mandate I have been entrusted with. However, this does not only depend on me. I am not talking as prime minister now, but as an economist. It is clear for me that a period of economic and social trouble like this has disastrous effects on the economy as would, for instance, capitulating in front of this basic problem of productivity-wages have. Just remember the terrible effect of September 1991 and what it meant at home and abroad. It meant Romania's regression by at least half a year. At this point, the problem is not that some one descends on you with a club; what is essential is the harm done and regress of the economy something that would undoubtedly happen. In our view, people feel they are moving ahead and that there is hope. This may be changed through dictatorial measures. It would not be a military dictatorship, but an economic one. Such a thing should not happen. The government's task is clear-cut: It has to create an economic environment to give an impetus to competition. When we, the government, leave our position—either after the general elections or before forced by events—we have to leave without being embarrassed to look people in the eye. I can tell you that I am not embarrassed about what I have done so far. I am dissatisfied with corruption; we have tried to bring Law No. 18 before the parliament, but the press quipped that we were returning to the past. Three months have elapsed, and nothing has moved yet. You have seen the case of "Competrol." There is no law, and there is nothing to be done about that director.

International

New Task Force of UN Officers Arrive

LD1102181392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1626 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, 11 February (TANJUG)—The task of the group of 192 United Nations (U.N.) officers who arrived in Yugoslavia today is to reconnoiter the zone which should be protected by the U.N., member of the Yugoslav State Committee for Cooperation with U.N. Representatives, Major General Slavko Jovic said. Major General Jovic told reporters that the group of officers would also consider the possibility that several more villages be included [word indistinct] zone of U.N. protection, as requested by the governments of west and east Slavonia.

Under the U.N. plan, the 'Blue Helmets' should be deployed in territories of the breakaway Yugoslav Republic of Croatia where Serbs, who are the majority population there, have proclaimed the Republic of Serb Krajina. The group of 192 liaison officers arrived as reinforcements to the existing group of 50 members of the peace operation who have been in Yugoslavia since January 7.

Six U.N. officers should also arrive [words indistinct] today, since the U.N. Security Council decided on Friday to send a total of [word indistinct] more officers to Yugoslavia.

"It is our wish that the liaison officers establish two or three more new points along the line of the cease-fire," Major General Jovic explained the reinforcements to the U.N. military liaison officers. Major General Jovic said that "regarding the Yugoslav side, all problems regarding the arrival of peace forces have been removed." He added that, however, the Croatian side now seemed to be hesitating.

Three days after unconditionally accepting the U.N. peace plan, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman yesterday told THE WASHINGTON POST and THE GUARDIAN that the local police in the Serb Krajina regions should be responsible to the Croatian authorities, which does not coincide with the U.N. plan. Tudjman also said that U.N. forces would stay in Croatia up to one year at the longest.

Major General Jovic expressed his opinion that a referendum of the Krajina citizens, as decided at a Krajina parliament session yesterday, will not affect the arrival of the "Blue Helmets" because he believes that "the decision of the Krajina parliament on the unconditionl acceptance of the peace plan is decisive."

At a session called by parliament President Mile Paspalj, the parliament of the Republic of Serb Krajina yesterday unconditionally accepted the peace plan proposed by U.N. [word indistinct] envoy Cyrus Vance. The assembly session was attended by more than two- thirds of deputies from 17 municipalities of the Republic of Serb Krajina.

Interrepublic

Serbians Claim Property in Slovenia, Croatia

LD1102215492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1823 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 11 (TANJUG)—A regulation issued by Serbia's government came into effect in the republic today under which firms and citizens should provide information about assets, claims and liabilities they have in the secessionist republics of Slovenia and Croatia.

Legal persons have been asked to forward the information filled out in special forms to the social accountancy service by February 20, and citizens will send it to their communal assemblies by February 25 this year.

The regulation also covers employees of breakaway branches in Serbia of Slovenian and Croatian firms, as well as enterprises which have property in the two republics.

The Serbian government is expected to have by March 15 this year a complete list of all property owned by legal persons and private citizens in Slovenia and Croatia.

Besides investments Serbian firms and citizens made in the infrastructure of Slovenia and Croatia - such as the Yugoslav oil pipeline, various industrial capacities, numerous hotels and rest homes - some 250,000 Serbs who have fled from Croatia to Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina have left much of their movable and all their immovable property in Croatia.

Croatia and Slovenia have also illegally taken over some 51,000 flats formerly inhabited by army personnel, as well as diverse miilitary equipment, which are all also to be encompassed in the division of assets and liabilities.

Air Route Between Serbia, Krajina Established

92BA0463C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 92 p 11

[Article by R. Pavlovic: "By Plane to Plitvice"]

[Text] Korenica, 1 Feb—Air transportation between Serbia and the Krajina was established yesterday by the first trial flight of an Antonov-26 military plane between Batajnica and the Udbine airfield, some 15 km from Korenica.

The flight was organized by the joint company Opera Orientis of Belgrade, whose airplanes will fly from Batajnica to Udbine and back twice weekly for the present, on Friday and Monday. These are military transport planes, An-26's, which will be refitted as passenger

planes for this purpose and will carry about 40 passengers. The plane will take off from the airport at Batajnica at 1400 hours and land on the runway at Udbine about one hour later. The return to Belgrade will be at 1630 hours. The trip one way costs 2,600 dinars, the price of a round trip is 4,400 dinars, and tickets can be purchased in the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] Center in Zemun and in Korenica in the business office of the company Opera Orientis, which is located on Saint Sava Square (no number).

For passengers from Belgrade who want to fly to Udbine, there is bus service from Zemun to the Batajnica airfield. Every Friday and Monday the bus will depart at 1300 hours from in front of the Pinki Hall, and the return trip from Batajnica to Zemun has also been organized.

The services of the airline Opera Orientis will also be used by passengers from Korenica and Bihac, which now have bus service to the Udbine airfield.

Upon completion of yesterday's trial flight, Bosko Bozanic, president of Korenica Opstina, held a press conference in Udbine, emphasizing that the air bridge with Serbia will afford Korenica and the entire Krajina the possibility of economic prosperity.

"If there is considerable passenger interest, the planes will fly every day," Bozanic said. "We are planning not only to carry passengers, but also cargo, because we are in the last stages of establishing a duty-free zone. We have talked with certain foreign firms which will invest their capital in the Krajina." The president of Korenica Opstina added that when peace is restored the Plitvice National Park will come to life; it has always attracted a large number of foreign tourists. Korenica, the largest opstina in Croatia, was neglected. It had an excellent raw materials base to offer, a source of inexpensive manpower, but all the revenue from the national park was taken by the authorities in Zagreb. We were proclaimed an underdeveloped opstina, although we possess a large economic and tourist potential, Bozanic said.

In yesterday's press conference, it was also announced that an independent television station, exclusively commercial in nature, might soon be opened. Korenica's leading citizen says that there are good chances of this undertaking, because there is a modern television tower on Pljesevica Mountain. All the natural beauties of the Plitvice Lakes have not been utilized, Bozanic says. We recently discovered that there are also the Cerovac Caves in the national park, and they are considerably more beautiful and larger than the Postojna Caves.

The successful operation of the air service between Belgrade and Lika depends above all on peace. The flight to Udbine is very secure, as newsmen from the Belgrade media and numerous passengers from the vicinity of Bihac and Korenica were able to see for themselves yesterday.

Federal

Jovic Assures Vance of Support Despite Babic

LD1102203592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1758 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, 11 Feb (TANJUG)—Dr. Borisav Jovic, member of the SFRY Presidency and chairman of the State Committee for Cooperation with Representatives of the UN, today sent a letter to the UN secretary general's envoy for Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance, informing him of the proceedings and decisions of the Assembly of Serbian Krajina, which definitely and unconditionally accepted the UN plan on Yugoslavia and expressed complete readiness to cooperate in its realization. Dr. Jovic recommended that Cyrus Vance suggest to the UN secretary general that the latter propose to the UN Security Council that the decision be adopted to send peace-keeping forces in accordance with the proposed plan since all impediments in the way of such action have been removed. The letter, sent to TANJUG, reads:

Dear Mr Vance,

As you have been informed, SFRY Presidency Vice President Branko Kostic, has written to Secretary General Dr Butrus Ghali informing him that the Assembly of Serbian Krajina has unconditionally accepted the UN plan for peace-keeping operations, that it has expressed full support for and confidence in the work of the SFRY Presidency and the State Committee for Cooperation with the UN Representatives in connection with the involvement of the peace-keeping forces, and, in particular, that it supports the stands in the letter that the SFRY Presidency sent to the UN secretary general on 3 February 1992.

In a separate decision, the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, as the highest organ of government in that territory, has committed all local organs to give their full support to the UN peace-keeping forces in the realization of the peace-keeping operations.

In response to your inquiries, I am informing you that the Assembly is composed of 112 deputies elected in 16 Krajina municipalities. The session was convened in Glina by Assembly President Mile Paspalj. The work of the Assembly was legitimate because it was attended by 87 deputies, which is more than the two-thirds quorum.

Moreover, that number included representatives of all municipalities, including representatives of the municipality of Knin. Eighty-one deputies voted for the unconditional acceptance of the UN plan, there were no votes against, and six deputies abstained.

Therefore, with these votes the UN plan was definitely and unconditionally accepted and complete readiness was expressed for cooperation in its realization.

Yesterday's convening of a session of the Krajina Assembly in Knin on the part of Milan Babic was the consequence of the realization that he has been left

isolated in his stands and without the support of the highest organ of government of Krajina. The majority of deputies, some 80 of them, did not even respond.

The attempts to form new municipalities and elect new deputies have not secured the legitimacy of this assembly either. The decision on a referendum at which the people would vote on the acceptance of the plan, which this assembly adopted, is also without any legal basis and effective validity.

I therefore consider that no great importance should be attached to all this. Formally, all the stands and decisions of this assembly are invalid, because the qualifying majority of deputies needed for decision-making did not take part in it.

In fact the UN plan has been supported and unconditionally accepted by the highest representatives of government in Krajina, its organs are committed to affording all necessary assistance and support in the implementation of the peace-keeping operations, and since this has also already been given on the part of the other Yugoslav organs, there are no longer any impediments to the successful commencement of the operations.

The resistance of Milan Babic is now reduced entirely to a personal issue which can have no effect on the behavior of the competent organs and citizens.

On the basis of the real situation, with full responsibility and all the necessary guarantees, I recommend to you that you suggest to the UN secretary general that he should propose to the UN Security Council the adoption of a decision on sending peace-keeping forces in accordance with the plan which you have put forward, in view of the fact that all impediments have been removed.

Yours sincerely, Dr Borisav Jovic, president of the State Committee for Cooperation with the UN Representatives.

A copy of the letter has been sent to Marrack Goulding, UN undersecretary for peace-keeping operations, the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs says.

Defense Official on JNA Hopes for UN Plan

92BA0452C Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Jan 92 p 10

[Article by S. Ristic: "A Meeting of the Council for National Defense on the Current Situation in the Country: Eliminating Yugoslavia Is a Dangerous Precedent"—first paragraph is NARODNA ARMIJA headline]

[Text] It is absurd for a regional association to eliminate an internationally recognized state, which, moreover, is not even a member of it. The liquidation of a UN-member state is completely absurd politically and legally—Admiral Stane Brovet told the delegates.

Admiral Stane Brovet, deputy federal secretary for National Defense, began his speech on the current situation in the country at last week's meeting of the Council for National Defense of the Federal Council of the Assembly of Yugoslavia by recalling the points of the Geneva agreement on the cease-fire of 23 November 1991 and the Sarajevo armistice agreement, signed on 3 January of this year.

In his words, the Croatian side has not honored the Geneva agreement, which called for an immediate cease-fire and the unconditional lifting of blockades of bases and garrisons in Croatia. This is indicated by information that, between 23 November 1991 and 3 January of this year, Croatian forces carried out 1,277 attacks on units and facilities of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA]. Of this number 1,226 attacks were made on units, 99 attacks on the air force, and 27 on military columns. The average number of daily attacks during this period was 31; this, as Admiral Brovet said, only proves that the Croatian side has not adhered to the cease-fire and armistice.

As for the Sarajevo agreement on a cease-fire, the fifteenth in order, which, in some ways, is only an elaboration of the Geneva agreement, it has been implemented to a somewhat greater extent, but information again shows that the Croatian side is constantly violating it. Thus, in the words of Admiral Brovet, there were a total of 106 attacks on JNA units between 3 and 15 January, or nine daily on the average. These attacks were of a sporadic nature and most of them were on the territory of western Slavonija, Lika, and Dalmatia.

The JNA has consistently adhered to the Geneva agreement, said Admiral Brovet. It did not open fire first in a single instance, and it responded to attacks only when the lives of its troops were threatened (it responded to attacks in 65 percent of the cases), and after the signing of the fifteenth truce, returned fire in only 16 percent of the cases. All these facts and figures indicate, added Admiral Brovet, that there is still a lack of combat discipline on the Croatian side.

Reflecting that the Geneva agreement in addition to an immediate cease-fire also called for the unconditional lifting of the blockade of bases, Stane Brovet, deputy federal secretary for national defense, said that it "has practically never been implemented," and that the withdrawal of JNA units and military equipment was carried out with great difficulty. Only the transfer of the Pula and Rijeka garrisons took place without difficulty, he said, and we had significant problems in Zagreb, Sibenik, and Divulje. But, despite all difficulties and obstacles, that task was carried out.

In continuing his speech, Admiral Brovet spoke to the delegates in detail about the concept of the peaceful operations of the UN in our country. He first pointed out that this concept calls for the establishment of protected UN areas on the territory of Krajina, western Slavonia, and eastern Slavonia, which would be demilitarized, with the departure of all armed forces except the UN's. In his words, this concept guarantees the Serbian populace that they will have their local government, their

judicial organs, schools, tax system.... Territorial Defense units would be disarmed, but not disbanded, and the arms would be stored in depots guarded by the local militia, in addition to UN forces.

"The arrival of the main part of the UN peacekeeping forces of about 10,000 men (based on experience with their deployment in some other countries) could be expected three weeks after a decision by the general secretary of the UN on their use," said Admiral Brovet.

Replying to a question by delegate Selimir Manojlovic whether the Croatian side can utilize this truce for new preparations for combat actions, considering primarily the fact of the recognition of its independence and how the SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense] views the protection of the Serbian people in threatened areas, Admiral Brovet said:

"My personal view of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the EC is that this act is unfortunate from several aspects, because it can significantly reduce the prospects for a peaceful solution of the crisis. It is absurd for a regional association to eliminate an internationally recognized state, which it has asked for good services, and which, moreover, is not even a member of it. In addition, the liquidation of a state, a member of the UN, is completely absurd politically and legally and a dangerous precedent that prejudices the resolutions at the Conference on Yugoslavia, and thereby destroys the European Security Committee document on the inviolability of international borders, and the EC showed its biased view in favor of the secessionists."

It is possible, considers Admiral Brovet, for Croatia to use this cease-fire for new preparations, but at the same time he believes that an attack on territories that would be protected by UN forces would be much more risky, because the guarantees of the UN as a world organization are much stronger than EC guarantees. If there is an attack, then the blame is clear, and the presence of UN forces guarantees that the guilty party will be treated in an appropriate manner and that appropriate steps will be taken against it.

The deputy federal secretary for National Defense sees only two ways to the solution of our crisis: the first is the most urgent possible introduction of peacekeeping forces of the World Organization, which would assume from the JNA the function of preventing genocide against the Serbian populace, and the second is the continuation of the war, which would spread to other areas (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sandzak, Macedonia). If the clashes spread, this would be a war by everyone against everyone, in the words of Brovet, and those who recognized Slovenia and Croatia would become involved in it. Under this variation, all of our peoples would experience a great tragedy, serious losses, and massive destruction.

"The SSNO is firmly committed to the realization of a peaceful solution, whereby the introduction of UN peacekeeping forces would assure peace and a guarantee of all human rights to the Serbian people in Croatia, protection from any attacks and genocide," said Admiral Brovet.

To the question by the deputy president of the Council, Matija Andjelkovic, of whether the SSNO had created a commission for confirming war crimes, Admiral Brovet answered that there are certain commissions at the federation level, on which SSNO representatives sit, for confirming war crimes.

After this, the meeting of the Council for National Defense continued behind closed doors.

Colonel on EC Helicopter Downing, Air Defense

92BA0456A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jan 92 p 10

[Article by Branka Mitrovic: "The Sky Is an Open Book"]

[Text] "Mahmut Skadrak is the second man who certainly knew the entire murder plan. He is a Muslim from Sandzak who declares himself to be a Serb and who is forced to make concessions to the Serbian authority. The first is Marko Negovanovic, who thought it all up and tried to carry out a putsch in the army."

That is what GLOBUS of Zagreb wrote after the EC helicopter carrying an observer mission was downed near Varazdin on 7 January about Colonel Skadrak, flight unit commander at the Bihac air base, while ST even published the name of the pilot who killed the five foreigners. This was supposedly Omer Avdakovic, captain 1st class (who does not fly at all), who was the colonel's subordinate. BORBA, however, has learned that little of this squares with the truth. The only accurate facts are that the pilot did take off from the Bihac air base, that he is of Muslim nationality, that he comes from a squadron that, now that this numbers game has become so common, is made up of about 80 percent so-called non-Serbs, and his name will soon be made public.

All of this is asserted by Col. Skadrak himself, who was far from his work station at the time when the helicopter was downed. That is, he had been in Jahorina since 5 January, but his name has been mentioned frequently in the Croatian press and he has been urged to say something more about this tragic event, although in the Army it is not exactly popular to "get oneself noticed."

Two Aircraft Were Detected

"To make it clear, it must first be said that the air defense system is such that the unit which I command provides the force, that is, the pilots, but they are directed by the operations center in Bihac, which was previously in Zagreb. That center has a direct line to Belgrade. That is, the moment the red light for the takeoff of fighters is lit, I have nothing to do with them, and the pilots are commanded by the operations center,

and the guidance officer who is guiding the pilot at the radar station decides what he will do. The pilot has no opportunity to do anything independently," Col. Skadrak said.

"That day when the accident occurred, as far as I know, our air defense system detected two low-flying aircraft with observation radar. We did not know what aircraft they were. It is up to the guidance officer to send the pilot to intercept and identify the object, or he will order it to be destroyed immediately. I would say that in this case two versions are possible. According to the first, because recently there have been quite a few aircraft coming from the direction of Hungary, carrying armament and dropping gas cylinders, if a low-flying object was recorded on the radar at low speed, the officer at the radar station could have concluded that this once again was some small Cessna or Piper and ordered it to be brought down. In that case, an air-to-air missile is fired at a range of six to 12 km, and the pilot of the MiG would not have been able to make any visual contact with the helicopter," the colonel explained.

What Has Been Coming From Hungary

We have heard that small aircraft had been destroyed even before this tragic event. They have been coming with arms from the direction of Hungary, it is asserted in army circles, but the Army and the other side have kept silent about this. After all, so it was explained to us, a large number of those aircraft have fallen on Croatian territory, and there were no official figures on this. Perhaps the obituaries in VJESNIK or VECERNJI LIST a day or two after the action are the only certain sign the Army has had that these aircraft were brought down. It is evident from them that it is the pilots who have been the victims, and many of them, because until recently they "defended" the colors of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], were known personally to people in the Bihac Corps. There was no other information except that, because that territory is inaccessible to the JNA.

"I do not even think that my unit will be held accountable. Unless someone stirs up trouble, this case could easily be resolved and the person really responsible could be found. In the air force, there are so-called written traces, everything is recorded, and when it is all put together one easily arrives at an open book. Anyone who wants to read it in good faith will read it, and who wants to confuse the issue will confuse it. There are quite a few things which must be clarified. It is difficult to assert anything absolutely without evidence, but if the regional control in Zagreb had a flight notification it should have forwarded that notification out of professional fellowship if nothing else. In any case, their regional control has not been included in the Yugoslav system at all, it is not recognized by all international organizations, and it controls the pilot in the sky on its own. What is more, there is no coordination at all with the regional controls in Bihac or Belgrade, and Bihac, for instance, has a duty unit that is responsible, this is an absurdity now, for the entire western sky," Col. Mahmut Skadrak commented.

Croatian, JNA Leaders Discuss Army Withdrawal

92BA0466A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by I. Profaca: "Meeting on Vis Between Representatives of Croatian Government and Yugoslav Army: Good-Bye—In Three Phases"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] The Croatian side demands that the first phase be the departure of the Federal Army from Vis and Lastovo, that the second be a withdrawal from regions in which there are no provisions for the arrival of peacekeeping forces, and that the third be a withdrawal from regions in which the blue helmets will be deployed, where the departure would take place in parallel. The Army has proposed that all phases be linked to the arrival of peacekeeping forces.

Split—Although it had been announced that they would be meeting only with opstina authorities on Vis, Croatian government minister Davorin Rudolf and Vice Prime Minister Mato Granic also met on this island with a very high-ranking delegation from the Federal Army, including Gen. Andrija Raseta, Adm. Mile Kamdic, Gen. Nikola Mladenic, and battleship Capt. Milan Radovic.

Although no document was signed, what journalists found out after the meeting, which was closed to the public, is nevertheless encouraging. The Croatian side demanded that the Army withdraw from Croatia in three phases: The first would be the departure from Vis and Lastovo; the second would include a withdrawal from regions in which there are no provisions for the arrival of UN peacekeeping forces (Dubrovnik, Mljet, Sinj, the Sibenik-Zadar hinterland...); while the third would relate to regions in which the blue helmets are deployed, whereby the arrival of the "men in blue" would take place in parallel to the departure of the Army. For its part, the Army proposed that all these phases be linked to the arrival of the peacekeeping forces, to which the Croatian delegation objected, declaring that there is no reason for such a condition.

As we found out, the Army will not create any problems in its departure from Vis and Lastovo, while the only thing that was definitively agreed to is that the complete weaponry and equipment of the Territorial Defense Force will be left behind after the departure of the Army from those islands. The military negotiators said that they will inform their Supreme Command of the other proposals by the Croatian side and then notify the Croatian side of the command's positions within the shortest possible time.

The Croatian government delegation made a few other demands, such as calling on the JA [Yugoslav Army] to disarm units of the so-called Serbian territorial defense forces and all Chetnik formations upon its withdrawal from regions in which peacekeeping forces are arriving.

In the words of Dr. Mato Granic, the Army representatives said that they will strictly observe all provisions of the settlement adopted by the UN Security Council.

Minister of Maritime Affairs Dr. Davorin Rudolf repeated the Croatian government's demand that part of the fleet of the JRM [Yugoslav Navy] be ceded to Croatia, while the value of these ships would be considered in a later settlement. The military delegation will inform the Supreme Command of this demand as well, and provide a response in the shortest possible time.

Gen. Raseta said that a date for the Army to leave Vis and Lastovo has yet to be specified, given the fact that not all the conditions for that departure are in place because, in his words, a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis has not yet been concluded. All activities pertaining to evacuation will continue, according to Raseta, under the auspices of Lord Carrington and the United Nations. The general rejected charges by some of the journalists present that the JRM is in these waters as an occupying force, saying that "you should be well-aware of when the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] arrived on Vis and Lastovo."

After the meeting with high-ranking military representatives, Ministers Rudolf and Granic met with leaders of the Vis and Lastovo opstinas, where they familiarized themselves with the situation on those islands. Dr. Granic emphasized certain positive assessments, such as the fact that there has been no fighting, destruction, or flight by the population on either of these islands.

[Box, p 3]

Responsible for Disorder

Granic and Rudolf discussed their meetings on Vis, but also many other things, at a gathering yesterday in Split, where they met with representatives of the executive councils of central Dalmatian opstinas, HRM commander Adm. Sveta Letica, the director of the regional Center for Social Work, Lena Elek, the government's commissioner for Split and central Dalmatia, Dr. Juraj Dodig, and other leaders of the Split city government.

The greatest amount of attention at the meeting was given to discussion of respect for the rule-of-law state in this region, whereby the Croatian army [HV], or rather some parts of it, were indicated several times as those responsible for the disorder. Cases were mentioned where they illegally and forcibly moved into former military housing and where certain HV units attacked civilian property (the president of the Omis government cited the Banja Luka rest home in Supetar as the most obvious example), and there was a great deal of talk about the future apportionment of property left behind in Split and environs after the departure of the Army.

Former Military Assets in Split Considered

92BA0466B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Feb 92 p V

[Article by Ivica Profaca: "The Wolf Rides Again; How To Divide Former Military Property in Split"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] The 80 buildings in the territory of the former Split VPO [Naval District] that the Croatian navy is claiming are not that significant in the context of all the property that the JRM [Yugoslav Navy] had on this coast, but what is more worrisome than that is the fact that that branch of the military is acting more and more like a special military force, and that it apparently wants to keep at least some of its comforts.

Will the military, in this case the Croatian one, play a future role of providing services to the citizens of the state of which it is an organ, something like a fire department, or will the old mistakes be repeated, so that we will end up with another state within a state? This question, although not expressed openly, was the focus of a hearing organized several days ago by the Croatian Circle, an informal association of intellectuals and prominent citizens of Split. A similar question was raised here 20 days ago, during the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] evacuation from Split, but at that time an answer was deferred until after the war. However, the aforementioned forum and the increasingly vocal ideas on this subject within all the structures of Split are forcing a somewhat hastier reaction. The fact that for now this sort of question is being raised only in this city clearly does not mean that the problem is local in nature. It relates to all of Dalmatia as well (the fate of Vis and Lastovo is especially important), but it is equally true that ideas on the future organization of the Croatian army throughout the entire republic are reflected on this microlevel.

Pipe Dreams

What all has the federal army left behind in Split and Croatia? First of all, there is the mammoth complex at the Lora naval harbor, which on its 250 hectares has several barracks and the super-luxurious Naval Training Center [MSC], which includes offices, cadet dormitories, sports fields, and the big MSC Club, with a library, restaurant, disco, coffee shops, and similar facilities, as well as a harbor, a marina, a big garrison clinic, a military prison, firing ranges, and much more. No less important is the base in Divulja, in the immediate vicinity of the Split airport, which includes a harbor, a helicopter port, buildings for military accommodations, workshops, and a nearby underground hangar for aircraft and rockets.

In addition, they have left behind the VPO Command building, the Naval Museum, the JNA Club, two smaller barracks in the same city, a large complex in Zrnovnica, including a reserve station of the VPO Command on four stories deep underground, the Military Court building, a relay station on Kozjak, and the almost

brand-new Dracevac barracks on the outskirts of the city. Nor should one forget the Military Hospital, the rest home in Duilovo, the Hydrographic Institute, and the Naval Electronics Institution. To whom will all this wealth belong?

There are many candidates, but one is mentioned most often in discussions taking place in the city: the Croatian navy [HRM]. At the aforementioned forum, Adm. Letica, the commander of the HRM, said that of all this property the only thing that interests them is Lora, with the Naval Training Center, while a decision has yet to be made on the republican level about what to do with the Military Hospital, which is currently also in the hands of that branch of the HV [Croatian army]. However, there is no small number of people who feel that once the Croatian navy assumes peacetime status, it simply will not need the amount of room occupied by the biggest naval base on the Adriatic. While some feel that the Lora fleet, which is situated almost in the very center of the city, is not even necessary and that the whole thing should be handed over to civilian authorities, others are more indulgent towards Adm. Letica's aspirations, and go along with the possibility that it could be located there with all its ships. However, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find anyone who would unreservedly support having Lora keep its current function in its entirety. Many would rather see a major university center here, with colleges and student dormitories, a modern and economically magnificent sports center, a marina, and all sorts of other things that can be located in the area that Lora occupies. As things stand right now, all indications are that these plans will remain pipe dreams.

The situation is similar with the former Military Hospital. When this institution was "handed over" to Croatian authorities, it was quickly put under the wing of the HRM, because it was obviously difficult for them to accept the living and working conditions of their colleagues at "civilian" hospitals and to share their bitter fate at the feeding trough of a perpetually impoverished health care system. After all, even though it was still a Military Hospital, a nurse there earned more money than a doctor at KBC [expansion not given] "Firule." However, there are indications that this sort of "transformation" will be difficult to carry out, because voices are being heard from many sides demanding that the hospital be taken over by the Ministry of Health. There is also animosity among the citizenry towards the approach to the hospital's existence taken by the hospital directors, so that it is recording an enormous drop in the number of patients.

The 80 buildings in the territory of the former VPO that, in Letica's words, the Croatian navy is claiming are not that significant in the context of all the property that the JRM had on this coast, but what is more worrisome than that is the increasingly widespread way of thinking in this branch of the military, which is acting more and more like a special military force and apparently wants to keep at least some of the comforts that its top people enjoyed in their old jobs. As an illustration, it is perhaps adequate to note the way in which Adm. Letica arrived at the Croatian Circle forum. He came in two largish cars with his entourage, including five or six security men, two journalists (!), and one photojournalist (!!) The whole time, soldiers stood guard in front of the building where the forum was being held, and the rest of the retinue was within arm's reach of the admiral the whole time. Time will tell whether this sort of perception will prevail, or whether the predominant one will be that demonstrate on the same occasion by Petar Simac, a member of the 6th Operative Zone Command, who arrived at the forum alone and on foot. It is true that Simac is below Letica in the hierarchy, but still....

Civilians and Military Personnel

It appears that the very fact that hundreds of former Yugoslav officers have changed uniforms and become Croatian officers will be one of the greatest problems in the effort to change, first of all, the way of thinking in the new military. All honor is due to those who crossed to the other side out of deep moral motives, but judging from the people whom this writer knows, such people are still in a minority. Whether or not the leaders of the Croatian army want it, we will once again have separate military housing, for the simple reason that the same tenants will remain there, in the same posts, but on the other side. The exception to this must be the housing of those officers who moved out, and which has largely been occupied already, mostly illegally. It is estimated that there are around a thousand such housing units, but that still leaves a very large number, around 7,000. Moreover, the former military housing fund has now become the "Primorje" enterprise and, like the hospital, it is operating under the wing of the Croatian navy. In this way, the HRM is gradually overrunning, one pore at a time, the former military life in Split, so that if nothing changes, the contention by Adm. Letica that the HRM claims only Lora for itself in Split raises doubts among many people.

Of everything that was heard at the forum, perhaps the most interesting presentation was the one by the chairman of the Split branch of the Socialist Party, Dr. Ivo Simunovic. According to him, the military clearly should not be a burden on the city, and the HRM should be quartered wherever it is truly needed and where it can symbolize something, while its headquarters should be open to the public and not in an area strictly shut off to the outside. Simunovic believes that this would also mean a redefining of the city of Split itself, with even more of it being open to the public. The entire concept of an Adriatic orientation, he says, has over the last 40 years been reduced to a situation, all under the guise of military-strategic objectives, in which cities are transformed into barracks, because of which the islands have undergone terrible depopulation, while the entire Dalmatian Zagora region has been exhausted because it represented a continuous source of people and resources. Thus, according to Simunovic, our coast is now defined by two symbols: military barracks and major industrial

complexes. Besides this, there has also been a division within the cities into civilians and military personnel, whereby the latter have enjoyed a number of privileges—from the right to housing in separate, often elite neighborhoods, to separate health care. Naturally, Simunovic is in favor of complete demilitarization, although even he agrees that this must be started once peacetime conditions have been established.

Still, all of this will depend most of all on who will actually control the military and, of course, on how long this war will continue, which has apparently become the context for the implementation of any initiative in Croatia.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

International Dispute 'Hovers' Over Mostar

92BA0452A Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Jan 92 pp 12-13

[Article by M. Petrovic and R. Ivanovic: "Under the Gusts of the West Hercegovinian Winds: Mostar Left and Right of the Neretva"]

[Text] Although it can be said quite reliably that the majority of inhabitants of ancient Mostar truthfully want peace, it is certain that the danger of the eruption of international clashes hovers constantly over this city. The city is divided not only by the River Neretva, which many now consider a future border, but also by politics. Representatives of all three majority peoples have their truths, and each of them thinks that the fuse for the eruption of clashes is in the hands of the others.

Hidden danger is felt in Mostar with every step. In fact, the streets are not so empty during the evening hours as can be heard in some news broadcasts, but that evening life in Mostar can in no way be compared with that in good old times. As if some secret force suddenly erased the smiles from the faces of Mostar citizens and took away the title of eternally peaceful place from that city.

The secret force is called politics, only no party recognizes that it has shared in the creation of this atmosphere, unacceptable for the future of Mostar. The distrust among Muslims, Serbs, and Croats has reached a limit at which an explosion can be expected at any moment. And in all this, judging from everything, the district authorities are making the principal moves. They are giving a tone and an imprint to the distrust among the three majority peoples who have lived here from time immemorial, as well as to the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], which they have accepted as their own armed force up to recently. Not counting the previous moves of the district authorities, who have directly contributed to the distrust by Mostar citizens of JNA troops, there are many more indications of the obstinacy of district leaders. Their steps are leading to the creation of chaos and the compromising of JNA units that are securing the Mostar military airfield and preventing international clashes.

As early as the arrival of reservists in this city, an unseen campaign began against JNA troops which has continued in one form or another. Two victorious parties (the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]), as well as the district leadership, were against the arrival of units of the Uzicki and Titograd corps. Although it was clear to them that these units would not come to the territory of Hercegovina if the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Presidency had not called up their reserves and the reserves had not answered the call for mobilization, since then the district authorities have been against having reservists from "the side" take care of the airport and the citizens of Mostar.

Strictly Controlled Approaches to the City

At the beginning they were exclusively called up because the alleged indiscipline of individual reservists bothered them. Now, when these problems have been resolved and when, as the commander of the Mostar garrison, Col. Milojko Pantelic, says, there is almost no criticism of the behavior of reservists, extremists from the district government and the two leading parties do not cease to attack the JNA and frighten the populace. With every gesture of a JNA member, an attempt is made to "split hairs," and there seems to be almost nothing that would, shall we say, uncover the plotters of the explosions that have very often been destroying the peace of Mostar citizens recently.

Facts are suppressed about the intelligence-reconnoitering activities of members of the HDZ, SDA, ZNG [Croatian National Guard], and certain organs of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Bosnia-Hercegovina directed at units of the Mostar garrison and the Uzicki corps, especially units that are guarding the airfield in Mostar. It is reliably known that members of the parties and organs mentioned follow and observe the change of units and submit reports about the activities of the army to so-called crisis staffs in Mostar, Citluk, and Listica. All approaches to Mostar are strictly controlled, every movement of units is followed, everything is documented and reported on through a developed system of communications. Every movement is followed at the airport. Every airplane and helicopter flight is noted and reported on, and the Mostar MUP knows planned flights in advance. Observation of military facilities in Gabela and Dretelj is continuing, as well as of storage depots in Konjic district (Ljuta, Zlatar), on which an attack is planned for the purpose of arming paramilitary units in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Taken generally, well recognizable psychological-propaganda activities are being carried out against JNA units in Mostar and vicinity. An anti-army campaign has continued in almost all forms of public media.

Leaflets, Explosions, Rumors....

Ugly words about the Army cannot be heard from real Mostar citizens. During the late night hours we strolled through the ancient city, dropped into restaurants on the right bank of the Neretva, about which it is said that they are "HDZ hangouts," spoke with people, but no one could confirm for us the numerous accusations by official authorities and the media, directed at JNA troops and reservists. And in the cafe in front of which an explosion resounded on Monday morning, they told us the day before that the reservists in the city are behaving quite correctly. But few of the citizens would not confirm that something strange is happening in the city, nevertheless, something that they can't even explain themselves.

Leaflets are being handed out, explosives are being planted, soldiers are being called upon to desert. The populace is being frightened with rumors about an Army attack. As an example, a correspondent of VECERNJI LIST in Mostar writes that the Military-Technical Institute is a "Factory for Toxic Weapons," from which the reservists have allegedly dismissed all the employees, including the specialized military personnel. With this the possibility of the destruction of these facilities is being suggested to the people; this would bring about an ecological catastrophe in the whole Neretva River basin. The majority of the populace, who truly want peace, do not know about the mass arming of individual settled areas. They do not know that the HDZ, the SDA, and the MUP of Bosnia-Hercegovina are establishing military battle hospitals, developing a system of rear supply, precisely assigning responsibilities. This is particularly being done in the area of Capljina and Ljubuski.

We have learned from several sources that, from the "Igman" Military Institute in Konjic, a system of secret channels has been developed, munitions are being stolen, which are given to members of paramilitary units in Hercegovina, and cases of the sale of these munitions in the area of Mostar have been noted. Mostar republic authorities are concealing the fact that uniformed and armed ZNG members are moving about freely and publicly in Capljina. They, instead of MUP members, are controlling the roads at night. Moreover, it is a public secret in Mostar that the extremist policy of the HDZ has come to full expression on the goods market in Mostar district. Organs of the government, without any regard for the citizens of Mostar, are sending the most valuable goods to western Hercegovina, and even to the Republic of Croatia. Large quantities of flour, meat, and other food products are leaving through Metkovic, Listica, and Split. "Jugobanka" is directing all credit potential into western Hercegovina.

Incident With the Train at the Airport

These facts are mainly unknown to the Mostar and Hercegovina public. The district republic authorities are bombing people daily with information about the danger from the Army and the reservists. When they lost the trump cards about the lack of discipline of the reservists, they switched to a "higher level" of deceiving the public. After the helicopter with European observers was shot down, the dramatic news went out over the ether that JNA troops, at the Mostar airport, shot at people on a train which, on the Mostar-Capljina line, was passing through the center of the airport. The Army was accused of shooting at people on the train at a moment when the train "stopped for unexplainable reasons in the center of the airport." But the Army sent a warning in a timely fashion to the railroad of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Mostar that the train could not stop at the airport. Until the presentation of the results of the work of a commission of inquiry, it cannot be said with certainty what really happened then.

The commander of the Uzicki corps, Brig. Gen. Milan Torbica, does not want to prejudice the results of the commission, but he concludes that the responsible organs were warned in time that the train could not stop at the airport. The railroad is justifying the stop with "objective circumstances," but that can be accepted with difficulty, especially when it is known that a real danger exists of unloading raiding groups into the very center of the airport. The district authorities are accusing the Army of that incident and do not recognize any arguments from the Army's side. However, proof also exists that clearly shows that the first shots sounded from the train. In any case the appointed commission will arrive at the truth; one must believe this. Although district and party leaders in Mostar often speak about peace and a life together, about which this team of military reporters has also been speaking these days, it is certain that they are skillfully avoiding answering questions connected with the causes of the Mostar unrest. There is still no answer to the question of who, even after the incident at the airport, again shot at the train, to be sure, outside the airport. All facts indicate that the army could not have done it, and there is still silence about who could have been the party guilty of that excess.

There are many questions without answers in Mostar. Last week we tried to speak about this with well-known citizens of Mostar, Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and others, but few wanted to get involved in political conversations or to comment on the causes of the Mostar picture and situation. For the most part, all told us that the information media "inflate" the Mostar unrest. They convinced us that no one was touching them and that one could stroll freely through the city even after midnight. We convinced ourselves of this and no one looked at us askance. But the next day in Mostar an explosion resounded in front of the cafe in which we sat in peace in the evening. This is a fact that warns and refutes all those who are underestimating the danger that is developing in Mostar.

What Kind of Peace the Intellectuals Are For

Just because of this, we sought out people in Mostar who are glad to talk about this real danger which, against our will and against our desire for peace, can ignite this very

beautiful city. Primarily, representatives of the Mostar club of intellectuals came to meet with us: Himzo Djukic and Omer Vatric. The substance of the platform of their club is that they support the peaceful option, or the resolution of all differences of opinion by peaceful means. They support the view that man, as an individual and citizen, should be in the center and represent the idea that, without the freedom of the individual, there is no democracy. They say that they are bringing all men of good will into their ranks, prepared to express their opinion freely and help to resolve conflicts by peaceful means. They say that they succeeded in October in bringing to a "roundtable" all "opposing" sides. They have established numerous contacts between JNA troops and civilian authorities. However, it is evident that their individual views are different from the views of JNA troops who, the whole time, are supporting a truthful peace, not an abstract one.

The club of intellectuals has issued an announcement which, in the opinion of JNA officers, has a negative effect on the situation in Mostar and Hercegovina. With a call to reservists to return to their homes because the citizens of Mostar did not summon them, they objectively did a "disservice" to peace. No matter how much they tried to be intermediaries and missionaries of good will, they did not view the situation realistically. Although they knew that, after a large number of reservists of Muslim and Croatian nationality failed to answer the callup, the defense of the airport was threatened, the intellectuals joined the ranks of those opposed to the arrival of reservists from "the side." Djukic and Vatric justify this with the fact that the reservists from Serbia and Montenegro came before the mobilization of citizens of Mostar and that citizens of Mostar, if there had not been this political decision, would have responded to the call to defend the airport.

The intellectuals of the Mostar club do not have good support for this claim because it is quite certain that after the appeal of the government and the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina to reservists not to respond to mobilization, those subject to military conscription from Mostar (Muslims and Croats) would not have responded to the callup even if the Uzicki corps had not come to the territory of Hercegovina. Therefore, representatives of the Intellectuals Club do not have an answer to the question of what would have happened if the Uzicki and Titograd corps had not come to the area of Hercegovina. It is difficult to believe that the "non-Muslim subjects of Mostar" would have defended Mostar and the airport, as the intellectuals like to say.

Not wanting to underestimate the good intentions of the Intellectuals Club, we can pose this kind of question: Can these neutral intellectuals have a positive effect on the resolution of disagreements and clashes by peaceful means if they start with the idea that peace can be achieved without delving into the substance and the causes of the current Mostar and Hercegovina unrest.

The Intellectuals Club, as well as other principals in the city of Mostar, avoid answering the question of who is persistently trying to maintain the tension of fear and uncertainty in the city. Is it JNA troops, who patiently resolve problems despite all the campaigns against them, or is it someone who stands behind all the attacks on JNA troops, explosions in the city....

Pilotless Aircraft Over the Airport

The commander of the PVO [Air Defense] unit at the Mostar airport, Col. Bozo Novak, known because of the withdrawal with his unit of all materiel from the Vrhnik garrison, says that Mostar, thanks to JNA troops and the inhabitants, is still a free city: "Mostar is our city and we can't attack ourselves. In order for us to defend ourselves, someone else must attack us and that, judging from everything, is clear to the citizens of Mostar. I hope that they will not forget this."

In addition to frequent explosions in the city, cases have been observed where the airport guards have been shot at, that JNA troops have been provoked, maltreated, even kidnapped. However, the most dangerous development is that pilotless aircraft have been appearing these days in the sky above Mostar, which have been able to cause great unrest and a drama with serious consequences. In the night between 18 and 19 January, aircraft appeared in the sky above Mostar, registered on the radar screens of Col. Novak's unit, which caused great alarm. The command was nearly given to open fire with missiles. However, the defenders waited nonetheless, doubting that it was a case of pilotless aircraft and provocation. This was repeated the following night when members of Novak's unit came to the conclusion that pilotless aircraft were flying along Mostarsko polje, from Citluk, from Zitomislice. Later, with the use of "invisible helicopters," the dilemma was resolved; the aircraft were guided from moving vehicles. It is not difficult to guess whose.

Judging from everything, these aircraft were launched as a new provocation of the Army. If by some chance fire had been opened on such "toys," it is clear that the warhead would not have been activated and it could have fallen in the very heart of Mostar. That would have been a tragedy for which the perpetrators of that foolish action would have blamed the JNA.

The citizens of Mostar are still attempting to prove that dark clouds have not formed over Mostar. One should certainly respect them, as well as their desire for peace, but the facts indicate that the Mostar peace is deceptive. Unfortunately, the good old times have passed when the city of blossoms was proud of the traditionally good relations between all peoples and religions in this area. This truth still lives in the people but, unfortunately, it is divided into three truths.

Among those who are deceiving the people are, unfortunately, some of the highest republic leaders, for example, Jerko Doko, minister of defense of Bosnia-Hercegovina. He recently stated to VECERNJI LIST that Mostar is the

most critical point in the former Yugoslavia, that the "Yugoarmy" is preparing something in this area and that, in case the "blue helmets" can't protect the citizens of Mostar, help should be sought from the Sixth Fleet! For Doko Mostar is "a besieged city, reservists from Serbia and Montenegro are provoking, shooting, attacks on the troika are frequent, and the property of citizens is suffering."

Should it then surprise anyone that the Neretva is increasingly dividing, rather than continuing to connect, Hercegovina and Hercegovinians?

Complications of Independance Considered

92BA0449D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Jan 92 p 12

[Article by Muharem Duric: "Acquiring an Army and a Currency the Other Way Around"]

[Text] Sarajevo, 27 Jan—The disputed referendum in Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] has left in the shadow the other intrigues that also make the situation entangled. When at dawn the day before yesterday deputies of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and representatives voted for the referendum even though the president of the Assembly had adjourned and postponed the meeting, it was noticed that night that in one of the debates a "silk sash" had been sent, just as in those dangerous times, for Hajra Balorda, governor of the National Bank of B-H.

Her "sin" lay in the fact that she had accepted the Yugoslav currency! The heaviest charges came from the former governor, and now, even after imprisonment (which is no exception among current politicians of B-H), by the republic prime minister.

Jure Pelivan and Hajra Balorda undoubtedly have many personal accounts that have not been settled, just as there are many loose ends left all over the republic from the earlier period, which was well-known for its major scandals. All of this can be seen in the present situation and even has an impact on it. Avdo Campara, general secretary of the Assembly, a former player and still an important officeholder, became involved, although marginaly, in the dramatic events in the B-H Assembly. In his own particular style, familiar from before, at some late hour, and after more than 10 hours of debate, he saw fit to call attention that the operating procedure was not being complied with.

It is no wonder then that everyone, each looking from his own vantage point, judges the decisions of the others to be illegitimate. That was also the case with the most recent dismissal of the governor of the bank.

As Republic Prime Minister Jure Pelivan was successful with a segment of the public in putting the "blame" on the governor, but, as is well-known, she got him back for it. The strong HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] current in Herceg-Bosna has been trying, if it has not already succeeded, to appoint its own man governor. At first, the focus was on Jadrano Prlic, there was a hitch, and then Mirko Puljic. Both at one time held the post of vice chairman of the B-H Executive Council and they have remained on their feet following the fall of the Communists in B-H.

And while the danger of the "Yugoslav dinar" was "imposed," the "Croatian dinar" found a home in Bosnia and Hercegovina, that 70 percent of whose border is with Croatia. Large amounts of old money arrive from the Croatian side in the central republic to be exchanged. Bosnia has had a hard time purging itself of its previous scandals, but it was unable to escape the "laundering of money."

At this moment, Bosnia wants its own currency, something which all analyses of any seriousness refute at the very outset. It also wants its own army. A strictly secret draft law on military defense is just one of the many secrets which are in fact open secrets. Jerko Doko, minister for national defense, figures here in the principal role. His deputy, Colonel Hazim Begovic, is on the ice just like the governor of the bank.

The issues of its own army and its own currency are intertwined with one another even without the business of the colonel and the bank governor.

They are trying to remove the bank governor, in the assessment of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] of B-H, because she attempted to provide Bosnia-Hercegovina monetary protection.

"Were we to introduce our own currency, it would not exist in 60 percent of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Householders who have been saving for decades would be impoverished in two or three weeks, because they would exchange their wealth for worthless paper and would end up in a difficult situation," was Dr. Karadzic's comment.

The presence of the Army in B-H is a large thorn in the eye. Irfan Ajanovic, a militant leader of the SDA [Democratic Action Party], has calculated that there are 50,000 professional soldiers in B-H at the moment. He was also precise in another way when he calculated that there is a soldier for every eight inhabitants of B-H. The fear is intensified in this way, and the threats of the "dinar from Topcider" continue.

Again, according to Ajanovic's calculations, of the present number of soldiers in Bosnia-Hercegovina, about 8,000 men should belong to Bosnia, and the rest should withdraw.

So, in Bosnia it comes down to endeavors for its own currency, its own army, and finally—a sovereign state. Except that the sequence as a rule is the other way about.

People generally forget the essence of the thing. But it is the essential differences that have brought about the most recent drama in the republic parliament, when Alija Izetbegovic personally appeared on the scene as the

principal protagonist. In OSLOBODJENJE today, instead of explaining his action, that took an unfavorable turn, he attempted to interpret the thoughts of Muhamed Cengic and Dr. Radovan Karadzic, who at one point found themselves together at the speaker's stand in the parliament expressing views that were close. A division of Bosnia, Izetbegovic is convinced, cannot be accepted. "If Bosnia-Hercegovina were divisible, it would already have fallen apart," Izetbegovic declared.

Divisions among the HDZ-ites in B-H are becoming increasingly obvious as well. Some are still for Bosnia in the communist vision in what they say, which has resulted in inevitable erosion, while others do not conceal the fact that they aspire to a "rich, democratic, Adriatic, and European state of Croatia."

Serbian Deputies in Bileca Claim Autonomy

92BA0464C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 92 p 16

[Article by N.A.: "Republic Authorities No Longer Have Jurisdiction in Serbian Autonomous Oblast Hercegovina"]

[Text] Bileca, 30 Jan—In a joint meeting with opstina presidents and some of the Serbian deputies held 29 January in Bileca, the government of SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Hercegovina debated this current sociopolitical situation. As we were informed by Milorad Bojovic, prime minister of SAO Hercegovina, the following decision was adopted:

SAO Hercegovina supports in all respects the views and conclusions of the Assembly of the Serbian People on 28 January 1992 as well as all earlier decisions and conclusions of that body, the decision states, adding:

"Full authority of the elected bodies of SAO Hercegovina, legislative, executive, and judicial, is being established on the territory of SAO Hercegovina, which means that hereafter the authorities of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] no longer have any jurisdiction whatsoever on the territory of SAO Hercegovina."

At the same time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of SAO Hercegovina is ordered to begin immediately to take over all powers from the previous Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to ensure public peace and order and the safety of all citizens and property on the territory of SAO Hercegovina. The military ministry is required to act in a similar manner within its area of responsibility, but in cooperation with the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], in order to secure the territory of SAO Hercegovina.

All other bodies and organizations, financial institutions on the territory of SAO Hercegovina in particular, are required within their respective areas of responsibility to undertake organizing at the level of this SAO.

Opstina executive authorities in SAO Hercegovina are required to coordinate with the government of SAO Hercegovina and carry out decisions of the government on the principle of subordination, the decision of the government of SAO Hercegovina states.

Concern Expressed at Serb Expansionist Tendencies

92BA0464A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 28 Jan 92 p 7

[Article by Zeljko Luburovic: "In the Pincers of the Serbian Democratic Party Serbs and the Yugoslav Army"]

[Text] A superficial acceptance of the thesis that, by ignoring the decision of the Assembly scheduling an all-Bosnian referendum on the independence of that republic, the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina have merely carried out an imperative from Belgrade concerning "all Serbs in one state," would overlook certain essential details that constitute something new in Belgrade's policy.

We should not immediately think, because it is not a case of that at all, that Belgrade has given up on expanded Serbia. Just like the reduction of its claims in Slovenia and Croatia, Belgrade, under the pressure of the international community, is now also attempting to play a game in Bosnia-Hercegovina that would end up in keeping with the logic of having your cake and eating it too. The proposal of Radovan Karadzic on confederalization, i.e., on constitutional transformation of that republic, is certainly a contribution to that. While some have seen that proposal as merely a stepping stone toward secession of the Serbian canton and its annexation to Serbia, others, consistent with the position of the international community that it will soon recognize Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H], have seen the attempt of Serbian expansionist policy to achieve even within an independent B-H the maximum political and other control over the territory of that republic where the Serbian population is in the majority.

The Serbian Army "Always on the Alert"

If we compare the opinion of the latter with the statements of Branko Kostic and the Chetnik Vojvoda Vojislav Seselj, in which they comment in their own characteristic way on the arrival of the "blue helmets" in Croatia and the withdrawal of the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] in B-H, it is easy to discern that the behavior of the SDS Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina at the moment does not represent mere inertia of the political/nonpolitical activities of Serbs outside Serbia up to this point. First of all, both Kostic and Seselj accept the arrival of the "blue helmets" and the withdrawal of the so-called JNA, but only 60 km from the border with the Republic of Croatia. [text missing] It is not difficult to imagine the stance that will be taken by that powerful army in the future development of the political situation. Especially because in return for its "good life" Serbia is calling upon them to be on constant alert toward Croatia.

That transforms that army into an echelon for intervention of the Republic of Serbia, an echelon that would be in constant alliance with the Serbs in B-H, and with those in the so-called SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] krajinas in Croatia would hold the republics of Croatia and B-H in a pincers that would represent long-term pressure. That set of events would give Serbia such an advantage over those republics that its constant threat of the whip would be a reductive element of Croatian and Bosnia-Hercegovinan independence, but also a factor disrupting peace in the Balkans.

Even Turkey Has Rejected Milosevic's Call for Help

However, the plan for constitutional transformation of B-H was eliminated by adoption of the decision scheduling a referendum on independence of B-H, and the arrogant secession of the Serbian people from that republic, which, like the one in Croatia, can only grow into war and finally mark the defeat of the policy of Serbian expansionism. Especially because Turkey, the most loyal and obedient American ally in the Balkans, rejected Milosevic's call that B-H and Macedonia not be recognized. Taken together with the statement by American Ambassador Warren Zimmerman that the United States will not look on coolly while B-H is splintered by force, that rejection is more than an accident. That is, if the Serbian expansionist establishment opts for the destiny of war even in Bosnia-Hercegovina, it will have unquestionably signed its death warrant. Its army will no longer be able to rely on arguments like those about the Ustashi, about the threatened Serbian people, etc., and sell them to a world that now has openly told Serbia—stop.

So, it is quite certain that the policy of the fait accompli of the SDS Serbs in B-H is most harmful to themselves.

Options Reviewed To Resolve JNA Status

92BA0449B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Jan 92 p 7

[Article by Radovan Pavlovic: "The Army and Bosnia"]

[Text] While the Army, without much pomp, is slowly packing its bags on the territory of Macedonia, the question is arising whether its units will take those same steps and leave the boiling "Bosnian pot."

The dilemma has become particularly relevant in the past several days because of the increasingly frequent demands of the coalition of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and SDA [Democratic Action Party] on a referendum for a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] and also on an appeal to Muslim officers and soldiers to avoid serving in the ranks of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. At the same time, the Army is exposed to frequent provocations, but also to an attempt to run the fuse of war from Croatia into B-H and thus light the Bosnian "powder keg."

Military sources say that there are about 16,000 armed extremists of the HDZ on the territory of western Hercegovina, and movements of Paraga's "HOS-ites" [HOS - Croatian Armed Forces] have also been noted. The situation is particularly dramatic in the Neretva valley, where, as military analysts warn, it could flare up any day. At the same time, reliable sources say that in other parts of B-H with a majority Muslim population armed formations of the SDA are being rounded out under the old names of "Handzar Division," "1st Muslim Detachment in the Islamic Republic," and so on. When the Army withdrew from Slovenia and Croatia, a large quantity of arms and members of the JNA were concentrated on the territory of B-H. The 2d Military District was formed with its headquarters in Sarajevo, and at the moment it is the best-equipped and largest army on the territory of "truncated" Yugoslavia. This has been hindering Alija Izetbegovic and his allies in the HDZ, so that in a recent meeting with the top Army leadership they sought guarantees that the JNA will not intervene in the political resolution of the B-H enigma.

In view of the large quantity of weapons and the awakened interethnic enmity, the situation in Bosnia is one which many have described as raw. A volcano which could erupt in flames at any moment. In such an environment, Army circles say categorically that withdrawal of JNA units simply does not come into consideration, because by its presence the Army is managing to restrain the bloodshed to some extent. There is no solution for the destiny of Bosnia-Hercegovina, they say, without the presence of the Army.

A Large Concentration of Weapons

However, the Army is not and will not be a protagonist, but a factor for a political solution in our central republic, military authorities say. So, the Army is not leaving Bosnia until a political formula acceptable to all three nationalities is found.

As things stand at the moment, in view of the option proposed in the recent discussion between B-H authorities and military authorities, there are three alternative solutions concerning the status of the JNA in B-H. The first idea is the so-called Yugoslav option, in which the fate of the entire JNA would depend on Yugoslavia's future system. That is, in the future governmental community (it would be made up of four sovereign republics) there would be a unified system of defense, accompanied, of course, by an appreciable reduction of the federal army and its complete deideologization. This model was proposed by Alija Izetbegovic himself, along with his special "amendment," which is that in future ethnic quotas would be respected in important command posts. More accurately, the SDA leader is calling for more Muslim generals in the JNA than up to now, and, in particular, more of them appointed to the most distinguished command posts.

Bosnia Lives Off the Defense Industry

The second possibility envisages the creation of republic armies, while the federal army would "keep" certain important arms such as the air force, the navy, and certain special units (atomic, biological, and chemical defense). According to this concept, the Army would not withdraw from Bosnia except for a partial reduction of its contingent, and it would also retain the entire defense industry on its territory.

The third alternative actually calls for disbanding the Army and creating republic armies. This is the so-called "Serbian option," and it presupposes total withdrawal of Army forces from Bosnia, which would find refuge only in Serbia.

There is one other factor that must not be forgotten. Almost all of Bosnia and Hercegovina is at the moment living on Army pie: About 55 percent of the capacity of the defense industry is installed on its territory, and those plants employ about 30,000 people. Towns like Bogosce, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Bugojno, Konjic, Mostar, and Gorazde live almost entirely from the production of weapons. If the factories were moved from those towns, thousands of workers would be left on the verge of starvation. If the B-H leaders are not taking that into account, it is certain that the "ordinary people" of Bosnia are.

Independence Viewed as Only Alternative

92BA0403A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Zeljko Kruselj: "Bosnia and Hercegovina: Independence or Disintegration? Alija Between Yugoslavia and Southern Slavia"]

[Text] Izetbegovic's proposal "for a new Yugoslav association on the territory of the disintegrating federation" inevitably reminds one of the fairy tale about Snow White in a country of political dwarfs.

In the midst of "the twelve's" distribution of belated "Christmas gifts," diplomats of the former Yugoslav republics are rushing in a panic from one European metropolis to another, gathering the last points, while at the same time the leaders of Bosnia-Hercegovina are more occupied with walking on the brink of the abyss. Judging from informal information, but also the poor work of its diplomacy, the central republic will certainly not be included in the rank of independent states on "D" day, although the possibility will remain open to it of resolving its internal "dubious situations" and subsequently joining the fugitives from Belgrade's embrace.

The whole policy in the land of "threefold sovereignty" is being reduced, despite the exchange of verbal fire, to buying time, or waiting for international circumstances to "disarm" the rivals in the conflict over Bosnian-Hercegovinian independence. The Croats in this republic are playing the same cards that led to the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, if possible without bloodshed. The Serbs are doing just the opposite of this, believing that the EC and America will "buy" Serbian appeasement precisely with Bosnia-Hercegovina's remaining in a "mini-Yugoslavia." Nevertheless, the Muslims are acting the "UN," attempting to level what they don't even believe in themselves. The leadership of the Party of Democratic Action is probably the only convinced patron of dialectics on the globe, more accurately, the syntagm that "thesis and antithesis equal synthesis." Namely, if the interests of the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia-Hercegovina are in objective contradiction, then the Muslim "synthesis" is really an agreement with the general paralysis of political life, with unforeseeable consequences for the general security of that part of the Balkans and Europe.

The Plan Has Been Delayed Some 15 Months

Alija Izetbegovic, whom his admirers like to compare with "an oriental wise man," presented the public several days ago with a long-announced, certainly prepared plan for the creation of "a new association on the territory of the disintegrating Yugoslav federation." Just as eastern wisdom is characterized by the lack of a feeling for time, as well as for place, so Izetbegovic's plan has missed by some 15 months, constituting a mirror of the complete rigidity of the policy followed by the majority people in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The story of the "new south Slavic association of six independent republics" inevitably reminds one of a fairy tale about Snow White in a land of political dwarfs, to whom the evil stepmother, in the form of a two-headed Serbo-Croatian monster, slipped a poisoned apple in order to rule the Bosnian kingdom peacefully. And in this way, while the dwarfs sobbed with pain, Alija slept, slept in a glass coffin with his crown on his head, right up to the time that the prince with 12 faces passed there by chance. This prince, having taken the form of van den Broek, first looked sternly at what was happening in the Bosnian forest, then, in the form of Douglas Heard, observed the general wailing with disinterest for a time, to be transformed next into the good-natured Genscher and, instead of a kiss, hit him hard on the back. The poisonous apple, and whatever else was left over, flew like a bullet out of Alija's insides, and the more powerful prince, utilizing the factor of surprise, immediately slipped him a form for seeking national independence. The sleepy Alija, in order not to offend the prince, filled it out and sent it to "general delivery, EC." Next, recovering from all that uproar which interrupted his dream about paradise on earth, he pondered, pondered, and somewhat heard the news about another Snow White who bit into an apple in the Moscow Kremlin, and then he pondered again, and finally he decided: Yugoslavia has disappeared, long live southern Slavia!

According to the Principle of "Thesis and Antithesis"

That is certainly the end of the fairy tale, although the Bosnian political dwarfs now must work in the mines

from morning to night to feed the Yugoslav army, which has arrived in full battle readiness in order to protect them from the loitering of whatever Snow Whites and princes.

Perhaps there is not too much room for irony in "this complicated situation," but Izetbegovic's political instinct has indeed been worthy of general attention. The concept of a southern Slavia, in order to depict its essence most easily in one word, is really a slight refinement of the plan of Croatia and Slovenia for signing a confederal agreement, pointed out to the public back in the fall of 1990. Then it met with the greater or lesser antipathy of the other four republics. The answer of Bosnia-Hercegovina has been the oft-mentioned "Izetbegovic-Gligorov plan," some type of hybrid of the completely opposing interests of Slovenia and Croatia. The republics, as Izetbegovic then conceived it, would be subjects of international right, but it would also be a federal state, there would be a joint currency and army, but the republics would also have the right to some of their own economic and security mechanisms, and all according to the principle of "thesis" and "antithesis" in this way. If all in the former federation agreed that the 1974 Constitution was controversial in its intentions, then the "Izetbegovic-Gligorov plan" was yet another step in binding the relations of the six Yugoslav republics.

In the meantime Izetbegovic lost his coauthor, since Macedonia decided on independence but, with an umbilical tie to the Croatian-Slovene plan, first relied on the good international reception of the Society of Independent States, the former Soviet Union, diplomatically recognized even before the individual republics met the criteria of the EC for recognition of new states. Certain parts of Izetbegovic's plan for a society "without customs duties and travel documents" were copied almost verbatim from the text of Yeltsin's experts, especially maintaining so-called highly sophisticated branches within the structure of a federal army.

Only Draskovic Supports Him

The society, put into practice, would probably function so that, for example, as Serbian extremists would enter Croatia without border checks, they would perform the work for which they have become qualified in a still unfinished war, and if Croatia complained about their behavior, Belgrade—because that would be the privilege of federal institutions—would send out a squadron of MiG's and some ground-to-ground missiles, the most certain Serbian argument for quieting political passions. After several years, if the "secessionists" were peaceful and obedient, a joint currency would again be introduced, since the Topcider printing office has proven adequate capacities for any Yugoslav society.

When Izetbegovic, dead serious, retold his "patent," and this was at a Sarajevo meeting of political parties "from all of Yugoslavia," more accurately "mini-Yugoslavia," many could not believe their own ears. Nevertheless, even with this he did not satisfy the interests of the Serbian Democratic Party, unshakeable in the parcelization of Bosnia-Hercegovina. It believes, more than in Izetbegovic, in the arrival of Arkan's volunteers, who would be a "commentary" on a possible surprise at an EC meeting.

Only Vuk Draskovic supports the president of Bosnia-Hercegovina, also with a 15-month delay from political reality. But, while he comes to power in Serbia, Croatia will also forget that it was in Yugoslavia, and it could happen to Alija's Snow White that the angry political dwarfs drive her permanently out of the fairy tale. At least because of the usual happy ending.

Croatia

Regaining Territories Considered Priority

92BA0463A Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Pjer Simunovic: "The Transparent Belgrade-Iraqi System"]

[Text] Among the priorities of Croatian policy in the end game of achieving a complete and stable state, emphasis is on restoring Zagreb's authority over the temporarily occupied areas, which is now bound up with the involvement of the "blue helmets."

That direction in the activity of Croatian policy is essential, because it automatically implies other matters of very great importance, such as the fundamental issues of national security, geostrategy, questions related to refugees and those driven out, economic recovery, and finally, Croatian interests in the neighborhood, in Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H]. The development of the situation concerning the occupied territory imposes two elementary tasks: to divine in terms of realpolitik what direction Serbian policy is taking in this case, and to figure out how Croatia is to triumph.

Belgrade sees relations with the United Nations and the involvement of the "blue helmets" as a tactical maneuver in the context of the strategy of taking Croatian regions for Serbian expansion. Because of the international pressure "on paper," it was compelled to back off from its maximum demands under which it wanted to bring in the peacekeeping forces only to the "line of conflict," and in that way cut off Croatian territory. But it is obvious that it is doing everything to maintain as much as possible of those maximum demands. The Belgrade leaders are guided in this by the mythical premise that something becomes the truth and reality only if it is stated a sufficient number of times—so that interpreting the UN peace plan they speak unendingly about the "line of separation," although nothing of the kind is mentioned in the annex of the Geneva Agreement agreed to and which states the concept of the peacekeeping operation.

At the political-diplomatic level, Milosevic is thus representing himself as "softer" on the question of the coming of the "Blue Helmets"—which he has to do because of his image in the world, while Babic and Hadzic remain "hard." This supposed "conflict" of theirs should be viewed only as a political maneuver with a dual effect—but toward the same goal, the taking of territory. There has also been mention here of the intention of the "blue helmets" nevertheless drawing a new border to the greatest possible degree. At the same time, there is the endeavor of the "SAO" [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] authorities of first drawing attention to themselves by the ploy of rejection and "authentic reflection," and in that way gaining their own relevance—in fact, Babic himself revealed this in a statement following a conversation with UN undersecretary Goulding in Knin.

And in the field, the occupying authorities and Serbian army are doing everything to emphasize the "line of conflict"—by fortification, by reinforcement, by armed provocations, and by strengthening their rule—they are driving the remaining Croats from the areas of which they have taken possession or are killing them, they are burning and destroying the remaining Croatian houses in order to discourage returnees, and they are resettling Serbian colonists.

In facing this terrorist approach, which is obviously that of a loser and of a political illusionist, Croatia probably can rely on the political-diplomatic solution and a possible military version. The military operation remains in case international mediation does not succeed, the "blue helmets" do not come, or perhaps at the very beginning they are driven away by Serbian fire. In that case, internationally recognized Croatia has a legitimate right to take back its areas by force of arms. When one assesses it realistically, it would be more worthwhile for the enemy to believe that it could do that. Its experience suggests that it can.

As for the political-diplomatic route, which is more probable—and because of growing international pressure in Serbia's isolation and its defeats on the battlefield—it is essential to persist with the greatest resolution to send back home all those who fled and were driven out, as stated in Point 20 of the Annex, and for all the new settlers to depart. The model for the solution should be Security Council Resolution 677, which clearly and resolutely frustrated the Iraqi attempt, similar to that of Serbian expansionism, to change the democratic composition of the population in occupied Kuwait. The Annex also states that the "JA" [Yugoslav Army] and Serbian paramilitary groups brought in would leave and that all military formations in the area that would be under temporary international supervision would indisputably be demilitarized and disarmed.

There must be no departure from this, nor from the position that the "SAO" structures of pseudogovernment, adopted with logs, knives, "Thompsons," and tanks are untenable. An excellent step in this case is the continuous strengthening of Croatian opcina authorities in exile and the just insistence on them as the "absolutely only legitimate authorities."

In the thoughtful, documented, and resolute advocacy of these points, Croatia has no reason to believe that it will lose through further internationalization, which has already been charitable to it, although not quickly enough.

Identifying Serbia as Aggressor Urged

92BA0463B Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Srecko Jurdana: "The Blue Helmet Is Protecting the Cockade?"]

[Text] It seems that after the visits of the last "special emissary" of the United Nations the military situation in Croatia has been articulated: It is clear that the Serbian occupation forces (under the command of the Belgrade dictator) and those who carry out their orders at the local level do not want to consent to any modification of the end of the war that would imply withdrawal of the Serbian armed force from the "crisis areas" and the disarming of Serbian war criminals, who—on the pretext of a "threatened people"—have for a year been eradicating Croats in the area from Petrinja to Slunj, from Gracac to Vrlika, from Lipik to Podravska Slatina, from Beli Manastir to Nijemci.

Serbian behavior is consistently terrorist. History records a negligible number of cases when attacks are made on those who withdraw voluntarily from areas taken by force of arms, and it was actually presumptuous to expect that no one other than the Serbs could overnight be transformed from butchers to peacekeepers. The fundamental, basic, and exclusive objective of the Serbs, that is, of Belgrade, comes down to holding on to the Croatian areas which, having hitched up the "JNA" [Yugoslav People's Army] to the wagon of their own national expansionism, they proclaim to be "Serb." On the internal plane, to achieve that objective they are using the technique of harsh occupation along with eradication of the indigenous Croatian population, settlement of Serbs in empty Croatian houses, destruction of all traces of Croatian spiritual survival, and also the positioning of Bosnia as a military-political base in the rear of the occupied regions in Croatia. On the external plane, they are using lies, deception, and hindrance.

Their logical assessment is that time is on their side. It is an incontestable fact of war that the Croatian army is not in Serbia, but the Serbian army is in Croatia. By that logic, it ought to be enough for the international community—in the name of defending the international legal order—to clearly identify Serbia as the aggressor and take radical steps to reestablish the status quo ante bellum on Croatian territory. Instead of that, the international community is acting like a conglomerate of partial interests difficult to reconcile and is taking ambivalent viewpoints toward the Serbian occupation of

Croatia. The realistic forces realize that this is an act of classic aggression, and, after a long wait, they are affording Croatia some kind of political protection. Nevertheless, that protection does not presuppose radical opposition of egoistic forces, which put their own interpretation of the former space of Yugoslavia not only ahead of the real historical course of events, but even ahead of basic humanitarian principles.

The consequence of that latent international conflict is perpetuation of the Croatian agony. Serbia is using every additional day of its military persistence in Croatian space as an argument for international strengthening of the "legality" of that presence, attempting to shift the weight on the international "scale" from "occupation" toward "the right of the Serbian people to self-determination," right up until the moment when the fatigued international community simply does not offer Croatia legalization of the status quo (accompanied by the possible threat that Croatian refusal of the proposal would be interpreted as an "act of aggression," i.e., as an attack of Croatia on Croatia). The present situation of neither war nor peace actually suits Serbia ideally, because it has been given an opportunity to continue genocide against the Croats and at the same time to cover it up politically. The Serbs, that is, are offering firm guarantees to the international factors that they do not threaten escalation of the war from their side and that the world can to that extent be at peace. Genocide against the Croats and occupation of Croatia are, of course, "secondary matters," and if Croatia pulls them into the foreground and responds to them militarily, it will be a "violator of the truce." Absurdity upon absurdity.

Macedonia

New Defense Minister Interviewed on Goals

92BA0436A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 18 Jan 92 p 15

[Interview with Trajan Gocevski, new minister of defense, by Aleksandar Damovski; place and date not given: "European Defense for Macedonia"]

[Text] Dr. Trajan Gocevski, professor at the UN Institute and dean of the Philosophy Department, SS. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, is one of our best experts on new aspects of defensive organization and the development of military systems, a man who understands the need to expand the range of these disciplines. At the start of efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis, Gocevski supported the idea of establishing a new, combined defense system at the union level. The actual development of the crisis led to an entirely different concept about the development of the Macedonian defense system. This, added to the fact that Gocevski was recently appointed minister of national defense of the Republic of Macedonia, was the reason for this discussion.

[Gocevski] A number of matters have been clarified with the drafting of the Constitution. As an autonomous and independent state, according to all international rules and the UN Charter, Macedonia has the right and the duty to organize its defense structures and to guarantee its territorial integrity and security. This also implies the need for an autonomous defense system. Inasmuch as this may involve a Yugoslav union, it is possible for our share in defense to be part of a joint function. Therefore, as the situation stands today, Macedonia must develop its own defense structures and, later, if international treaties are concluded, become part of and be assigned combined defense functions.

[Damovski] How should this new Macedonian defense system be viewed, bearing in mind the changes in defense theory?

[Gocevski] Defense should no longer be considered the exclusive domain of the Armed Forces. They are only part of the security and defense available to the state. Our defense must rest on three firm foundations.

An Integral Defense System

[Gocevski] Considering the present Macedonian orientation in relation to the trend of European integration and Macedonia's geostrategic location, the country must initiate the steps that will enable the Republic of Macedonia to become part of a collective European security and defense system. This means signing the CSCE documents and becoming part of the mechanism for the collective defense and security of Europe. This is the first foundation on which the Macedonian defense system must be based. The declaration on a united European defense policy presented by England and Italy offers the fundamental postulates on which such a policy would rest. A part of this declaration stipulates that, in addition to its members, other countries that have adopted the European defense system standards will be able to participate in the Council of Europe. Therefore, Macedonia's first fundamental concept must be based on its participation in this defense and protective system of security and defense.

The second foundation is the Armed Forces, which we must organize. The Armed Forces must consist of two parts: the operative part, or the standing Army, and the reserve, which must be based on a territorial basis. In Macedonia's case, the territorial principle in organizing reserve units is unfavorable because, in some cases, preference is given to forming units on a strictly ethnic basis, which is inadequate for defense purposes. As to the professionalism of the forces in Macedonia, as is the case with the majority of European countries, the model of civil conscription has been adopted. I prefer the model of a broader professionalism, which means that, in addition to the cadre of officers, there must be skills in which the people are professionally trained. This would be very advantageous to the Armed Forces (such as, for instance, drivers of some special-type vehicles, radar system operatives, and so forth). Their number should not exceed 10

to 20 percent of the active officer cadre, the expansion of which, naturally, could have different repercussions.

The third foundation of our defense system is civil defense and not civil protection, as we have up to now called for. The structure of the defense system should be based on a strengthened civil defense that will essentially aim at protecting the people, material goods, cultural objects, and anything else related to the state in both peacetime conditions and in case of direct military threat, war, or any other abnormal condition that may develop in our country—for example, earthquakes or epidemics.... Added to this is protection of the environment, protection against the pollution of waters and ionized radiation and nuclear accidents, and the safeguarding of information systems....

Macedonia will be able to develop such standards, with its adaptable model regulations. Considering its neighbors, Macedonia cannot rely on the possibility of being a regional power balance, with the necessary ways and means that block or prevail over forces that surround it. For that reason, it is necessary to strengthen the other forms—that is, the latent potential of the state, which will have the function of ensuring the relative safety of its space. These protective structures for security and defense must provide not only protection from military threats but also protection of the population from any kinds of threats. This means ensuring the stability of the political system, the organization of society, the economic system, and the professional means of defense and security, the environment, and the information systems.... Briefly, such is the concept of an integral defense system.

For an Accurate Division of the Assets of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA]

[Damovski] Considering that the JNA continues to remove all of the equipment from Macedonia, what would this cost us?

[Gocevski] According to the standards of the JNA for the 1987-90 period, the Macedonian forces, numbering from 25,000 to 30,000 troops (1.27 percent of the population), should cost an average $9,000 per soldier annually for maintenance alone. If we adopt the standards of European countries, the cost would reach $35,000 per soldier annually, and, according to the U.S. average, we would have 18,000 persons under arms, which would cost $130,000 each annually. Let us not forget that these figures do not include the cost of the initial outfitting of the forces. Starting from scratch, the Macedonian defense system would require some $2 billion. Naturally, this would be unreasonable because, in the past, as well, Macedonia appropriated funds for the JNA. (From 1945 to 1987, Yugoslavia accounted for 10.7 percent of the national income.) This means that our Republic has the right, in the division that may take place, to have a share of the assets of the JNA covering a certain amount of military equipment, armaments, and systems to the extent of its participation. In terms of the model I favor, this share would be quite satisfactory for an initial outfitting. However, we must not forget the equipment needed for Macedonian territorial defense.

[Damovski] Yes, but some of this equipment is stored in the warehouses of the JNA, and most of the JNA equipment in Macedonia has already been moved, mainly to the territory of our northern neighbor.

[Gocevski] The most difficult problem in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis will be that of the JNA, which, in the course of the past 50 years, developed as a compact unit, operating on a high technological level relative to the development of the country. At the beginning of the crisis, the military did not dare do what it subsequently did, which was give its exclusive support to the policy of the Republic. It did not see a solution in the possibility of creating a united defense function in the future union but in something entirely different. Thus, in the course of the talks on the division of the assets, one of the main items will clearly be the equal division of military property. And, even after that, we will still be able to discuss the possibility of having some joint functions, the nature of such functions, the tasks such a military would be able to perform, and, in general, whether it could assume some duties.

Even today, the military's problems are much worse in Serbia than in Macedonia. Therefore, it has no reason to aggravate relations with Macedonia. Following the adoption of the Constitution, a new political situation was created, according to which the military authorities are legally subordinated to the elected Macedonian leadership. No single modern country has a situation in which the military lectures the political structure on politics. Inasmuch as any such thing may have occurred, the result has always been clear: the withdrawal of a military structure. The creation of tension in reciprocal relations on the part of the military authorities in Macedonia is truly something unnecessary because, in this area, there are few reasons for such tension.

A Respective Macedonian Defense Structure

[Damovski] Nonetheless, the transfer of expensive equipment out of Macedonia is continuing. How can Macedonia put an end to it?

[Gocevski] The only way—something that, in fact, is being done—is by reaching an agreement and holding discussions that, in my view, would be the best. The second way would imply the use of force, which, I believe, no one wants. The Army must realize that there is no force that could stop a nation that would act as one in blocking the barracks and, naturally, would halt such transfers.

[Damovski] What will be your approach to resolving the issue of Macedonian conscripts in dealing with the military courts located essentially on Serbian, Bosnian, and Hercegovinan territory?

[Gocevski] In my view, the Army should abandon this unseemly practice. Extending the length of service by another three months is one more tragedy for all of us—parents, in particular. This is one more error. Trying in court privates and noncommissioned officers of a Republic that is a state and that is accountable for its own population creates further national divisiveness, which, naturally, conflicts with the Army's concept of being a Yugoslav Army. Macedonia must formulate a clear idea for the protection of these people and their return and professional training.

[Damovski] Bearing in mind Macedonia's neighbors, in terms of defense, how risky do you consider the idea of Macedonia's becoming a demilitarized zone?

[Gocevski] In terms of defense theory, demilitarization means going beyond the status of a society in which military structures dominate the civilian authorities, that become a function of the military authorities. In other words, when we speak of Macedonia, we can speak of a "free zone" or "open space...." There is no country without a defense structure. Therefore, Macedonia, as well, cannot proclaim itself a free or demilitarized zone. Studies have indicated that the factors that threaten Macedonia require the Republic to develop a defense structure with several basic functions: protecting the border system and maintaining a ready armed force that, at any given time, can counter a first strike and make possible the mobilization of the entire society, which will become a bastion of defense.... Finally, we could also say that Macedonia, in terms of its defense, will not have to provide anything more than it did in the past as part of Yugoslavia's defense. The only problem would be the start, the time needed for the establishment of this structure. However, even that could be avoided with a suitable division of the assets of the JNA.

Naturally, the price of one's own security can never be expressed in terms of money.

Future Macedonian Army 'Ambitions' Questioned

92BA0466D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Feb 92 p 5

[Article by Ivan Torov: "Peace Does Not Pay Off: The Macedonian Army and the Outcome of the Yugoslav Crisis"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] No one in Macedonia is interested in war nor in creating a bad climate in relations with neighbors. It is emphasized that any pretext for any sort of confrontation whatsoever will be avoided, but only up to the point where it is deemed that misplaced patience could threaten Macedonia.

On 15 January, having finally abandoned its illusion about the possibility that all the parts of the former Yugoslavia would come back together into some sort of gentler type of community, Macedonia also definitively renounced its hesitation about whether it should create its own armed forces. Concrete steps are already being taken; funding is being allocated in the republican budget for renaming the territorial defense forces as defensive forces; reinforcements are being sent to the borders with Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania; and the new minister of defense, Trajan Gocevski, in anticipation of a law on national defense, is engaging in large-scale marketing of his (and the republic's) ideas about what the future armed forces should look like in the new Macedonian state.

However, ambitions are one thing, and possibilities are another. At the moment, Macedonia is not able to take care of even its elementary social needs, which means by necessity that the decision to create its own army must be adapted to somber realities. At least $2 billion are needed for a real, strong army, which amounts to science fiction for the Macedonian leadership at this moment and for a longer period of time. They do not have this kind of money, nor will they ever have it, and this means adapting to the only possible option under the current, in no sense pleasant, Macedonian circumstances. All the more so since the military ambitions of the new state, as it is often emphasized in Skopje, are exclusively defensive in nature, and since Macedonia has still not abandoned the idea of this region as a demilitarized zone.

Motivation Stronger Than Weaponry

So why are Gligorov and Kljusev going ahead with the creation of a republican army? Minister Gocevski says that like it or not, the future (internationally recognized) state must have its own defense system, because that is an obligation that comes from the European security system and the UN Charter. A Macedonia with its own army could be (first of all) a "thorn in the side" of certain neighbors, but it is certain that a state without any sort of army could be too great a temptation for territorial (and other) pretensions by some of its neighbors. Thus, an army of any dimensions and strength is something of an important factor that, given a continuation of Macedonia's current peaceloving policy and its insistence on the opening of all borders for the flow of people, goods, and ideas, could have an effect on establishing the so strongly hoped-for equilibrium in the Balkans.

Although some of its neighbors continue to regard Macedonia and its military and war-waging options and capabilities ironically and with arrogant condescension ("only the big guys win"), officials in Skopje are convinced that the defensive strategy is completely adequate for the state to defend itself.

Moreover, mention is made of the bitter experience of one such powerful army, the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] in Slovenia, while not even the war in Croatia has definitively confirmed the doctrine that only he who is heavily armed (but unmotivated) wins. They are counting on the popular factor, but also on the fact that an armed attack on Macedonia by any neighbor would serve as a detonator for widespread fighting. If, say, Serbia attacks Macedonia, then it is quite certain—according to Skopje—that Bulgaria, Turkey, and perhaps

even Albania will react. If Bulgaria does so, then it is realistic to expect counteraction from Serbia and Greece, for example. Mutually conflicting ambitions, oppositions, atavisms, and the historic legacy of the Balkans are interwoven to such an extent that they give the Macedonian leadership good reason to think in this direction as well and to believe, sincerely, that armed action in the south will not be worthwhile for any Balkan state, and even less so for Europe.

Intensified Aggressiveness

However, no matter how solid the foundations for this Macedonian course are to some people—while to others it is the fruit of pure improvisation and of a reassessment of the strategic position of this republic—the strongest position in Skopje in recent days is that Macedonia should no longer wait for an outcome, listening in, pondering, and calculating, because events in the former common state, but also in Europe (around Yugoslavia) are progressing at lightning speed, faster than anyone hoped.

The moment when Badinter's arbitration gave Macedonia the "green light" for international recognition, while on the same day the European Community changed this assessment (temporarily) to "red," because at that time its interests did not coincide with Macedonian aspirations and desires, was when the leadership in Skopje realized clearly that "law and justice" do not always go together and that Macedonia could end up as a scapegoat not only of a "European frameup," but also of wider international games, ambitions, conflicts, and interests. The range of moods, from exultation and triumph (that only Slovenia and Macedonia fulfilled the conditions) to resignation and disappointment, and even fear of tomorrow (that the EC was suppressing recognition of Macedonia), has largely undermined the hitherto firm Macedonian position insisting on a peaceful course in the unraveling of the Yugoslav crisis, meaning that in no way should it contribute to further complications in that process.

The moral dilemma—to continue to play the peace card, on which Kiro Gligorov's team insists, or to follow the example of Slovenia and Croatia, an approach stubbornly supported by the national block around VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity]—has been increasingly visible and strong since 15 January, but also increasingly destructive. Advocates of the other, hard-line option (an exacerbated approach to the "remainder" of Yugoslavia) are rejoicing a little at the fact (according to their interpretation) that peace does not pay off after all and that Gligorov's course of tolerance and patience is not only directly turning Macedonia into easy plunder for the extreme nationalist politics of the majority of its neighbors, but also creating the image in Europe and in the world of a region that does not demonstrate enough decisiveness and radicalism to achieve its own state. The crowning proof that is put forward is the Slovenian and Croatian postponement of recognition of Macedonia, because those two republics allegedly demanded that the Macedonians follow their example and make life miserable for the Federal Army and for Serbia.

In fact, the proponents of such logic have become more numerous in recent times, even among moderates, especially after the EC decision to once again postpone "for two weeks" international recognition of Macedonia. A more aggressive approach is also countenanced by intensified economic and political pressure coming from Greece and Serbia to thwart the creation of an independent Macedonian state, by Turkish and Italian modifications in "quick recognition," by Bulgarian exultation at being the first to recognize "fraternal Macedonia" ("Macedonia should not forget this," says Zhelyo Zhelev), and by the extortionist position of Albania, that recognition of the Macedonian state can be made conditional on the granting of "special status" to Albanians in Macedonia and on Macedonian recognition of the Republic of Kosovo.

Course Remains, Tactics Change

But no matter how much momentum a more aggressive approach to the outcome is gaining (the decision on creating an army, withdrawal from the federation, the announcement of the withdrawal of athletes, the announced introduction of coupons or a national currency), the impression is that Gligorov has no intention of fundamentally changing his previous peace course. One would be more inclined to say that he is changing tactics. The difference in his current ideas and actions compared to those of only a month ago is that he regards Macedonian sovereignty as a fait accompli, and international recognition as a process that cannot be halted, a more energetic distancing of himself from Serbian and Greek ambitions that Macedonia remain in "some sort of Yugoslavia." To be sure, Gligorov is not definitively abandoning the idea of a new association (a wider, Balkan-oriented one), but he reduces any realization of this idea exclusively to agreement to the "Soviet recipe" for an association, while also allowing for negotiation only after Macedonia has achieved widespread international legitimacy and verification.

Although peace is the first option for the Macedonian leadership, this does not mean that everything is being left up to chance and that they will just sit there with their arms folded if the whole matter takes an unexpected course. Lately, the Macedonian government has been warning that the republic must be ready for anything, even for the most adverse turns of events. Even today, its situation is very unpleasant. It is subject to strong pressure from advocates of a "truncated Yugoslavia" on the one hand, to the Bulgarian "fraternal embrace" on the other hand, and to the unseen, in many ways inhuman and uncivilized campaign by Greece (stopping a convoy with medicine at the height of an unprecedented flu epidemic) to prevent Yugoslavia or Serbia from being a "good neighbor" to it in the future.

Given a continuation of a somewhat more aggressive and radical peacemaking course, the defensive forces, whose primary goal is to defend the borders with Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and Serbia, must be one of the levers of the new state, with which Macedonia's immediate neighbors and Europe will be shown that it will persevere in the realization of its eternal goal—the establishment of its own state—at any cost. Naturally, no one in Macedonia is interested in war, nor in creating an unbearable climate in relations with its neighbors. In Skopje it is emphasized that any pretext for any sort of confrontation whatsoever will be avoided, but only up to the point where it is deemed that a misplaced policy of patience and love of peace could threaten everything that Macedonia has already achieved.

Montenegro

Prime Minister Comments on Referendum

92BA0449C Titograd POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jan 92 p 8

[Article by D.B. prepared from statements by Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, made on the program "Signals" of Novi Sad Television on 22 January: "The People Is Deciding Its Destiny"]

[Text] Now that we are talking about the referendum, I think that it is the only logical possibility, as the present government in Montenegro sees it, an expression of political reality in Montenegro, in which today we have very loud advocates of widely varied political and also constitutional conceptions of the system of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, Montenegrin prime minister, said the night before last. In saying that, I have in mind that the forces that believe that Montenegro should be constituted as a sovereign state are neither small nor to be underestimated. In this way, then, they are implicitly communicating their position concerning Yugoslavia's continuity. On the other side, we also have, I nevertheless believe, a larger portion of the citizens of Montenegro who believe that Montenegro should continue to live in some redefined, economically and politically optimum and orderly joint state, in contrast with what has been Yugoslavia up to now. Accordingly, the answer of the current government to those dilemmas is such that it is calling upon the citizens of Montenegro to answer in a referendum in what kind of state they wish to live in the future. When I say that opinions are considerably polarized, I really have in mind that neither of these categories is to be underestimated, and the latter has several different forms. Accordingly, I nevertheless believe that no rational government is going to push a motion through in parliament or in any other government body that will automatically turn against it 30 percent of the people in the state. That is why I say we have nevertheless tried to share the responsibility for that decision with all the citizens of Montenegro, Djukanovic said on the program "Signals" over TV Novi Sad.

Speaking about the continuity of Yugoslavia, he said that in spite of our desire to preserve continuity, there is something called international institutions, which, whether we like it or not, are very important to decision-making concerning the continuity of the sovereignty of the Yugoslav state under international law. When I say this, I am thinking of the United Nations Organization. Depending, of course, on the response of the citizens of Montenegro in the referendum, and I believe that that response will be favorable in the majority, both the main committee of the ruling party and the Presidency and government of the republic have finally declared themselves in favor of that commitment—I think that the conditions are thereby brought about for Yugoslavia to continue to live without interruption in the sense of a legal state, along with an essential redefinition of the joint content of that joint state, and accordingly of the institutions of that joint state as well, Djukanovic said.

In connection with the referendum that we intend to conduct in Montenegro, I forgot about the entire negative connotation which the very word "referendum" has now in that part of Yugoslavia because it has almost become a synonym for making decisions to break up Yugoslavia. It is clear from the very statement of the question, the statement of the question in the referendum in Montenegro, that this is a completely different referendum. We have had various proposals from the various political parties concerning the wording of the question. One proposal called for stating the question this way: Do you favor a sovereign Montenegro? We considered that meaningless and a case of knocking on a door that is already open when we answered the offer that we seek recognition of the European Community under international law that we have been a sovereign state since 1878, which conveyed only part of its sovereignty to the joint state that now exists, and that the act of the possible disappearance of that joint state will again make it sovereign. Second, we also felt that the question should not be put of whether, should some alliance of sovereign states be formed, we are in favor of Montenegro becoming a member of that alliance. We have the favorable determination of the Assembly concerning that offer in the Hague document, and we felt that that was also an unnecessary question to put. So, we have opened that dilemma which we see is now outstanding and which needs to be resolved—Will the citizens of Montenegro take advantage of the opportunity, within the framework of some possibly broader and loose association with some of the Yugoslav republics which desire it, to join in a joint state? Actually, this is today the only question which ought to be put to the citizens of Montenegro and offered to them for them to decide on the decision through a democratic expression of their will, Milo Djukanovic emphasized.

Concerning the dilemma of federation or confederation, that is, the essential dilemma of the content of the joint state, Djukanovic said that in the substantiation of the referendum question they have stated what is now being offered as a possible content of that joint state. It is

stated that, roughly speaking, certain joint functions should be performed concerning defense of the country, concerning the market, the currency, the foreign exchange and customs systems, and concerning foreign policy and that legislative and executive institutions of government should be constituted after the model which we have proposed, which would ensure that those functions are performed. When, he said, we talk about the kind of new state of Yugoslavia we now favor, I think that that is clear from the referendum question and from the substantiation. The offer of the Montenegrin Assembly, because the decision is under public discussion, and it is possible that the citizens of Montenegro will correct it through the public discussion, is in favor of one state of equal republics. So, a state in which the institutions of the joint state and their functions will express the intention that Montenegro, I assume Serbia, and I hope Bosnia-Hercegovina or Macedonia as well, will be equal republics in the full meaning of the word. Accordingly, the conception which Montenegro is now offering as an initial basis for talks, because if we want to form a joint state it is quite logical that we must talk with all the potential partners about the content of that joint state, is the offer of a joint state of equal republics.

[Box, p 8]

Prevlaka

Much has already been said on the question of Prevlaka. For that reason, it is difficult to convey anything new. I think that a great deal of blood has already been shed over Prevlaka, as well as over certain other equally important issues.

The question of Prevlaka is actually a question of an essential interest both for Montenegro and possibly this new joint state that is coming into being. I hope that it is not necessary for anyone who has had occasion to examine this himself to prove that the borders that now stand between Montenegro and Croatia are illogical. That border was tenable in the context of Montenegro and Croatia living in a joint state, and it was really irrelevant whether Prevlaka belonged to one republic or the other one, because Croats have never lived on it. During the entire postwar period its inhabitants and residents have been representatives of the Yugoslav People's Army. However, when there is a desire to proclaim that border between republics, that administrative border between republics, to be a national border, then the question is really raised of whether Montenegro can allow that, and is it at all possible that Croatia in its present borders, that is, including Prevlaka, will in turn guarantee the sovereignty of Montenegro in its present borders? I think not, because Prevlaka is actually a place that controls the entire Kotor Bay, and as a completely practical matter it would not be possible for a single vessel to enter Kotor Bay without being subjected to control from Prevlaka, which would be part of the sovereign Republic of Croatia.

Which is why that is for us a very important affair of state. In view of the importance of that issue, we have taken every step to resolve it. I would remind you that we raised this issue in the Peace Conference in the Hague. I would recall that consistent with our democratic orientation toward a political solution we took the initiative to begin talks concerning this issue at the level of the Croatian Assembly and Montenegrin Assembly. I would also recall the fact that the Yugoslav People's Army is now again on the territory of not only Prevlaka, but even much deeper toward Dubrovnik Opstina, and that Montenegro will continue to insist on correction of that border—in a peaceful, democratic, and political manner, but it will truly be ready to protect its interest in every other manner.

Deputies Discuss Referendum

92BA0437A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jan 92 pp 8-9

[Article by Velizar Brajovic: "The Fate of Yugoslavia in the Hands of 102,000 Heads"]

[Text] The Montenegro Assembly accepted the sealed move of the Montenegro Presidency, that is, the draft of the decision scheduling a referendum for the citizens to declare in advance whether they wish to continue to live in a joint state of equal republics. That move, it is assessed, could bring several solutions, but it unambiguously demonstrates that the ruling party in Montenegro has broken with the policy it has conducted up to now.

That is, gone without a trace is the ruling party's advocacy by ultimatum of Yugoslavia as a modern federation, which literally came down to "federation or death." Instead, the citizens have been offered to answer YES or NO to a single question on the referendum ballot: "Are you in favor of Montenegro as a SOVEREIGN republic continuing to live in a joint state on a completely equal footing with the other Yugoslav republics which desire that?" That future state, it is indicated, would be based on the principles of a unified market, a single currency and monetary policy, a unified system of defense and joint supreme command, a joint foreign policy, with joint diplomatic missions, along with the right of the republic to also have their own consular and other missions abroad. There would also be joint legislative authority in the domain of those functions of the joint state set forth in the constitution, which would be exercised through a parliament made up on the parity principle. Protection of human and ethnic rights and the rights of minorities remains exclusively in the jurisdiction of the republics, while the joint government would be composed on the parity principle: The state would be represented by the president, an office that would be held in turn by the presidents of the republics, occupying it for six-month terms.

When President Momir Bulatovic presented all this on Saturday, 18 January, in a session of parliament, the public was in shock, caught by surprise because of the

announcement that everything would be done differently. Still more when the one-hour recess that had been proclaimed was extended to two hours, and it was then announced that the session was being interrupted and would resume on Tuesday, 21 January. The reason given was "the need for deputies to consult with their constituency." Then guesses began in various directions, imagination was fired up as to the real causes of the interruption, and that was also a burden on resumption of the session. The parties polarized.

The People's Party, for example, judged in its press release that a plebiscite at this moment would cause a disastrous division of the people regardless of the response given to the question posed by the referendum. If there are any important reasons or pressures of the international community making it necessary to hold a referendum, and if it is necessary to hold a referendum right at this time, the People's Party proposes the question: "Are you in favor of Montenegro remaining as an equal republic in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?"

The Liberal Alliance of Montenegro, as the antipode on the scale of opposition views, emphasizes the need to clearly state the issue of sovereignty, along with a warning that avoiding a clear referendum question concerning the sovereignty of Montenegro and playing with Montenegro's interest as a state and nation, dangerously strains the intraethnic conflict in Montenegro, whose consequences are exclusively the responsibility of the government and the ruling party. No pressures whatsoever, the Liberals say, to which the Montenegrin leadership has obviously and inappropriately been subjected, will prevent the citizens of Montenegro from taking the fate of their state in their own hands at this dramatic moment. Only a sovereign Montenegro open to cooperation with all Yugoslav and other peoples can make the greatest contribution to the moral uplift of the Yugoslav community, which has stumbled, and to establishment of peace in this part of Europe and the Balkans.

All of that preceded the resumption which was awaited with anxiety and distrust, with a suspicion that a political game is on the horizon in which the ruling party and the Montenegrin leadership are making a play down the center.

The debate of the law on the referendum radicalized the conflicts. The reform bloc was explicit that two-thirds of the citizens must favor the decision for life in a joint state, but that proposal did not pass, but it was adopted that the referendum would be successful if half of the electorate voted, and the decision would be valid if half plus one voted in favor. Both sides had arguments to support their views. Both said a dictatorship of the minority was possible. After all, if a two-thirds majority is required, then a third of the voters can achieve the sovereignty of Montenegro, that is, prevent its linkage to the republics which desire that. On the other side, the electorate of Montenegro numbers 405,000, the decision on life in the new governmental community, according to the law that has been adopted, could be made by 102,000 citizens voting in favor.

In response to all that, the People's Party and some of the deputies of the ruling party demanded the right to vote even for citizens born in Montenegro who live outside it, but who have Montenegrin nationality. But that was rejected on grounds that the fate of the state will be decided only by those who live in Montenegro, or, as Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic said a few days later on a live interview over Novi Sad Television, "those who live outside Montenegro will decide on the form of the community where they live, and it is realistic to expect that they will exercise their rights there, just like members of other nationalities in Montenegro."

The Montenegrin leadership was caught in a cross fire, beginning with the motion of Vojislav Jovicevic, deputy of the reform forces, to the effect that President Bulatovic say which forces were putting pressure on him, to do this publicly, here, in front of the people, clearly and loudly, is it the JA [Yugoslav Army] or the government of any other republic?

"A heavy duty has fallen upon me today," said Pavle Milic, previously a deputy of the People's Party, but now of the SNO [Serbian National Renewal], "to announce that with this proposal for a referendum, the October-January popular rebellion against the policy in Montenegro has finally been smothered by a craftily conducted separatist putsch at the top levels of power in Montenegro. Because I am one of the main ones to blame for those in power being in power, if for no other reason because of my naivete and trust, because of my participation in bringing them to power, I express my sincere regrets in public today before the Montenegrin people. This government has held us by force and repression, it has deceived us with craft, sweet talk, and cleverness, advocating much worse objectives than that other government. After all, the proposal which Momir has offered, which is either a confederation or an independent Montenegro—is similar to what is advocated by Slavko Perovic.... And if you proclaim an Independent State of Montenegro [NDCG], you know that you will wake up one morning to see logs near Ostrog, the Moraca Monastery, at Brajici and Bioce, so that you can comfortably rule the Docleans, the Skipetars, and the Muslims."

Pavle Milic emphasized in his speech how much Montenegro needs for oil, food, armament, wondering from where that difference will be made up ("Probably from exporting the clean air of our environment in cans"), and he then asked whether the Italians would pay pensions? "Perhaps those $2.5 billion," deputy Milic said, "which are being talked about and which are the price of Montenegrin honor and principle, will last forever? Gorbachev received a total of $1 billion for dissolving the USSR, but who is going to give Montenegro $2.5 billion? Those are tales for small children, which is

exactly what some people here seem to be." He ended his speech by shouting "Long live the federation of Serbian lands!"

Dr. Branko Kostic differed from Milic by a shade, expressing the assurance and hope that the principles of the new governmental community would be corrected in the public debate. He judged a parity government and assembly to be impossible, and asked whether there would also be parity in supplying funds for operation of the new state? "Let us not come to the conclusion on the basis of such proposals concerning parity," Kostic said, "not that we will not with them (Serbia), but that they will not with us." Kostic recalled that the ruling party won the election thanks to the policy of protecting the Serbian people. "Why would it bother the Muslims and Albanians if we are ready to help the Serbs in the Krajina, perhaps even readier than Serbia, because those are our people, as is evident in their last names? A separate Montenegro presents the possibility of realizing the idea of an expanded Albania, and the advocates of that idea are this very night the same ones who called for the autonomy of Sandzak." Kostic emphasized that the breakup of Yugoslavia did not come from the centers Ljubljana and Zagreb, but it is known precisely where it came from, asserting that as the scenario for creating a dozen little states plays out, it is realistic for Montenegro to be reduced to the four Turkish districts from the time of the Congress of Berlin.

Dr. Branko Kostic's speech evoked enthusiasm from deputies of the People's Party and several in the ranks of the DPS [Democratic Party of Socialists], but discussed on the part of the reform coalition, especially deputies of Muslim and Albanian nationality. To such an extent and in such manner that a goodly portion of the 12-hour debate consisted of skirmishes.

And finally, after the closing speeches of Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic and President Momir Bulatovic, the conclusions and documents were adopted in an atmosphere that does not instill tranquillity in the face of everything that will probably happen in Montenegro during the one-month public debate. The prime minister remained consistent with his own past performance and returned the charges in the "right measure." President Bulatovic was more moderate and publicly acknowledged for the first time that what 30 percent of the electorate thinks about everything is not to be underestimated. This refers to those who, it is thought, would like a sovereign and independent Montenegro, but the question is how he arrived at that percentage. Especially since recently many things have been changing in Montenegro and it is certain that the real troubles for the government are yet to come. Above all because it is burdened with various mortgages from the past, because now it will be accused by those who supported it most loyally, people like Pavle Milic and other early fighters in the antibureaucratic revolution. The conflicts will undoubtedly shed light on many events behind the scenes in past years, including those that occurred during the summit meeting of Serbian and Montenegrin leaders.

Serbia

Elections, Milosevic's Resignation Demanded

LD1002212792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1240 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, February 10 (TANJUG)—The opposition Democratic Party in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia in a public proclamation on Monday demanded that the Republican authorities immediately call elections for a constituent assembly and that Republican President Slobodan Milosevic resign.

The new assembly is to establish the future state order of the country and its national and state interests, the proclamation addressed to the Serbian public said.

The political leadership of Serbia bears the full responsibility for the Serbian people and the citizens of Serbia remaining as the biggest losers in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Democratic Party said.

The party considers that the policy of the current leadership has failed and that no-one any longer has the right to be reconciled with an uncertain future of the state, poverty and hopelessness, the plundering of national property, the physical threat to citizens and their property, unemployment and the deceiving of the public.

The Democratic Party underscored that the moment has come for the authorities to account for their actions and called on all citizens, political parties, institutions and associations in Serbia 'to support the demands set out in the proclamation with their signatures.'

Reasons for Resignation Request

AU1102170892 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Leaders of the Democratic Party have explained at a news conference why they adopted a decree with the demand that Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic, submit his resignation. Here is a report by Nebojsa Spajic:

[Begin Spajic recording] The Democrats think that ruling politicians have suffered a total defeat in all areas and it is therefore necessary for Slobodan Milosevic, president of the republic, to resign and for elections to be scheduled immediately for a constituent assembly.

This decree, which is open for signatures, will be made available to all citizens and parties this week, it was said at the meeting. A report will be made known on 9 March on the results of the collection of signatures. The question remains unresolved as to how the report will be publicized. The possibilities range from the publication of a statement to holding rallies and demonstrations.

The representatives of the Democratic Party explained that they are making this demand because the resolution to the crisis is only now in sight. In answer to the question of whether they are accusing Milosevic of

starting or (?losing) the war, they did not give a specific reply. The Democrats think that the present authorities have betrayed the national program and abandoned the idea that all Serbs be in one state. They have also increased unemployment and inflation and decreased the standard of living and security.

The Democrats explained that they are not abandoning their national program, even though they are advocating the recognition of Serbia within its present borders. They say, therefore, that solutions should not be imposed on the Serbs outside Serbia but create a Serbian state that would be a foundation for resolving the state issue of the Serbs.

Journalists at the news conference were given this party's declaration on Serbia, which contained a section on Kosovo and Metohija, which is a new element in the already well-known proposal for this document. This section says that the present way of solving the problems in this province has pushed this part of Serbia into total political and economic collapse; the emigration of Serbs has not stopped, and the ruling party has caused a rift among Serbs.

Reporters were also given a statement concerning the commentary by Mila Stula and Ratko Dmitrovic on the news programs of Belgrade and Novi Sad Television. Dragoljub Micunovic, party president, announced the possibility that because of these commentaries, which he called warmongering and said were written without any foundation in fact, he would resign from the managing committee of Serbia Radio and Television of which he is a member. [end recording]

DS Leader Comments on Resignation

LD1102223492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2011 GMT 11 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 11 (TANJUG)—Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, the head of Serbia's Democratic Party (DS), said today his party's proclamation, issued on Monday, asking Serbia's public to support a demand for the resignation of republican President Slobodan Milosevic and the calling of elections for a constituent assembly was a test which should show who was now thinking as a patriot and supporter of the opposition.

Stressing at a news conference held here today that the moment was right for "testing the mood of the people in this legitimate manner," Micunovic the many changes that had taken place gave good grounds for concluding that the people did not think the same as they did a year ago. [sentence as received].

"We expected the authorities themselves to raise the question of their own confidence," he said, adding that the authorities had betrayed the national programme in giving up the idea of a democratic federation—an optimal solution—while the promised prosperity in Serbia had never materialized.

Micunovic pointed out that the Democratic Party had never been ambivalent to Cyrus Vance's plan and that it believed that all those the plan concerned had a right to know what would happen to them once the "Blue Helmets" were gone and who would decide when they would depart.

The DS has also said it will mark the anniversary of the March 9 opposition demonstrations, and that agreement on this will be reached with others who took part in the protest last year.

Deputy Memic Comments on Assembly Expulsion

92BA0478A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 92 pp 30-31

[Interview with Mahmut Memic, deputy in the Serbian Assembly, by Marijana Milosavljevic; place and date not given: "I Am Only Afraid of God"—first paragraph is NIN introduction]

[Text] "The reason for this persecution of me (by the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]) is my opposition to taking a position on the absolute autonomy of Sandzak. I think that it was impossible to carry out this referendum without the consent and participation of the other peoples who would be living in that possible state.... The democratic way is for everyone, including the Serbs, to take part in such a referendum, with the approval of the authorities...."

Mahmut Memic is the first deputy in the Serbian Assembly who has been expelled from his own party. In a subsequent announcement, his SDA wrote: "We believe that one day Memic will also realize that he was an expendable person. Have a good trip, Mr. Deputy, to the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] benches; you have also sat there in the past."

The announcement explains the essence of the conflict. Sulejman Ugljanin and the group around him are seeking a "Sandzak Republic," while the more moderate members of the SDA are insisting on the peaceful coexistence of Serbs and Muslims. The second group is headed by people's deputy, lawyer, and prominent resident of Novi Pazar Mahmut Memic.

At one time it even appeared that each side would go its own way. In the meantime, Memic has acted as an independent deputy and joined the deputies' club of the Democratic Party. Then, at a public trial last week organized by the SDA, he was informed that "he has seven days, no more or less, to withdraw from the Serbian Assembly."

The ultimatum has expired.

[Milosavljevic] Last week, at the Culture Center in Novi Pazar, you were virtually put on trial. How did that happen?

[Memic] The reason, naturally, was my opposition to taking a stand on the absolute autonomy of Sandzak. I

think that it was impossible to hold that referendum without the consent and participation of the other peoples who would be living in that possible state. I tried several times to explain that this was feasible, through legal Assembly procedure. And no one can know whether the results of the referendum would be positive. The democratic way is for everyone, including the Serbs, to take part in the referendum, with the approval of the authorities. I have also personally worked to create some form of cultural autonomy.

[Milosavljevic] The SDA has decided that you should submit your resignation within a period of seven days. Have there been any specific criticisms of your work?

[Memic] At the above-mentioned meeting, all sorts of things were being said about me. I was proclaimed a traitor to the Muslim people because, they say, I spoke against the interests of that people. Furthermore, their key argument was my firm disassociation from the autonomy of Sandzak, which, in their opinion, is the main issue for the Muslim people.

[Milosavljevic] How is it that the campaign against you has only culminated now, three months after the referendum was held in Sandzak?

[Memic] Yes, this was quite interesting. I do not have any proof, but it seems to me that the witch hunt occurred because some of the party's leaders were arrested a few days ago, for smuggling weapons. Two of them are currently in jail in Titovo Uzice, where criminal proceedings have been instituted against them. I assume that the ultimatum and the unprecedented campaign against me are actually aimed at turning the attention of the people of Sandzak away from that event.

[Milosavljevic] Has the long-announced "shadow government" begun to function in Sandzak?

[Memic] Believe me, I do not know anything about that. The leading members of the SDA are making an effort to keep such information out of my reach. They are managing to do it. Naturally, it is clear to them that I am opposed to any sort of parallel government.

[Milosavljevic] After everything that has happened, are you satisfied with the Democratic Party's support?

[Memic] They were the first to help me in these difficult times. At their own initiative, they announced that they were against the Stalinist methods that were being used against me. The Democratic Party has fully supported my political action, which it asserted was leading to rapprochement between the Serbian and Muslim peoples.

[Milosavljevic] Back on 1 August 1991, you sent an open letter to your constituents and to the SDA president himself, which said, among other things, that you were sincerely afraid that the knowledge and ability of Mr. Ugljanin were modest, and that with all due respect, he should be thanked for his work to date. Aren't you now suffering the consequences of such an attitude?

[Memic] In the letter, I asserted that it was essential that everything that was being undertaken be done by legal means. This was because in the beginning, they advocated a state within a state; as a lawyer, it was clear to me that they were thus working against the territorial integrity of Serbia, and that, of course, is prohibited by the law and the constitution. The consequences would inevitably have been a ban on the party's work, its dissolution, and the possible arrest of the initiators. I wrote the letter in order to help the party. I am responsibly maintaining that many citizens of Sandzak think as I do, but do not dare to say so publicly. In spite of all this, I have emphasized several times that Ugljanin has done a great deal that is positive for the Muslim people, and will certainly be remembered in the history of the Yugoslav Muslims. It is precisely for this reason that I called his attention to the mistakes in the party. Ugljanin and his colleagues were afraid after this that I had the intention of replacing him, which I denied later in a private meeting. My wish was to help.

[Milosavljevic] You were the initiator of the formation of the Assembly delegation that visited Sandzak. How would you comment on the subsequent statement by Mr. Bogdanovic about the abolition of the SDA?

[Memic] I was pleased that the delegation also included representatives of the opposition parties DS [Democratic Party] and SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement]; this contributed significantly to the quality of the work. After all, we agreed that the crudely formulated statements that economic and cultural genocide had been committed against that people were not entirely correct. Naturally, some areas are backward, for instance Tugina and Sjenice. There would also be some criticisms of the delegation's report, however. The coordinator of the parliamentary group, Mr. Bogdanovic, without any authorization from the other members, stated that he would propose a ban on the party's work, and subsequent measures to be undertaken against its leadership. After that, I spoke with the chairman of the Committee for International Relations, Radomir Tesic, and with Mr. Cindzic, and they disassociated themselves from that opinion. Such a conclusion is not mentioned anywhere in the draft of the parliamentary group's official report.

[Milosavljevic] Mr. Bogdanovic, on that occasion, cited Serbia's Law on Political Organizations, which provides for a ban on the activity of a party that causes interethnic conflicts. Can that be said today of the SDA?

[Memic] Democracy is in its infancy here, and we are all pioneers in this work. No one is infallible. Let us recall how many times Seselj made threats, or how much Vuk Draskovic threatened Muslims in his former activity. Didn't those threats disrupt interethnic relations? It would be unjust to use such a Stalinist method to eliminate the SDA or any other party.

[Milosavljevic] Is a people's historical memory a sufficient basis for seeking territorial autonomy? Can the

demand by the people of Sandzak be compared with the aspirations of the Serbs in Croatia?

[Memic] Unfortunately, there is an intolerance between the Serbs and Croats that has now flared up again. In contrast to the Croats, Muslims are much more mixed with the Serbs, and that hatred does not exist among them. In his book "Genocide Against the Muslims," Dedijer writes that in 1941 Ante Pavelic sent an Ustasa battalion to Foca, dressed in Muslim clothing, to conduct a massacre of Serbs. The whole time they kept shouting to each other, "Strike him, Mujo!" and "Cut his throat, Haso!" The consequences were that the Cetnik Pavle Djurisic's vengeance against the Muslims assumed the characteristics of genocide. Now that all those facts are known, I hope that no one will allow anyone from Croatia or Europe to do anything like that to us again.

[Milosavljevic] The SDA leaders claim that Sandzak is currently under occupation by the police and JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] units....

[Memic] I do not think that those claims are true. After the announcement by the SDA leadership that it would no longer recognize the legal authorities and that it would establish a "state within a state," the militia were reinforced and the leaders of the SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs] in Novi Pazar were replaced. It is also true that the army was withdrawn from the barracks and that weapons and equipment were purchased partly with funds from the opstina's territorial defense budget. In response to a deputy's question that I raised in connection with those events, I received the answer that this was under the jurisdiction of the federal authorities, and not the republic ones. I hear that a similar thing is happening in other cities, even where the majority population is Serbian.

[Milosavljevic] Is it difficult to establish political communication with the present regime in Serbia?

[Memic] The SDA leadership criticized me several times for ingratiating myself with the SDS and minimizing the problem of Sandzak. It is my nature that I always emphasize what is good in some policy, and thus in the SDS's policy as well. For example, President Milosevic emphasized that the Muslims are a nation with which the Serbs are mostly living in good-neighborly and friendly relations. That cannot be called a coalition between me and the socialists.

[Milosavljevic] The ultimatum that your former party has set for you has expired. Do you perceive any change in the situation, or indication that something will happen? You have even been threatened with physical liquidation....

[Memic] Anything can happen, naturally. I am not afraid of it, however. I am only afraid of God. I am also being helped in holding out to the end by the support of my family, as well as the legacy left me by my father. He died last year, and was considered one of the most prominent and most influential Muslims, not just in Sandzak, but also in Yugoslavia.

[Milosavljevic] Sulejman Ugljanin, however, very often claims in the news media that you have betrayed that legacy....

[Memic] That is very interesting. How can he know better than I what my father told me? He told me that we should not engage in conflicts, and not develop intolerance among peoples. I assert that I have not betrayed that, and I think that I am correctly and consistently defending the interests of my people.

Kosovo

Separatists Increase Personal Arms

92BA0452B Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Jan 92 p 18

[Article by Milovan Milutinovic: "How the Albanian Separatist Alternative Is Being Armed: Weapons Are the Most Sought-After Commodity"—first paragraph is NARODNA ARMIJA headline]

[Text] Albanian national separatists are obtaining as many arms as possible so that they can achieve greater Albanian goals set long ago. Individuals coming from crisis areas are bringing weapons, munitions, and bombs, and selling them under the counter for foreign exchange. During searches of the apartments of former officials and militiamen of the PSUP [Provincial Secretariat of Internal Affairs]-Kosovo, certain quantities of various types of weapons and ammunition have been found.

The difficult situation in the Kosmet is being constantly aggravated by the increasingly manifested arming of Albanian national separatists who, preparing themselves for the opening of a "southern front," are attempting to obtain as many arms as possible so that they can achieve greater Albanian goals set long ago.

Security organs are succeeding daily in uncovering individuals who have armed themselves illegally and whose arms represent a constant threat to people's security. Thus, through the actions of special units of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Serbia, more than 400 different pistols, about 80 automatic rifles, 100 different hunting rifles, 20 Kalashnikovs of Bulgarian and Albanian make, 10 submachine guns of German make, several dozen hand bombs, mines, explosive devices and detonating rods for mines, and over 10,000 pieces of various types of ammunition were confiscated during 1991.

A battalion could arm itself with the arms taken; this certainly represents a great success for the security organs. The arms were taken mainly during routine checks, and unknown quantities during searches of the apartments of extremist individuals. Weapons have become the most sought-after commodity in the Kosmet;

many are caught through various means while being smuggled or sold at a high price.

The Dirty Affairs of War Profiteers

The captured arms include domestic, German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Albanian products. Large quantities of ammunition are usually found with the weapons. As always, every war has profiteers, as does this one. Individuals are coming to the Kosmet from crisis areas, bringing weapons, ammunition, and bombs, and selling them under the counter for foreign exchange. It is unfortunate that among them are individuals of Serbian, Montenegrin, and Muslim nationality. However, blinded by money, they do not think about how these same weapons can also be used against them.

During a routine traffic check, a Kalashnikov of Bulgarian make and 30 cartridges were found in the automobile of Muhamet Halitaj from Djakovica. During a search of the automobile of Binak Gasij from Surka near Klina, a Thompson submachine gun and 31 cartridges were found, while Sefedin Budrij had a CZ pistol, a number of cartridges, and two red caps with two-headed eagles and the motto "the Republic of Kosovo."

During a search of Sokolj Gasij from Pec, a military rifle of Italian make and five cartridges were found. Two pistols and a rifle with ammunition were found in the possession of Ram Berisa and Redzepij Nimon from Pristina, and two TT pistols with ammunition in the possession of Sadik Hisenij from Majenca. A "Turkish-hamarlez" military rifle was found in the possession of Redzep Dervisaj from Pec, and two pistols with a magazine of ammunition in the possession of Ajmon Baljaj. All these weapons were found in the possession of people who did not have permits for them.

In following the activities and actions of individuals, security organs have periodically come upon certain information about people who could have certain arms. After a search of houses and apartments, a certain number of various arms were found for which there were no appropriate permits from authorized organs.

During a search of the house of Fljamur Berisa in Veliki Djurdjevki near Klina, a pistol with two magazines of ammunition, an M-48 military rifle with 16 cartridges, and a hunting rifle were found, for which he did not possess a permit. During a search of the house of Samija Balupaj in Istok, three pistols, a hunting carbine, two hand-operated radios with chargers for radio batteries, and handcuffs were found. The objects found serve as a warning that this is an organizer of Albanian national separatists, who uses radios to communicate with certain people.

Propaganda Material With Weapons

During a search of the house of Skender Nezirij in Gnjilan, 675 7.65-mm cartridges, 478 9-mm cartridges, and 40 7.9-mm cartridges were found; they had been buried in the yard of the house, well concealed, and wrapped in nylon bags to prevent corrosion. In the house of Bajr Isku in Punosevac near Djakovica, a pistol and 146 9-mm cartridges were found, and two military rifles and two pistols with 200 cartridges were found in the house of Hasim Jakup in Baovac near Podujevo. During the questioning of the suspects, all explained that they had bought the weapons from unknown persons and were going to use them in game poaching!

A military rifle and several dozen cartridges were found in the chimney of the house of Adem Nuredin in Guvno near Lipljano. During a search of the apartment of Delija Ramadan in Pristina, a carbine with 100 cartridges and an Italian pistol with several dozen cartridges were found. Security organs found a military rifle, a Colt revolver, two pistols, and several dozen pieces of various ammunition in the house of the Tus family in the village of Solnice near Kacanik, while two pistols with ammunition magazines were found in the apartment of Ajmon Baljaj in Pristina.

During searches of the apartments and houses of former officials and militiamen of the PSUP-Kosovo, certain quantities of various types of arms and ammunition have been found. Thus, a Kalashnikov with 120 cartridges, a Bokerica hunting rifle with 50 cartridges, and a Beretta pistol with 10 cartridges were found in the possession of Braim Krasnicij, a former militiaman from Dusanovo near Prizren. During a search of the apartment of Veselj Krasnicij, a former director of the CB [Central Bureau] of Prizren, a Smith & Wesson pistol, a Beretta automatic pistol, a Hekler, an automatic rifle and a hunting rifle, and numerous types of ammunition and bayonets were found—all without permits. During a search of the house of Atim Jahija in Rapac near Dragas, a hunting rifle, 60 cartridges, a large quantity of propaganda material (cassettes, books, video cassettes, brochures, and pamphlets with a hostile content). In addition to a hunting rifle, numerous types of ammunition and a large quantity of cassettes with a hostile content were found in the possession of Daut Recaj from Korican near Prizren. During a search of the apartment of Safet Hodza in Kosovska Mitrovica, in addition to a pistol of Hungarian make and large quantities of various types of ammunition, various types of propaganda material were found, as well as several dozen unsolved files dealing with criminal acts by members of the Albanian nationality.

Slovenia

Japanese Envoy Promises Economic Cooperation

LD1002231292 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 10 Feb 92

[Text] Japan will in the future be one of the most important Slovene economic partners and investors. This was emphasized today in Ljubljana by Feri Horvat, chairman of the Chamber of Economy of Slovenia, and Japanese Ambassador Taizo Nakamura. They agreed that it was necessary to create as soon as possible an

economic system which will be attractive to foreign partners as would-be investors.

They also discussed economic assistance to Slovenia, better mutual information, and the opening of a Japanese economic mission in Slovenia and a Slovene mission in Japan.

Ambassador Nakamura was also received by Milan Kucan, president of the Presidency of Slovenia, and Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel.

Rail Link With Hungary May Reopen

92BA0454C Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
24 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Dusan Grca: "Will Slovenia and Hungary Be Linked by a Railroad?"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] The ministry, the port, ZG [the Railroad Industry], and Splosna Plovba [General Shipping] are thinking seriously about building a railroad line; international loan?

Koper, 23 Jan—After the 24 years that have passed since Slovenes "lost" a direct railroad link to Hungary, will a decision on restoring it finally be made? The Ministry for Transportation and Communications of the Republic of Slovenia thinks that this is one of the elements within the framework of Slovenia's opening up to the neighboring states (and beyond), and has also included this in a document on Slovenia's future transportation policy.

At today's meeting in Koper—in which representatives of the above-mentioned ministry, the Koper Port, the Railroad Industry, several shippers, and Splosna Plovba of Piran participated—support was given in principle to the fairly old project for a railroad link with Hungary through Slovene territory, and it was decided that possible organizational forms for the investments should be determined as soon as possible (whether it should be headed by a stock company, a consortium, or someone else), and, of course, first of all a final commitment on the route of the railroad link should be obtained from the government (both Slovene and Hungarian). As stated by the ZG representative, three alternative routes have been considered together with Hungarian colleagues, and the most acceptable of all was considered to be the route along the Murska Sobota-Puconci-Mackovci-Martinje-Szentgottgard line. This is a railway section 38.3 kilometers long, which would have to be built virtually from the beginning (in fact, the route between Murska Sobota and Mackovci is no longer usable, and in one way or another the tracks were taken elsewhere 24 years ago); 21.3 kilometers of this railroad line would be in Slovenia, and 17 kilometers in Hungary. According to experts' assessments, $58-60 million would have to be allocated for this construction, and if this step were to be decided upon this year, approximately three years would be needed from the detailed designs to the final execution.

Since this project, in the final analysis, also received quite concrete business support at today's meeting in Koper, one can expect faster and concrete involvement at the government level as well. Slavko Hanzel, a representative of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, said among other things that interest in this rail link was also being shown by partners in Italy (it would also be possible to obtain some nonrepayable funds to cover the investment), and that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was also showing interest in the project, and that the Hungarians were also expressing their interest in view of the interesting nature of this transportation route. In short, there is a great deal of interest, and it is time for us to create a new, competitive corridor for the 3 million tons of goods traveling across Slovenia (with a "detour" through Croatia) to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and also the East, of course. The Koper Port is extremely interested in this, and director Rudi Duje said that it is prepared to contribute a million dollars to the stock company or consortium (however the entity responsible for the investment will be constituted; proposals for this are to be prepared by the end of February). Other participants in the meeting also expressed willingness to contribute money, aware of the fact that the initiators of the project would have to provide at least 20 percent of the projected value (in this regard, they are also expected $4-5 million in Hungarian capital) of the investment, and thus, with a sufficient amount of their own funds, they have also asked for an international loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

With respect to the investment in this part of the railway line, the investors should also be aware that there will probably not be any direct profits from the scarcely 38-kilometer-long section, and that their contribution to the investment will be repaid in the long term and in several ways. It is only necessary to hurry, since some people think that we have been considerably delayed in implementing this project.